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The topic of whistleblowing is achieving unprecedented prominence in official reports, 
publications, research, legislation and the media. Some influential voices are 
suggesting that far from whistleblowing - informing on organizations that commit 
. illegal or unethical acts - being subversive and undesirable, it may in certain 
circumstances deserve high praise. Inevitably it entails huge risks, and these risks 
need to be personally and carefully considered.
The first part of this thesis examines the case of external audit, a close cousin of 
internal audit. There should be fewer opportunities for the external auditor to blow the 
whistle, although such instances are likely to be highly material. There has been much 
international debate on the role and purpose of external audit, and this has tended to 
exclude whistleblowing. However there are winds of change, and tightening of 
legislation and recent ethical guidance suggests that there are occasions when 
whistleblowing is either required or seriously to be contemplated.
Attention then turns to the central theme of internal audit. For practitioners the issue is 
far from clear-cut, and the Code of Ethics of the Institute of Internal Auditors and its 
other guidance is found to be ambiguous and even prejudicial to the interests of the 
individual member. Case studies of internal audit wlustleblowing highlight the issues. 
Participant observation and social audit are explored, since both result in die possession 
insights that are the substance from which whistleblowing revelations are derived.
Generalized examples of whistleblowing are then presented to shed light on the wider 
context. Disaster situations by their life-threatening nature receive more widespread 
assent as to their societal value . The extent of legal protection for whistleblowers 
follows. Finally come criteria for valid forms of whistleblowing, the formulation of 
codes of ethics for whistleblowers, and suggest the way forward for the internal audit 
profession.
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SCOPE OF THESIS.
The topic of whistleblowing is achieving unprecedented prominence in official reports, 
publications, research, legislation and in the media. Some influential voices are 
suggesting that far from whistleblowing - informing on organizations that commit 
illegal or unethical acts - being a subversive and undesirable act, it may in certain 
circumstances be an activity deserving high praise. Inevitably it entails huge risks, and 
these risks need to be personally and carefully considered. Some whistleblowers may 
be described as activists, but others fall less willingly into the role, with the force of 
circumstances being the precipitating factor. John Banham, Director General of the 
Confederation of British Industry, wrote in support of the Social Audit report on the 
subject (Winfield 1990), and a government- established committee has suggested the 
possibility of honouring whistleblowers in the British Honours system for their good 
corporate citizenship.
The first part of this treatise examines the case of external audit, which is a close cousin 
of internal audit, albeit with a much more restricted scope than internal audit which is 
not just concerned with the year-end financial accounts. This means that there should be 
fewer opportunities for the external auditor to blow the whistle, although such instances 
are likely to be highly material. There has been much international debate on the role 
and purpose of external audit, and this has tended to exclude whistleblowing. However 
there are winds of change, and tightening of legislation and recent ethical guidance 
suggests that there are occasions when whistleblowing is either required or seriously to 
be contemplated.
Attention then turns to the central theme of internal audit, which seems far more 
resistant on this point in terms of the professional guidance issued. For the troops on 
the ground the issue is far from clear-cut, and the Code of Ethics of the Institute of 
Internal Auditors and its other guidance is found to be ambiguous and even prejudicial 
to the interests of the individual member. Some case studies of internal audit 
whistleblowing highlight the issues raised. The topics of participant observation and 
social a:udit are explored, since both result in the possession of knowledge and insights 
that are the substance from which whistleblowing revelations are derived. It is often by 
being a participant observer that one gains the insights into the reality of situations that 
then becomes the impetus to whistleblowing. Social audit, as its name implies, takes 
the auditor into areas in which the wider social impact of the organization is explored, 
and in which matters of serious concern are more likely to surface. It involves greater 
risk - and maybe opportunity - to both auditor and organization.. -
Generalized examples of whistleblowing are then presented in order to shed light on the 
wider context, followed by a consideration of disaster situations which by their life- 
threatening nature may receive more widespread assent as to their societal value . The 
extent of legal protection for whistleblowers is then treated. Finally we provide criteria 
for valid forms of whistleblowing, the formulation of codes of ethics for 
whistleblowers, and suggest the way forward for the internal audit profession.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
"If everybody minded their own business", said the Duchess in a hoarse growl, the 
world would go round a deal further than it does".
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland
Whistleblowing is a new name for an ancient practice. It may be dated in history from 
the development of the concept of individualism. In the Middle East this was largely 
lacking until the eighth century before Christ, and the Hebrew prophets around this 
time, such as Hosea and Amos (Anderson 1967). They did not hesitate to criticise 
rulers and their social injustices, and risked their lives in so doing:
" Forasmuch therefore as your treading is upon the poor, and you take from them 
wheat: You have built houses of hewn stone, but you shall not dwell in them; you have 
planted pleasant vineyards, but you shall not drink wine of them. For I Know of your 
many transgressions and your mighty sins: they afflict the just, they take a bribe, and 
they turn aside the poor in the gate from their rights." (Amos 5: 11-12).
The lamentations of the prophet Jeremiah are another example, with the prophet daring 
to castigate God for having set him up to have to bear so many torments and 
tribulations (Birmingham 1956, Skinner 1963). He has his own sense of dignity and 
worth that is not immersed into the collectivity of the organic state (Wayper 1973) or of 
the deity. Prior to this period we find that:
" The basic phenomenon peculiar to man is the consciousness of responsibility. In 
primitive man this is directly expressed as. collective responsibility, in which the 
consciousness of the I remains uncertain and weakly developed. Only when 
responsibility breaks through the collective constraint and releases the individual from
his circle, making him rely on himself as a responsible individual, is it possible for full 
personal consciousness to awaken." , . (Eichrodt 1966).
The awakening has happened at different times in different places. Even in relatively 
unawakened countries, such as the People's Republic of China, there are pockets of 
whistleblowers, called counter-revolutionaries by the authorities, which is the Chinese 
name for treason. In the West, the history of non-conformity witnesses the blossoming 
of individualism, and the consequent increased possibility of whistleblowing. 
Whistleblowing that leads to the possibility of revolution led to fears that the social 
gospel of Methodism, even though by contemporary standards not that strong, might 
prompt an offshoot of the French Revolution in Britain (Harrison 1961,172-173).
There is also a long-established literary genre that often entails an element of 
whistleblowing. This may be discerned in the Confessions of St. Augustine of around 
400 A.D. Although it is mainly confessions of personal short-comings, it does not 
hesitate to reveal and castigate the pretensions of Faustus, the Manichean doctor, and 
the fraud which the scholars at Rome use against their masters - transfering from one to 
the other just before the fee is due. (Hudleston 1957, 114-123, 131-132). Pascal, 
writing in the 17th century, and in the line of the so-called Christian apologists, wishes 
to take the lid off religions seen as inimical to Christianity, especially Islam (Pascal 
1966). Kierkegaard, in the next century, launches into a personal attack on Victor 
Hugo, based on information privileged to the circle in which he moved (Dm 1958, 
180-181), and these were early examples of what eventually became investigative 
journalism, and which relies heavily on whistleblowers. So-called exposure texts on 
freemasonry are an example ( Knight 1985).
It is particularly germane to examine whistleblowing in external and internal audit, since
the professionals who inhabit these areas are regularly privy to secrets of the highest 
magnitude, the improper revelation of which could do great harm to the organisations to 
which they relate. Such inner intelligence may place receivers in a serious ethical and 
professional dilemma where they regard it in the public interest to reveal what has been 
discovered. The extent of such potential outpourings has become the more likely in that
we live in what has been described as an audit explosion and an audit society :
* ,
"The word 'audit' is being used in the UK with growing frequency. In addition to 
financial audits, there are now environmental audits, value for money audits, 
management audits, forensic audits, data audits, intellectual property audits, medical 
audits, teaching audits, technology audits, stress audits, democracy audits and many 
others besides. More generally, the spread of audits and quality assurance initiatives 
means that many individuals and organisations find themselves subject to audit for the 
first time and, notwithstanding protest and complaint, have come to think of themselves 
as auditees. Indeed there is a real sense in which 1990s Britain has become an audit 
society'." (Power 1994).
There are now many more individuals that possess sensitive information, and so the 
potential for whistleblowing is at an all time high. Referring to professions, Metzger 
(1987,10) has stated that from an historical point of view, the dominant inclination of 
society was to " salute the professions as corporate guilds that protected civil morality 
and social solidarity from the corrosion of modem egotism"; Some may regard this 
Durkheimian type of view as overstating the contemporary role of the profession, but 
on the other hand professions are giving unprecedented emphasis to ethical 
considerations, partly under the weight of regulatory pressure, some emanating from 
the European Union. . " '
The impetus for the research was reading the attacks on internal audit whistleblowers 
by Courtemanche (1986, 1988, 1989), and the lack of any support for them through 
their professional association. The definition of the Institute of Internal Auditors Inc 
(HA Inc) Position Paper on Whistleblowing (Internal Auditor, December 1988, p i6, 
see Appendix A ) is :
"The unauthorised dissemination by internal auditors of audit results, findings, 
opinions, or information acquired in the course of performing their duties to anyone 
outside the organisation or to the general public."
Whistleblowers seemed to be upholding their professional obligations, yet were often 
suffering the double ignominy of loss of employment and censure, generally implicit, 
from the professional body. Given the public interest involved in hearing the 
revelations of whistleblowers, it seemed worthy of research effort to dig deeper with 
the basic aim of discovering whether there was a case for revising HA policy. To this 
end it was decided to:
(i) examine whistleblowing in the analogous professional area of external auditing.
(ii) review and critique official HA policy.
(iii) discover cases of internal audit whistleblowing to see official policy at work in the 
real world.
(iv) consider the model of participant observation, as being an analogy easily fitting the 
internal audit role, and being a context in which the sort of information which may give 
rise to whistleblowing is more likely to be discovered.
(v) investigate the concept of social auditing as being the type of auditing which 
intentionally involves itself in areas which, if not resolved, can easily result in 
whistleblowing activity.
(vi) paint the wider canvass of whistleblowing outside audit, including disaster 
situations,with examples, in order to shed light on what the policy response should be 
within audit contexts.
(vii) consider the efficacy of legal protection for whistleblowing.
(viii) look at the possibility of introducing codes of ethics to help to resolve 
whistleblowing situations.
(ix) in the light of this research endeavour to draw overall conclusions as to the way 
forward for the internal auditing profession as to whether it should be able to 
accommodate whistleblowing.
Our discussion falls into several parts. We start in chapter 2 by outlining definitions 
found in the literature. Chapter 3 discusses the external auditor and the development 
through which a hundred years' tradition of outlawing whistleblowing has recently 
undergone gentle erosion. We then turn to internal auditing, and consider whether the 
HA Position Paper should be regarded as the last word on the subject, and examine 
actual incidents of internal audit whistleblowing. We consider the added opportunities 
provided for whistleblowing through participant observation and social audits. This is 
followed by a review of the experiences of whistleblowers in other professional areas 
and in disaster situations. Finally we look at the legal protection available to 
whistleblowers, the formulation of codes of ethics, before we draw conclusions as to 
the future of whistleblowing.
CHAPTER 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this chapter a series of definitions is presented before the definition adopted by the 
HA is considered. It is argued that this definition is inadequate and ill-considered. Even 
the HA-UK has found it necessary to amend the definition. Finally a definition is 
presented which is more comprehensive.
The first time that the term whistleblowing' is believed to have been attached to a case 
was the 1963 publicity surrounding Otto Otopeka (Petersen and Farrell 1986,2-3). He 
gave classified documents concerning security risks in the new administration to the 
chief counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. The then Secretary of 
State, Dean Rusk, dismissed him from his job in the States Department for conduct 
unbecoming a State Department officer. Alternative terms for whistleblowing may be 
conscientious objector (Beardshaw 1981), ethical resister (Glazer and Glazer 1989), 
mole or informer (Benson 1985 ), concerned employee (Thompson 1987), rats (quoted 
in Orr 1981) or licensed spy (Clitheroe 1986).
Definitions tend to be scarce. Often a series of examples are provided from which a 
definition is to be assumed. State official secrets acts provide some boundaries at the 
extremes, and in the USA we have the First Amendment to the Constitution 
("....Freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances ") (Bems 1965), 
and the Fourteenth (life, liberty and property not to be deprived without due process of 
law, and equal protection of the laws for all), as well as numerous sections of acts 
which are loosely referred to as whistleblower acts, but which do not use the term. 
They tend to talk about employee disclosure of information, although the False Claims 
Act (31 u s e  3734) does use the header "Whistleblower Protection" (Kohn and Kohn
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1986). Beyond this, we enter the murky and uncertain area of employment law.
Whatever the legal phraseology, whistleblowing is the term used in the debate on the 
subject. A quick survey of some of the definitions in use reveals both the variability and 
the loose way in which they have been spawned :
"The employee is said to have blown the whistle' when, without support or authority 
from his supervisors, he independently makes known concerns to individuals outside 
the organization." (Chalk and von Hippel 1979)
"Whistleblowers sound an alarm from within the very organization in which they work, 
aiming to spotlight neglect or abuses that threaten the public interest." (Bok 1980a)
"Whistleblowing is an attempt by a member or former member of an organization to 
bring illegal or socially harmful activities of the organization to the attention of the 
public. " (James 1980)
In a second bite of the cherry, James (1994) provides a slightly more general definition 
in terms of wrongdoing :
"Whistleblowing may be defined as the attempt by an employee or former employee of 
an organization to disclose what he or she believes to be wrongdoing in or by the 
organization."
"Whistleblowers, as we know, are employees who believe their organization is 
engaged in illegal, dangerous, or unethical conduct. Usually, they try to have such 
conduct corrected through inside complaint, but if it is not, the employee turns to
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government authorities or the media and makes the charge public." (Westin 1981)
"Whistle-blowing is a term that has come to mean informing persons outside the 
company - usually government regulators or authorities - about suspected 
wrongdoing." (Willson and Root 1989)
Another writer takes two bites of the cherry, starting with an approximate definition 
before moving on to a final, even if somewhat unwieldy definition. The initial 
definition is :
"As a first approximation, whistleblowing can be defined as the release of information 
by a member or former member of an organization that is evidence of illegal and/or 
immoral conduct in the organization or conduct in the organization which is not in the 
public interest." (Boatright, 1993, 131)
Following discussion of a number of pertinent issues, Boatright posits his final 
definition:
"Whistleblowing is the voluntary release of nonpublic information, as a moral protest, 
by a member or former member of an organization outside the normal channels of 
communication to an appropriate audience about illegal and/or immoral conduct in the 
organization or conduct in the organization that is opposed in some significant way to 
the public interest." (Boatright 1993,133)
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One definition is more permissive than some, but claims to be full and elemental :
"An act of whistleblowing occurs when;
1. an individual performs an action or series of actions intended to make information 
public;
2. the information is made a matter of public record;
3. the information is about possible or actual, nontrivial wrongdoing in an 
organization;
4. the individual who performs the action is a member or former member of the 
organization. (Elliston 1985,15).
The definition of the HA Inc Position Paper on Whistleblowing ( Appendix A ) is :
"The unauthorised dissemination by internal auditors of audit results, findings, 
opinions, or information acquired in the course of performing their duties to anyone 
outside the organisation or to the general public."
The HA Inc is the world-wide professional body with headquarters in Florida to which 
other national institutes are affiliated. However there has been a degree of U.S 
chauvinism since it is also the Institute for the U.S., where it was founded in New 
York in 1941. This began to change in 1993-1994 with a policy of globalisation and the 
internationalisation of committees. We can immediately see that this definition is of the 
class of one "introduced quickly and used carelessly" (Elliston 1985,4), and has none 
of the fullness of other definitions. It is so keen to damn whistleblowing from the 
outset that it is does not even bother to mention wrongdoing. This pale HA Inc 
definition may be amended to reflect the circumstances of the external auditor, but there 
will be some legal complexities involved in so doing, as well as ethical and professional
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judgements to be made. The Institute of Internal Auditors-UK (IIA-UK), originally a 
set of chapters of HA Inc starting in 1947, and an autonomous institute affiliated to HA 
Inc from 1976, issued in April 1994 a Professional Briefing Note entitled 
"Whistleblowing and the Internal Auditor" (Institute of Internal Auditors-UK 1994). 
This highlights inadequacies in the HA Inc definition with, it is argued, whistleblowing 
truly implying that the message being communicated relates to perceived wrongdoing of 
some form which had not previously been disclosed, as well as also applying to 
unauthorised communication within the entity. This leads to the IIA-UK modified 
definition :
"The unauthorised disclosure by internal auditors of audit results, findings, opinions, 
or information acquired in the course of performing their duties and relating to 
questionable practices."
' . (Institute of Internal Auditors-UK 1994,3)
For a fuller, more generalized definition, we may take the version that it is "the act of 
disclosing any information that an employee reasonably believes evidences a violation 
of any law, rule or regulation, mismanagement, corruption, abuse of authority, or 
threat to public health and safety at the worksite" (Peters and Branch 1972).
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CHAPTER 3. THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR
The external auditor is related to the internal auditor through standards and guidelines 
from both perspectives on the extent to which the two should cooperate and collaborate. 
Although the scope and purpose of each profession are different, there are enough 
similarities to make comparison useful. At the very least, if whistleblowing should be 
permitted for the external variety in areas of collaboration, the internal variety cannot 
avoid becoming implicated.
External auditors find early in their training that they are watchdogs and not 
bloodhounds (re. Kingston Cotton Mill Co (No2) 1896,2 Ch 279; Vinten 1989a) and, 
following the Caparo decision (Caparo Industries pic v. Dickman and others 1990 1 All 
ER 568; Mills 1990) the duty of care to third parties has been more closely defined, and 
thereby restricted. The Caparo case dictated that a duty of care was only owed to the 
current group of shareholders, and not third parties, whose identity could not be 
envisaged. Looking over the debates on the role of external auditors around the 
recessions of 1973-74, 1980-81 and 1990 onwards one immediately experiences deja 
vu. It is enlightening to look at the different waves, and the auditing reaction. The 
cynic will argue that plus ca change, mais c'est la meme chose: twenty years of non­
progress. The landmark reports of the period are the Corporate Report in the UK, the 
Cohen Committee Report in the US, and the Adams Committee Report in Canada 
(Accounting Standards Committee 1975; Cohen Committee 1978; Adams 1978; 
Gwilliam 1987, 110), all of which referred to the potential or actual expectations gap 
between auditors and their various publics. The cynic will dismiss these reports as 
inconsequential window-dressing exercises. Roger Adams reviewed the situation to 
the mid 1980's (Adams 1986), and the MacDonald Commission represented the latest 
Canadian thought on the matter (MacDonald Commission 1988).
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The optimist, with a belief in constant historical progress, will see auditors as becoming 
increasingly cautious with each recessionary wave. Each recession results in greater 
conflicts of interest between careful and critical auditors and their boards of directors, 
with pressure being applied on auditors as adverse results are being produced. The 
optimist will assert that the 1973-74 recession taught auditors some useful lessons 
which led to many more going concern qualifications in the subsequent recessions. 
This is an interesting hypothesis to investigate, although firms remain highly vulnerable 
in the light of the litigation explosion.
The realist, reading through two decades of Department of Trade and Industry 
Investigation reports (Sherer and Turley 1991) will recognise an auditing profession 
needing to tackle the self-same eternal issues, falling short of the mark on occasions, 
and indulging in a process that is over-secretive and involving boardroom politics rarely 
reported or commented on. There have been genuine professional advances, the 
establishment of the Auditing Practices Committee in 1976 being one, and although 
these various responses to each recessionary wave have represented progress, it may 
sometimes have seemed merely a slight advance on the efforts of a King Canute.
Cases such as Court Line in our first period are easily replicated by similar cases in our 
second and third period. There was an irony with the English and Welsh Institute of 
Chartered Accountants declaring that weaknesses in the audit of the final accounts of 
Court Line, the holiday group which failed in August 1974 leaving thousands of 
holidaymakers stranded, would be unlikely to recur.
It is difficult to find evidence that the underlying issue has changed by period two, 
although as in all periods, we can find occasional examples of an auditor being
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prepared to take a stand, Finnie Ross Allfields resigned from the Cope Sportswear 
audit in 1980 and two days before the AGM sent shareholders a long letter under 
section 16 of the 1976 Companies act. The letter, signed by Michael Freedman, 
Finnie's senior partner in Leeds, said: "We encountered extreme difficulty in 
persuading your directors to accept the very material amendments which we thought 
necessary."
The alterations which Finnies forced through and which led to their resignation 
included 'numerous adjustments to accounts of individual group companies' as well as 
additional provisions against debtors and also stock and work in progress of £115,000 
and £208,000. The adjustments 'ultimately gave rise to alterations totalling in excess of 
£1.325 million resulting in a pre-tax loss of £588,541.' The result was that the Cope 
board 'in view of these disagreements and the changing nature of the group' put 
forward Arthur Andersen as replacement.
"
It is informative to see how easy it is to change auditors in situations such as this. This 
lengthy explanation, which the 1976 Companies Act was designed to achieve, brought 
matters into the open, and was also the first occasion where the auditor's letter has 
revealed more about the background to the argument between auditors and board than 
there was in the original auditor's report. In that report Finnies revealed that there had 
been a breakdown in the accounting systems of a subsidiary and also said that loans to 
directors of £32,000 had contravened section 109 of the 1948 Companies Act. Section 
123 of the 1989 Companies Act inserted two new sections 394 and 394A into the 1985 
Companies Act and requires an auditor, ceasing to hold office for any reason, to 
deposit at the company.'s registered office a statement of any circumstances which he or 
she considers should be brought to the attention of the members or creditors. If there 
are none, then a statement to this effect has to be deposited. In the case of resignation,
17
such a statement is mandatory. There are also stipulations relating to notifying the 
Registrar of Companies, and those entitled to receive the accounts. This should rectify 
some of the previous abuses concerning changes of auditor.
> K. '
The traditional attitude appears in an influential report of the mid 1980s (Benson 1985). 
Although it refers to the recommendation of the Davison Committee, which had 
reported a month earlier in October 1985, that guidance from the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of England and Wales on the reporting of suspected fraud by clients 
should be revised in favour of reporting to the appropriate authorities ( Davison 1985 ), 
Lord Benson returned to the doctrine of near-absolute client confidentiality :
" If pressures are to be put upon the auditor which causes him to be regarded as a 
possible mole or informer with the result that he takes action without his client's 
knowledge, or when there is no dutv to do so, the integrity of the profession is 
destroyed. We believe that any move in this direction would meet with widespread 
objections, not only from auditors, but from the business community at large and from 
other professions, since such practices would need to be extended to the professions 
generally. "
It was therefore resolved that this should not happen unless two cardinal conditions 
t were fulfilled:
(a) The law or professional directive so demand; and
(b) The client is first informed.
18
3.1 THE WATERSHED.
In the present period it is possible that we have come to a watershed in which the rights 
and responsibilities of auditors is beginning to chrystalise in an unprecedented fashion. 
Eight factors are evidenced in support : '
1. There may be a gathering storm over the result in the Caparo decision (Caparo 
Industries pic v Dickman and others, House of Lords, 8th February 1990, 1 Ail ER 
568), which reversed the trend of third party liability law over the past half-century. 
Auditors now owe only a duty of care to the current group of shareholders as a class. 
This has also reversed the dichotomy of the auditing profession attempting to minimize 
liability contrasted with government, public and the judiciary seeking to enlarge it. For 
the time being it is auditors and judiciary versus public and government. However 
governments have ways of dealing with a rogue decision, and there is a trend in 
English legal refonn to codify so as to reduce the uncertainties introduced by an excess 
of judge-derived case law (Vinten 1990a).
2. The Auditing Practices Committee in its 1990 guideline on the auditor and fraud, five 
years in the making, and its exposure draft auditing guideline on the auditor's 
responsibility in relation to illegal acts, has come closer than ever before to permitting 
or at least condoning an element of whistle-blowing. One can but wonder if this is 
simply in reaction to the writing on the wall contained in the Financial Services Act 
1986, the Building Societies Act 1986 and the Banking Act 1987, which describe the 
circumstances in which auditors should go directly to the regulatory authorities to 
protect the interests of shareholders or depositors. Normally the auditor's first step is 
to alert the client's management to the existence of fraud or illegality. However, if 
senior managers or directors are involved or condoning such acts, the auditor may
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bypass the board of directors, even the non-executive directors and the audit committee, 
and report directly to the regulatory authorities. This may be justified where a material 
gain or loss is likely to result for any one person or group of people, or a fraud is likely 
to be repeated with impunity if not disclosed, or there is a general management ethic of 
flouting the law and regulations. All this is a great gain over the previous situation in 
which the only matter the auditor was required to report was treason - a topic untreated 
in auditing guidelines until the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales 
issued their Guidance on Professional Conduct for Members in Business on 9 January 
1991.
3. The politicians continue to express concern. With the widening of the expectations 
gap following the Caparo decision, the then corporate affairs minister was keen that 
auditors should not seek to take undue shelter behind it. Auditors should do more to 
reassure the public about the role they play in identifying fraud, Mr John Redwood, 
corporate affairs minister, said in a Department of Trade and Industry Press Release on 
8th October 1990 :
"Auditors have an immensely important role in the health of the business community 
and should be seeking ways to live up to the public's expectations," the minister said in 
an address to the Joint Council Conference of the UK's three institutes of chartered 
accountants. Mr Redwood alluded to the so-called "expectation gap", between what the 
public think auditors do and what auditors actually do. Under UK law, auditors are 
merely required to form an opinion as to whether accounts are "true and fair" and are 
not obliged to look for fraud. "Although it is right to remove popular 
misunderstandings. It would be wrong for the profession to focus on lowering 
expectations," the minister said. He added that the profession's move this year to define 
the circumstances in which the auditor should report fraud to regulatory bodies was a
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step in the right direction but was not enough. He offered no specific recommendations 
for future action but said he welcomed recent moves to overhaul the Auditing Practices 
Committee.
On the other side of the House we have Austin Mitchell, Labour MP for Great 
Grimsby, who criticizes the profession for putting profit before independence. He 
comments on how abuse of accounting standards, and by implication lax auditing, have 
contributed to corporate failures such as Coloroll and British and Commonwealth. 
Recommendations being considered are that: auditors of public companies should be 
rotated; accountancy firms should provide financial information about themselves; non­
audit services, notably management consultancy, should be curtailed; and that the 
profession should be regulated by a statutory body similar to the Office of 
Telecommunications (Oftel) which monitors the telecommunications industry.
4. The whistleblowing principle is now being countenanced as between fellow 
accountants, with a duty to inform on colleagues. Chartered accountants are obliged to 
"blow the whistle" on colleagues who are dishonest or do bad work, according to rules 
first published in draft on 8 October 1990 by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England & Wales.
The move, subsequently voted in by the Institute's membership of more than 90,000, 
came as part of a general overhaul of its disciplinary procedures. The institute 
envisaged appointing an independent ombudsman to review decisions of its 
Investigation Committee, and hoped to take on new powers to intervene in members’ 
practices. Under the rules, accountants are obliged to notify the Institute about 
"misconduct or probable misconduct" by fellow members. Previously, members 
reported on each other for unethical practice promotion, such as aggressive advertising.
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but not for potentially more serious matters. The rule applies to all chartered 
accountants, whether in practice or in industry, and is designed to strengthen the 
resolve of those who are in two minds about reporting on colleagues. It is also 
intended to demonstrate the willingness of the profession to deal with those who fall 
short of its standards.
Precisely what constitutes "misconduct" has yet to be defined. The term seems broad in 
scope, covering "all indictable offences" and therefore everything from murder to minor 
fraud. The Institute has said that the Law Society has had a similar rule in place for 
years and it gives rise to no difficulties in practice. The proposed independent 
ombudsman will adjudicate on cases where, after a complaint, the Institute's 
Investigation Committee has ruled that no prima facie case exists against a member. 
The Institute receives about 2,000 written complaints every year, of which only a 
handful are not resolved. The Institute is being given increased powers to take control 
of the affairs of accountants who commit serious criminal offences, suffer from "mental 
incapacity" or abandon their practice.
The proposals do not tackle the way in which Institute members are disciplined for 
serious frauds or crimes under the so-called Joint Disciplinary Scheme, which has been 
subject to another review. The new rules also include the power to order members to 
return papers and complete clients' work.
5. The higher standards that already pertain in the public sector, due to the greater need 
for accountability there, may act as a role model for the private sector. An example is 
the Audit Commission report 'in the public interest' to local tax payers.
6. The establishing of the Auditing Practices Board on 1st April 1991 heralded more
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than just cosmetic change to its predecessor, the Auditing Practices Committee, and 
indicated a serious intent to sort out the myriad of problems. One such was the very 
vagueness in the central concept of materiality (Lee 1984; Leslie 1985, Vinten and 
Chong 1994) which permits huge and material variations in actual practice of which 
readers of accounts are blissfully unaware. The less ethical client could well search out 
auditors with wider margins of materiality, and to call this the exercise of professional 
judgement debases the whole activity.
7. The prominent emphasis on the public interest in the International Federation of 
Accountants 'Guidelines on Ethics for Professional Accountants' of July 1990. The 
relevant section reads as follows:
"THE PUBLIC INTEREST . ^
A distinguishing mark of a profession is acceptance of its responsibility to the public. 
The accountancy profession's public consists of clients, credit grantors, governments, 
employers, employees, investors, the business and financial community, and others 
who rely on the objectivity and integrity of professional accountants to maintain the 
orderly functioning of commerce. This reliance imposes a public interest responsibility 
on the accountancy profession. The public interest is defined as the collective well­
being of Ae community of people and institutions the professional accountant serves.
A professional accountant's responsibility is not exclusively to satisfy the needs of an 
individual client or employer. The standards of the accountancy profession are heavily 
detennined by the public interest for example:
o independent auditors help to maintain the integrity and efficiency of the financial
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statements presented to financial institutions in partial support for loans and to 
stockholders for obtaining capital; o
o financial executives serve in various financial management capacities in 
organizations and contribute to the efficient and effective use of the organization's 
resources;
o internal auditors provide assurance about a sound internal control system which 
enhances the reliability of the external financial information of the employer; 
o tax experts help to establish confidence and efficiency in, and the fair application of, 
the tax system;
o management consultants have a responsibility towards the public interest in 
advocating sound management decision making.
Professional accountants have an important role in society. Investors, creditors, 
employers and other sectors of the business community, as well as the government and 
the public at large rely on professional accountants for sound financial accounting and 
reporting, effective financial management and competent advice on a variety of business 
and taxation matters. The attitude and behaviour of professional acccountants in 
providing such services have an impact on the economic well-being of their community 
and country.
Professional accountants can remain in this advantageous position only by continuing 
to provide the public with these unique services at a level which demonstrates that the 
public confidence is firmly founded. It is in the best interest of the worldwide 
accountancy profession to make known to users of the services provided by 
professional accountants that they are executed at the highest level of performance and 
in accordance with ethical requirements that strive to ensure such performance."
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Although much of this is reminiscent of the landmark reports referred to at the outset, 
the expression is more focused and concise, and is a useful statement of the issues 
being discussed.
8. In March 1994 the Auditing Practices Board issued a Statement of Auditing 
Standards 620 on "The auditors' right and duty to report to regulators in the financial 
sector" followed by Practice Notes in July on (i) The Auditors' Right and Duty to 
Report to the Friendly Societies Commission under a statutory instrument duty 
contained in The Friendly Societies (Auditors) Order 1994, and (ii) The Auditors' Right 
and Duty to Report to the DTI in Relation to Insurers Authorised under the Insurance 
Companies Act 1982 under the Auditors (Insurance Companies Act 1982) Regulations 
1994. This UK legislation implemented two EU Directives - the Third Non-Life and the 
Third Life Directives - which were implemented on 1st July 1994, in particular with 
reference to new criteria for sound and pmdent management.
The answer to the question whether the whistleblowing external auditor is an 
oxymoron, is that the 1990's will mark the first decade of general recognition that 
whistleblowing auditors may not invariably be a contradiction in terms. In certain well- 
defined circumstances thet have a right to whistleblow. In other circumstances they 
have a right so to do. What, however, of internal auditors? An experiment involving 
the prediction-task judgements of 106 internal auditors from the public and private 
sector, found internal auditors much less likely to whistleblow than external auditors 
(Arnold and Ponemon 1991). To the topic of the internal auditor we now turn.
25
CHAPTER 4. THE CONTRADICTION OF INTERNAL AUDIT?
In this chapter the main internal audit professional proclamations are examined. This is 
followed by the exegesis on the proclamations undertaken by Gil Courtemanche, who 
has become a type of unofficial spokesperson on the issue. Although he is not an office 
bearer, he has authored two texts which the IIA Inc commends, and the article he wrote 
on whistleblowing was given the Thurston Award for the best article that year, and it is 
likely that the endorsement the article gave to the official doctrine was a major factor 
behind the award.
Internal auditors are almost always at one remove from the public, and so have not been 
exposed to the same public criticism and debate as has the external auditor. It is 
instructive that the public interest was a topic selected for research at the outset of the 
profession in the 1940s, but this never in fact materialised (Vinten 1993a). As a 
generally non-statutory activity, albeit custom-and-practice in large parts of the world 
economy, it would be foolish to make internal audit a front line of defence in revealing 
corporate abuse. Occasionally an organization may allocate a duty which does involve 
a direct relationship with the public. An example is the building society which requests 
investors or borrowers to communicate direct with the internal auditor should there be 
any discrepancy on balances or interest. In both cases the auditor is dealing with the 
equivalent of a shareholder, not just with a member of the public or a client.
One has to realise that the occupational hazard of the HA is to believe that their 
standards and Code of Ethics are universally accepted. A study in the US of all 2,012 
Certified Internal Auditors, with 1,414 responding, found that the influence of the HA 
through its Certified Internal Auditor examination was not as great as may have been 
imagined. Not surprisingly, the individuals who obtained the qualification did so as a
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means of professional advancement, and thought highly of it. Unfortunately their 
expectations were not fulfilled to any great extent, either in terms of their own feelings, 
or in tenns of the perceptions of their employers, as evidenced by promotion or pay rise 
(Agrawal and Siegel 1989). The writer recorded his impressions during a visit to New 
York City in May 1989:
"One only had to compare the listed members of the New York Chapter of the IIA by 
company affiliation with the numbers of internal auditors in each company to realise 
that in some cases only ten percent were in membership. These were not peripheral 
companies. They could certainly be said to have an HA culture. What was even more 
surprising and paradoxical was that in one company, spending time acquiring the CIA 
qualification appeared to be a positive disadvantage. Those who gained the qualification 
tended to find those who had concentrated whole-heartedly on the job were being 
promoted before them. Often these CIAs left, hence depriving the company of even 
more HA members." (Vinten 1989).
A subsequent letter to the Director of Professional Services at the HA in Rorida elicited 
the response that the HA was aware of this situation, concerned about it, and 
considering a solution. Part of this solution was to introduce a company membership 
scheme. Survey evidence suggests the less than universal adoption of the IIA 
Standards. The 1985 Survey of Internal Audit in the UK and Eire found that only 36% 
of UK organisations required substantial adherence to the HA Standards (HA-UK 
1985). There was no separate question on the Code of Ethics, and although section 240 
of the Standards contains a cross-reference to the Code:
" 240 Compliance with Standards of Conduct - Internal auditors should comply with 
professional standards of conduct.
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.01 The Code of Ethics of the Institute of Internal Auditors sets forth standards 
of conduct and provides a basis for enforcement among its members. The Code' calls 
for high standards of honesty, objectivity, diligence, and loyalty to which internal 
auditors should conform."
It would be hazardous to suggest that respondents had the Code of Ethics specifically in 
mind when answering the question on the Standards generally, and future surveys 
should include questions specifically on the Code.
The 1985 Survey included wherever possible question responses from the Surveys of 
1979 and 1983 ( IIA Inc 1979 and White and Xander 1983), and all these surveys are 
referred to as being international. In reality this amounted to North America, and so 
was scarcely international. 72% and 74% in these two surveys reported substantial 
adherence to the HA Standards, and the 1985 Survey draws the conclusion that there is 
a significant difference here. This is the wrong conclusion. The US Surveys of 1979 
and 1983 use as their sampling frames the membership lists of the HA. This introduces 
an overwhelming bias in favour of the IIA Standards. The UK Survey based its 
sampling frame on organisations, and so avoided this form of bias. Even so, there was 
a disappointing response rate of 34%, and if it is assumed that HA Standards users are 
more likely to reply, it might be necessary to divide the 36% of HA Standards adherents 
in the UK by up to one third.
Rather as the external auditor has sought to minimize professional liability, so the 
internal auditor has emphasized the dogma that one's reporting channel is to the 
organization, which is defined narrowly as consisting of the managers and directors. 
This does mean that one significant aspect of professionalism, responsibility to the
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public, is more difficult to sustain. There may be indirect benefit, but the public named 
in the professional statements is twofold as already stated. From this follows the 
received wisdom that whistleblowing is not to be countenanced for the internal auditor. 
There is an IIA Position Statement on Whistle Blowing. Position Statements do not 
have the same status as the General and Specific Standards and the Code of Ethics, but 
are issued to provide guidance, although this guidance may be regarded as reasonably 
authoritative. The Position Statement indicates that "for organizations with internal audit 
functions that adhere to the Standards and Code of Ethics of the HA and that are headed 
by an audit director with full access to an active audit committee, there should be no 
need to report in an unauthorized manner to anyone outside the organization". Where 
this does not apply, the internal auditor is still obligated by the Standards and Code of 
Ethics to report through the hierarchical channels first within the internal audit 
department, then through the levels above this, and ultimately, if necessary, to the 
board of directors to seek timely resolution. Failing this, legal advice should be 
sought, the position paper suggests. The only concession made is where there happens 
to be a state or federal whistleblowing statute.
4.1 THE PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BULLETINS
There remains one further potential source of guidance in the form of the Professional 
Standards Bulletin (PSB), which is regarded as being "semi-authoritative" since it 
undergoes a reduced exposure process and approval requirement. It does not amend 
existing standards or guidelines or set new ones, and its aim is to help practitioners to 
apply the existing pronouncements. (HA, 1991). Since the PSB was invented in 1981 
the number h ^  never exceeded twenty in one year. Those that might have a bearing on 
our subject in the UK numbering are:
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PSB 26 (US.83:5) Suspected Wrongdoing: Does an internal auditor have
responsibility to notify outside authorities of suspected wrongdoing? No direct answer 
is provided to this, although reference is only given to internal reporting channels.
PSB 58 (US.86:2) Reporting underbilling to Contractors: Is the internal auditor 
ethically required to report findings to an operator or contractor when an outside audit is 
performed (e.g. joint venture or contractor audit) and exceptions are found which 
would create additional costs for the internal auditor's company? The answer is that 
where the sum involved is material and/or especially clear-cut, internal audit 
management should be consulted, following which the findings may be reported to the 
third party. Otherwise both internal audit management and the company’s operating 
employees responsible for the contract or service should be consulted. It is then their 
responsibility to resolve the underbilling with the outside firm. The reasoning given by 
the PSB is that there could be underlying issues or historical events bearing on the 
eventual settlement, but of which the internal auditors are unfamiliar. It is interesting 
that only the underbilling situation is mentioned.
PSB 71 (US 86:10) Comphance with HA Code of Ethics: How does the HA determine 
compliance with the HA's Code of Ethics? The answer refers to the procedures which 
may end in censure or suspension/expulsion from membership, with the results printed 
in a membership periodical.
PSB 78 (US87:4) is on Expert Witness Testimony, and suggests the internal auditor 
should inform the appropriate members of their organization's management about court 
appearances. Presumably this is so that they may vet the nature of the appearance, and 
ensure that it will not disadvantage the home organization in any way.
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PSB 79 (US 87:5) Handling a Management Impropriety wants to know if this should 
be handled at a very high management level. The suggested procedure is to go through 
the chief internal auditor, who then infomis the individual before he or she hears from a 
non-audit source. This is stated as minimizing the possibility of jeopardizing future 
working relationships should the allegation prove groundless, as well as ensuring clear 
communication of facts rather than of rumour. Following this initial meeting the next- 
up line manager to the employee should be invited to a three-way meeting to discuss "a 
mutual item of interest". Utmost confidentiality and the avoidance of defamation are 
emphasized, the audit committee may possibly be informed, and the concluding draft 
report should be reviewed by a lawyer prior to being issued.
PSB 80 (US 87:6) Handling Tip-Offs or Complaints: How should an auditor handle a 
confidential "tip-off", or oral or written complaints from employees or others that could 
have a significant exposure for the organization? The auditor is to caution the 
individual that a serious charge is being made, and that it could have unfavourable 
consequences for the caller, the employee or situation being targeted, and perhaps the 
organization itself. The caller should be encouraged to consider the implications of the 
allegations that are about to be made before proceeding further. The auditor should 
explain that the normal policy is to make every effort not to reveal sources, but that no 
guarantee can be provided, and if this makes the person uncomfortable, it would be 
desirable for them to write an anonymous letter. This PSB is of particular interest since 
it involves internal whistleblowing, which is considered perfectly legitimate.
PSB 88-8 (no UK numbering). Disciplinary Action. The new 1988 Code of Ethics is 
the opportunity to ask what disciplinary action may be taken under it. This involves a 
three member panel with attorneys present for each side if desired, with censure, 
suspension or expulsion possible outcomes.
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4.2 SUMMARY OF PSBs.
It is clear that in these PSB's loyalty to the organization, its board of directors and 
management, is paramount, although PSB 26 inadvertently or otherwise avoids 
comment on the wider issue. For contractor underbillings, only in restricted 
circumstances is the auditor to "spill the beans".
Internal whistleblowing is countenanced, but the individual is to be given the 
organization’s health warning. Management impropriety needs special handling, but 
this does not include going outside the organization. In an expert witness situation the 
organization could veto appearance. Whistleblowing auditors could find they are on the 
wrong side of the code of ethics in the event of a complaint being made against them.
4.3 THE COURTEMANCHE VIEW.
These uncompromising statements of the Position Statement and the PSB's are perhaps 
based more on expediency than on idealism. Some would argue that the internal auditor 
is not in the business of idealism:
"Society will be much better served if, by rejecting special social-control functions, 
internal auditors are enabled to form a closer partnership with management and to 
broaden the scope of their beneficial services. Article VI (Now Article 9) of the Code 
(of Ethics) must be understood as requiring internal auditors to protect the employer 
from the consequences of his lack of knowledge concerning illegal acts committed 
within the organization". (Courtemanche 1986, 55-56)
Courtemanche considers that internal auditors should not act as self-appointed
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watchdogs over the behaviour of their employers, and he makes it clear that internal 
auditing is not independent of management, but independent because of management 
(Ibid, 43). Auditors need to work closely with management otherwise they are cut 
loose from their moorings, set adrift without a flag (Ibid, 44). Courtemanche seems to 
believe that auditors should bend with their managements, even if the bending includes 
a figurative interpretation of laws, rules and regulations. In his article on 
whistleblowing, Courtemanche reports the confusion and disagreement on the issue he 
has discovered among both academics and practitioners. His view manages to be clear- 
cut and unambiguous, and indicates a failure to realize the necessity to explore various 
trade-offs in ethical thinking. One business researcher warns against simplifying ethics
"The more uncertain the issues, the more contemptuous and intolerant some people 
appear to be in the face of alternative views. Such close-mindedness, as in other 
disciplines, is the most serious enemy of rational, consistent conduct."
(Donaldson 1989)
This comment is exemplified by Courtemanche's comment that :
" The modem audit director has no problem interpreting the Code - it's simply a matter 
of taking words and phrases at their obvious meaning in the context of the Code as a 
whole and in the context of the general body of IIA pronouncements."
(Courtemanche 1989,178).
Courtemanche's overriding objective is that the internal audit profession should not be 
severely damaged by any loss of trust on the part of employers, and he considers that 
the IIA will best serve its current and future membership by "lobbying vigorously 
against any ill-advised legislation that would enlist the profession into a law-
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enforcement role for which it was never intended." (Courtemanche 1988, 41). 
Whistleblowers, whom Courtemanche describes emotively as voluntary snitchers on 
their employers, can expect neither support nor sympathy from this quarter. In those 
extreme cases in which the employer's conduct represents such an overwhelming threat 
to the health, safety, property or financial security of others that all reasoning 
individuals would consider action imperative, Courtemanche's advice is do what you 
must, but preferably out of public view and as concerned citizens rather than as internal 
auditors. His six guidelines are that internal auditors should:
1. Report all findings of employee fraud and unlawful practice to their employers,
2. Not report any audit findings outside the organization unless authorized by their 
employers.
3. Avoid the risk of damaging the lawful interests of their employers through the audit 
process itself.
4. Consult with company lawyers wherever it appears that an audit investigation might 
uncover unlawful practice.
5. Manage their files to avoid damage to the lawful interests of their employers.
6. Not be a party to any illegal or improper activity.
Courtemanche goes on to refer to internal audit as being a unique profession with a 
unique role and a unique ethic (Ibid, 39). Some might regard this uniqueness as 
residing in total failure to give any interest to the public and societal interest, and being
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the only body regarding itself as a profession that wishes to be known by this attribute. 
Others will see the ethics of cover-up and deceit, and wonder whether this is the sort of 
profession to be recommend. The inherent ambiguity of the internal audit role can 
produce a very thin dividing line between normal audit reporting and whistleblowing,
4.4 BEHAVIOURAL RESEARCH.
The ambiguities of the internal audit role can be observed in research into the 
behavioural aspects of internal auditing, which surveyed those names that others give to 
internal auditors which the auditors both like and dislike. It is interesting that some 
names, such as supersleuth, occur in both category. Some of the terms that pleased 
auditors would certainly seem to have whistleblowing undertones. These included 
ombudsman, corporate monitor, corporate guardian, watchdog, truth seeker and 
conscience of the organization. Displeasing terms were more uncompromising and 
included corporate spies, Gestapo, trouble seeker, busybody and dirt digger (Wilson 
and Wood 1989). It is clear that within normal internal audit activity there is a 
perception of others that internal audit is reminiscent of whistleblowing, and that 
internal auditors may hold some of these perceptions themselves.
4.5 SUMMARY.
The official proclamations of the DA bearing upon whistleblowing have been outlined. 
They are generally unsupportive of whistleblowing, although they do reflect ambiguity. 
This ambiguity is picked up in the behavioural study. External observers of internal 
audit activity perceive whistleblowing aspects within the function, and this is reflected 
in the names that are used. Internal auditors seek to deny this. Courtemanche manages 
a clear-cut view of the situation whereby whistleblowing is basically outlawed.
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CHAPTER 5. CRITIQUE OF THE OFFICIAL DOCTRINE.
, In this chapter a critique is provided of official doctrine as represented in IIA Standards,
. ’ and in particular the Code of Ethics, the relevant contents of which is outlined. A 
classification of three types of ethical code is suggested as a helpful model to clarify 
discussion. Various influential sources are then quoted which take a more sympathetic 
view of whistleblowing.
We have already described the Courtemanche view of morality as simplistic. It belongs 
to early, immature stages of moral development at which concrete rather than abstract 
thought prevails. Piaget, in his research on 5 to 13 year olds, postulated three 
overlapping stages of moral development; a 'heteronomous morality' based on 
unilateral respect for the rules of adult authority; a morality of co-operation and strict 
equality based on mutual respect among social peers; and a morality of equity based on 
a flexible, Golden-Rule consideration of the needs of individuals in particular situations 
(Piaget 1965). Kohlberg developed Piaget's ideas in his six stages, ranging on a 
continuum from a preconventional, heteronomous morality in which there needs to be 
an avoidance of breaking rules backed by punishment and obedience for its own sake, 
to a stage six postconventional or principled universal ethical principle. In this, self­
chosen ethical principles are followed. Particular laws or social agreements are usually 
valid, because they rest on such principles. However, when laws violate these 
principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles 
of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as 
individual people (Kohlberg 1976, 31-53). Chris Argyris has further developed these 
themes in an organizational context. He sees seven developments as characterizing the 
progression from infancy towards maturity. These are:
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1. From infant passivity towards adult activity 
2 i From dependence towards relative independence
3. From limited behaviours to many different behaviours
4. From erratic, shallow, brief interests to more stable, deeper interests
5. From short time perspective to longer time perspective
6. From a subordinate social position to an equal or superordinate social position
7. From lack of self-awareness to self-awareness and self-control.
Argyris sees formal 'rational' organizations as operating towards the immature end of 
the spectrum in what he calls pseudo- health'. Tasks are reduced to minimal 
specialized routines with a chain of command in which instructions are given in 
precisely what to do. The result is that the specialists and departments follow their own 
ends irrespective of wider interests and even to each other's detriment. In the poor state 
of managerial interpersonal competence that is found in such situations, matters of 
concern cannot be raised and discussed. Although openness of communication and the 
participative approach may form part of official rhetoric (the espoused' theory), the 
reality may be very different (Argyris 1957, 1965, 1985). In collaborative work with 
Schon two models have been suggested. In Model 1 there is a minimization of 
generating or expressing negative feelings in public, with one's own thoughts and 
feelings kept a mystery. It is also necessary to be rational and ‘objective’ and suppress 
the voicing of feelings by others, thus protecting oneself and others from facing 
important issues which often have an emotional content. Learning how to conform is 
the only learning taking place, and managers strive for complete control. In Model 2 
action is taken on valid information in open decision-making with free and informal 
choice from all those competent and relevant to participate. Managers seek 
contributions from others, and are able to confront their own basic assumptions, test 
them in public, and be open to changing their viewpoint. (Argyris and Schon 1978)
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The anti- whistleblowers fail to recognize the important distinctions of three types of 
Code of Ethics formulated by the present writer (Vinten 1990, 10-11). This typology 
accords with the insights of the writers just discussed, and sheds light on why 
whistleblowing may be approved or disallowed according to which ideal type one is 
following. The three types are:
1. The regulatory code. This is the equivalent of the Ten Commandments. There 
is a direct one-to-one correspondence between code and behaviour. Shades of grey are 
not recognized, with an ethical imperative that is so compelling as to require no further 
discussion.
2. The aspirationai code. This is the equivalent of the Wisdom literature of the 
Jewish Scriptures/Old Testament. "There is nothing new under the sun" is an example 
from the book of Ecclesiastes. The aim of this type of code is to provide a standard to 
aspire to, but to recognize that full compliance may rarely be possible, and that one may 
need to consider practicality and expediency. However such codes rarely provide much 
help in assessing the merits of alternative courses of action. This leads us to:
3 . The educational code. This does not believe in rules and regulations, which it 
believes to be unhelpful or even damaging. To meet one ideal may be to fall short on 
another one. It believes in the individual conscience of the professional rather than 
collective decision. This is a contextual ethic. It aims for enlightened discussion of the 
issues, but then the matter rests in the hands of the matured professional. Post­
modernists would certainly find this view of the ethical code nearer to their liking.
The regulatory code seems to be the one assumed by the anti-whistleblowers'.
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Although there is certainly a time and place for each type of code, or elements of each 
within a single code, the educational code is the one least developed, but with the 
greatest potential for coping with the inherent ambiguities of professional ethical 
situations, and most in tune with the developmental and social psychologists already 
cited. It is also the only one with a chance of dealing with cultural diversity, both 
national, organisational and societal. Only by adopting the third approach is there any 
chance of resolving otherwise insuperable internal inconsistencies in the HA Code of 
Ethics (See Appendix B). At present the articles of the Code with a bearing on the 
subject are:
(2) Members shall exhibit loyalty in all matters pertaining to the affairs of their 
organization or to whomever they may be rendering a service. However, members 
shall not knowingly be a party to any illegal or improper activity.
(8) Members shall be prudent in the use of information acquired in the course of their 
duties. They shall not use confidential information for any personal gain nor in any 
manner which would be contrary to law or detrimental to the welfare of their 
organization.
(9) Members, when reporting on the results of their work, shall reveal all material facts 
known to them which, if not revealed, could either distort reports of operations under 
review or conceal unlawful practices.
It is clear that the overwhelming emphasis is of loyalty to the organization. Unlawful 
practices are to be revealed - but to the organization. Internal auditors are not 
themselves to be a party to illegality or impropriety. This would seem to support the 
hard-line approach. The problem occurs in seeking to implement the Code, the ethics-
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in-action. The only HA. Inc-commissioned survey on the Code presented twenty case 
study situations to 343 participants and invited rating on a five point scale from 
dismissal to do nothing as follows : '
Scale Proposed Action
j . . .
1 The supervisor should consider firing the employee.
2 Reprimand, and record placed in employee's personnel file.
3 Supervisor and subordinate to discuss the undesirable 
aspects of the action and why it should not be repeated.
4 The action is questionable, but it is unclear that any follow- 
up action is required.
5 No apparent problem: the action is accepted practice.
Three situations involved loyalty, and one in particular involved whistleblowing:
Situation 17. Thomas, an internal auditor, uncovered a serious situation in which a 
corporate officer had paid a government official in his state a substantial sum in order to 
get a governmental contract for the firm. Thomas reported the incident to his 
supervisor who told him he would take care of the matter. No action had been taken in 
six months, so Thomas went to the government's legal authorities to tell them.
There was a high degree of uncertainty, with issues far from clear-cut and all possible 
responses observed frequently. Situation 17, regarded by the study as the most serious 
of the three because it involved outside action, raised the most confusion. The authors 
state that government legislation to protect whistleblowers has tended to cloud the 
loyalty issue and conclude "It is apparent that this ethic principle needs more attention
40
and discussion." (Dittenhofer and Klenun 1983, 17). It is a pity to discover that there 
has been a surprising lack of discussion among writers on ethics as to how individuals 
should work out the conflicts which do arise when their personal views conflict with 
their organisational responsibilities on matters of ethical import ( Blois, 1985, 225). 
There has, however, been an increase in such discussion over the past decade in the 
greater quantity of published material on business ethics.
The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (The Treadway 
Commission), a collaborative venture between the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, the American Accounting Association, the Financial Executives 
Institute, the Institute of Internal Auditors, and the National Association of 
Accountants, progressed the debate by recommending that public companies should 
develop and enforce written codes of corporate conduct. These should foster a strong 
ethical climate as well as open channels of communication to help protect against 
fraudulent financial reporting. An employee, when confronted with suspected fraud, 
should then feel uninhibited to bring the problem to the attention of those high enough 
in the corporation to solve it without fear of reprisal. The code should also provide an 
accessible internal complaint and appeal mechanism, such as the use of an ombudsman. 
For one thing this might avoid external disclosures to government authorities or other 
third parties, and for another, it might reduce the probability of further anti-retaliatory 
legislation, for which there is already precedent at both federal and state levels. 
(National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987,35-36).
Internal whistleblowing is certainly encouraged by the National Commission, although 
in one company at least, The Williams Companies, it was difficult to persuade 
employees to sign their compliance with this stipulation of their Code of Business 
Conduct (Hick, Weiland and Miller, 1989, 14). The basis for not stressing external
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whistleblowing is that sufficient internal safeguards are to be introduced. However it is 
not ruled out by the report. The report does shed some doubt on what the stand of the 
IIA actually is, since the report seems to represent a mellowing of attitude. Martin 
Weiland, General Audit Manager of Amoco, attributes a more sympathetic attitude to 
the IIA than is probably justified: "The IIA has taken some very proactive and positive 
stands on various issues related to ethics, such as the role of audit committees and 
strong support of the Treadway Commission and Whistleblowing" (Hick, Weiland and 
Miller, 1989,15).
Three researchers have identified the vital importance of codes of ethics in companies, 
and the internal auditor's role in conducting independent reviews of them, even though 
it is still early days for these (Gavin, Roy and Sunmers 1990). Another writer has 
expressed concern as to whether employees will blow the whistle on an irregularity that 
they might discover, pointing out that reporting irregularities is an assumption that 
underlies effective internal control (Johnson 1979).' In the analogous activity of 
management accounting - analogous since it too is a non-mandatory, internal function 
with similar reporting channels - it has been argued that there is a moral responsibility 
to challenge or report that which is at variance with professional standards and that has 
actual or potentially material and harmful consequences (Loeb and Cory 1989). In the 
case of engineers, it is suggested that since they have considerable control over 
technological developments, they have an obligation to make greater sacrifices for the 
sake of the public welfare, and this may include taking the risk of whistleblowing 
(Alpem 1983, 39- 41).
Those, therefore, who seek to outlaw whistleblowing may well be appearing as 
increasingly reactionary, and failing to recognize the intrinsic lack of clarity of the 
situation, and the need to think and discuss further, much as is posited by the
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educational type of code. They also fail to recognize the force of a growing number of 
whistleblower protection acts in the US (Kohn and Kohn 1986), and that the debate on 
the issue is increasingly world- wide. One example is in Queensland, Australia, in 
which the Electoral and Administrative Review Commission has been considering a 
variety of matters, including the protection of whistleblowers (Electoral and 
Administrative Review Commission 1990).
It is instructive that the Commission of the Speaker of the House of Commons on 
Encouraging Citizenship provides a definition of citizenship which includes 
whistleblowing (Stonefrost 1990):
"The challenge to our society in the late twentieth century is to create conditions where 
all who wish can become actively involved, can understand and participate, can 
influence, persuade, campaign and whistleblow, and in the making of decisions can 
work together for the mutual good."
This is the nearest one comes in the UK to any official recognition of the value of 
whistleblowing and, indeed the attribution of almost a constitutional role.
It is revealing to see the result of an epistolary confrontation between whistleblowing 
practitioner Arthur Suchodolski, discussed in the next section, and armchair ethicist Gil 
Courtemanche. Arthur wrote to Gil on January 27,1988 strongly disagreeing with both 
the tone and substance of Gil's February 1988 article, which subsequently won an 
award for the best article of the year in the US journal Internal Auditor, thereby 
providing an element of HA endorsement. On 6th February 1988, Gil replied:
"Please believe me when I say that I find myself in complete sympathy with you in the
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remarkable experience that you had. My article was prepared in the spirit of 
discouraging trivial and petty breaches of confidentiality between internal auditors and 
their employers on the theory that this sort of behaviour was a breach of ethics and 
would pose a grave danger to our profession. Your case was clearly different. The 
issues were of very large proportions. The shabby treatment given to you certainly 
cancelled any obligation of personal/professional loyalty and placed you in a position of 
self-defense - a natural right no one can deny to another. Congratulations on your 
remarkable achievement. You are indeed a credit to our profession."
It rather seems that when Gil comes face-to-face with a real-life example, his argument 
is reduced to banality. Few whistleblowers are interested in bothering with "trivial and 
petty" matters, and even if they did , the immateriality of the issue would mean that the 
employer would probably not be moved to take much action, and outsiders would be 
equally disinterested. It is a poor test of Gil's argument that its sole applicability is to 
the trivial and petty, and that it is incapable of dealing with cases that are of serious 
moment, and representative of instances that give rise to public concern and debate.
It is even possible for Courtenay Thompson, a fraud consultant who runs courses for 
IIA Inc, to perceive whistleblowing as being an activity to be encouraged when it 
relates to employees reporting suspected fraud to internal audit. In this case, internal 
audit should take steps to protect such employees when the rest of the world seems 
determined to punish them. This should include the existence of a policy that states that 
internal audit should establish procedures, policies, facilities, and communication 
channels to receive, on a confidential basis, information relevant to potential 
wrongdoing. Thompson views whistleblowing as being an ever present possibility for 
the internal auditor. He gives the common example of audit managers filtering out 
findings from audit reports with little or no explanation. In trivial cases the auditor will
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probably give grudging assent. If significant but not life- threatening, illegal or 
immoral, many employees would leave the company, but not blow the whistle. If the 
finding seemed life- threatening, felonious or abhorrent to moral principles, then some 
auditors would choose to report outside the chain of command, perhaps to regulatory 
authorities (Thompson 1987).
An internal auditing manual of encyclopaedic dimensions discusses whistleblowing in 
its section on fraud. This is on the basis that it is in such contexts that internal auditors 
are more likely to ponder what their ethical responsibility for reporting is (Willson and 
Root 1989, 22 : 56-57). The authors consider that the problem has become more acute 
since the federal government created hot lines and actively promoted their use by 
anyone to report suspected fraud. Ethically speaking, they do not believe that internal 
auditors are under any general duty to inform outsiders of suspected wrongdoing. Their 
ethical duty is to report to management, and it is their ethical duty to investigate - 
possibly using internal audit as part of the investigating mechanism. Management 
decides whether to report to outsiders on the basis of all relevant facts and 
circumstances, including any legal requirements for such reporting. If management fails 
to act prudently, including failing to report when required by law, the internal auditor’s 
ethical duty is to report to the company's audit committee. The authors, writing 
theoretically and without having taken the trouble to examine cases such as Suchodolski 
(1981) in which the audit committee was far from supportive, aver that : " The 
responsibility of audit committees is such that it is all but inconceivable that it would fail 
to make proper inquiry and disposition of the situation." In the very rare situations 
where the auditor is not satisfied, he or she should resign and seek legal advice as to 
further action to be taken, which may include reporting to the proper authorities.
Two other authors believe that internal auditors have a job role that in certain
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circumstances requires that they become whistleblowers ( Near and Miceli 1985, 2; 
Bowie 1982, 145 and 1985, 48-49). In their subsequent research on 1,045 directors of 
internal audit. Near and Miceli (1988) found that although 80% had observed 
wrongdoing in the preceding year, and 90% of these had reported it, only 6% of the 
total respondents had suffered retaliation for reporting. Few felt that the reporting 
should be done externally. 25% had reported externally, but this had generally been to 
the external audit team only. These findings agree with the view that whistleblowing 
should be an exceptional event, even though internal auditors will experience 
wrongdoing as a regular part of their work.
Similarly, Professor Curtis Verschoor opines that the internal auditor lives constantly 
on the horns of a dilemma, tom inexorably between conflicting forces. The first is to 
be part of a problem-solving partnership with operational management, but the second, 
which is at variance, is to report significant adverse findings to top management and the 
board of directors (Verschoor 1987). James Treadway (1986) has commented that:
"It is the general belief of our Commission that the internal audit function is far too 
hidden firom public view."
As public awareness inevitably increases, it will become urgent to give frank 
recognition to the dilemma, and to find a way of avoiding impaling the auditor every 
time the issue arises. This is no longer a marginal matter to be swept under the carpet, 
but rather something that strikes at the heart of the very raison d’etre of internal 
auditing. In this chapter we have experienced a turnaround of the argument. 
Whistleblowing is now seen as more central to the core of internal audit activity, rather 
tham being seen simply as a marginal aberration.
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CHAPTER 6. CASE STUDIES OF INTERNAL AUDIT  
WHISTLEBLOWERS.
We present here case studies of internal audit whistleblowers to illustrate the 
practicalities of the whistleblowing situation, and to permit a consideration as to 
whether the 'anti-whistleblower' stance seems sustainable in the light of such cases. All 
the cases are based on interviews with the writer, with the exception of the Urda case, 
and represent all the cases that have come to light, including from various appeals in 
articles written by the author. Documentary sources have also been used where 
available and as referenced. In the first case, the events took place fifteen years ago 
when there was perhaps less sympathy with whistleblowing than now, and thought had 
not crystallized even into the ambiguous state of play of the present. Employment law 
was very much in the tradition of the at-will' doctrine, which historically granted the 
master complete discretion to dismiss the servant. (Blades 1967) The Suchodolski case 
was the "pioneering" case which was very much in mind when the IIA Inc was 
formulating its views on whistleblowing. The researcher has corresponded with 
Suchodolski and has received a dossier of material on the case, including legal 
documents. The Wells case is one which has more recently occupied the attention of 
IIA Inc, and the researcher met and interviewed Wells during the IIA International 
Conference in Phoenix, Arizona in June 1992. Case 6.4 represented a prominent 
member of the HA-UK raising the issue, and contributing to the debate in the UK. 6.2 
and 6.5 are cited as having taken place in financial institutions where there is much 
public concern. The first is not well known, and follows confidential disclosure to the 
researcher. The second has been the subject of widespread media attention, and a 
telephone interview with the researcher in 1991. Case 6,6 contacted the researcher in 
1992.
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6.1 THE ARTHUR SUCHODOLSKI STORY
Arthur is one of the unsung heroes of internal audit. A man of principle, whose name 
needs to be added to the internal audit book of martyrs, and who sacrificed career and 
livelihood because of his whistleblowing. From 1972 to 1976 he worked for the 
Michigan Consolidated Gas Company - the largest gas distribution company in 
Michigan - as an internal auditor. When he uncovered evidence of mismanagement and 
possible fraud in the credit division of the company, his report was ignored by top 
company officials. He found an audit department which lacked the respect of the 
company, and this led to high turnover of staff, as well as the difficulties of being 
promoted out of audit. He also found that audit reports were often dressed up to 
present a rosy picture to company management. Despite promises to the contrary, 
Arthur was passed over for promotion and, finding himself increasingly out of 
sympathy with audit procedures and practices, he had requested a transfer to another 
job within the company. He was asked to start the audit of the credit division without a 
proper plan. Even so he immediately located lax procedures and a mass of problems, 
with fifty major areas all requiring attention. The most highly significant of these 
involved the State of Michigan's Aid to Families with Dependent Children Programme 
from which welfare families received a lump-sum payment from which they were 
supposed to manage their financial affairs, including their gas bills. After some 
embarrassing publicity over service disconnections to welfare customers, Michigan 
Consolidated entered into a "sweetheart" deal with the Michigan Department of Social 
Services. The company agreed to inform the Department of Social Services prior to 
cut-off action; the state reciprocated by agreeing to pay the bills for delinquent accounts 
out of the state's emergency aid fund. Initially payments were modest. However as 
word spread, abuse multiplied. Welfare recipients were thereby receiving a duplicate 
payment. Michigan Consolidated sunk into a lethargy in which it took no action to
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clear up arrears. In fact the 1976 sum cheated out of state funds was $19 million. 
Arthur's audit was taken over by his manager who repackaged it in a way Arthur found 
unacceptable. Shortly afterwards he was dismissed. (Suchodolski 1981)
Arthur appealed to the company audit committee about both his audit findings and 
dismissal but to no avail. His by now public revelations were taken seriously by the 
State, which refused that part of a Michigan Consolidated price increase which 
appeared to be because of the fraud. The next fourteen years saw several civil court 
appearances and gradual but painful, uphill vindication, with also various other 
episodes coming to light to shed doubt on the corporate integrity of Michigan 
Consolidated, and with the resignations of the company president and of the board 
member chair of the audit conunittee coming immediately after the publication of the 
book article (Suchodolski 1981). ' <
HA Inc found itself unable to give any professional support to Arthur. This was partly 
due to the problem of achieving a judicious overview of the situation from the outside, 
but was also no doubt due to the ambivalence and mixed emotions to which 
whistleblowing gives rise. It is interesting to note that the procedural problem does not 
obstruct investigation of cases of alleged professional misconduct, and if 
whistleblowing were to be the cause of the complaint, then the HA would be forced to 
investigate. Without wishing to make judgements on past history with the benefit of 
hindsight, this is certainly a nettle that needs to be grasped in the future, both as a 
practical concern, and as an inconsistency which results in a natural injustice for 
internal audit whistleblowers. . . '
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6.2 THE PENSION FUND FRAUD STORY
An internal audit of the pension fund of a financial institution revealed that legal 
requirements as to trust status were being broken. Monies were being removed 
'temporarily' and placed in speculative investments by definition not permitted for 
pension funds to invest in. If a profit were made, the original capital was returned to 
the pension fund, but the speculative profit went to the company itself. The 
consequences to the pension fund of an overall loss had yet to be realized, although it 
was likely that some of the loss would be passed back to the fund. The head of internal 
audit reported to the board on this practice, but there was no willingness to change, 
indeed the board was behind it. The auditor pushed the matter hard from the inside, but 
without any success. He secured another similar position elsewhere, and then resigned 
in protest. This took place in the UK in 1980 when impractically ethical matters were 
still to be referred to the US Institute, and so this would weaken even further the low 
level of support that might have been expected had this individual blown the whistle 
and gone public.
6.3 THE STEPHEN F WELLS STORY
Stephen was working for a state agency funded by several sources, including a federal 
agency. The federal agency required a financial and compliance audit governed by the 
US General Accounting Office's Standards for Audit of Governmental Organizations, 
Programs, Activities, and Functions and the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards. The section of the 
G.A.O. Standards which caused the problem, since it enjoined a legitimized 
whistleblowing, read as follows:
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"Public officials are accountable both to other levels of government for the resources 
provided to carry out government programs and to the public. Consequently they 
should provide appropriate reports to those to whom they are accountable. Unless legal 
restrictions, ethical considerations, or other valid reasons prevent them from doing so, 
audit organizations should make audit findings available to the public and to other levels 
of government that have supplied (them with) resources."
It soon became clear to Stephen in his audit that there had been a failure to comply with 
federal regulations requiring accurate, current, and complete disclosure of project costs, 
federal reporting requirements, and federal property-management standards. The 
highlighting of significant internal control weaknesses placed continued support from 
federal funding in jeopardy. Pressure was applied by top management to modify 
substantially the audit report. Stephen and colleagues identified four major ethical 
issues: .
0 Should internal auditors exhibit loyalty to the extent that an incomplete and 
misleading report be issued so that management can ensure continued funding?
o Should internal auditors jeopardize the independence of the entire auditing function 
by allowing organizational impairments to limit the extent of disclosure?
o Should internal auditors recognize as preeminent their obligation to the general 
public to disclose all relevant information, whether favourable to their agency or not, 
regarding public officials' stewardship of public funds?
o Should internal auditors knowingly become involved in what would be improper, if 
not illegal, activities by failing to disclose information specifically required by the
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federal agency?
To Stephen the way forward was clear: the report was issued, with minor changes 
only. Subsequently the agency head decided that internal audit was over-staffed, and 
Stephen was given redundancy notice. He promptly started labour grievance 
procedures. Following months of appeals, an independent arbitrator declared that the 
actions of the agency were improperly motivated, vindictive and without cause. 
Stephen was reinstated one year after his dismissal, and the senior management 
mentioned adversely in the audit report were no longer with the agency. A new 
governor and cabinet revitalized the way the agency was run. Stephen considered that 
there should be some specific avenues of direct, professional support and 
encouragement for internal auditors who uphold professional standards and ethics at the 
expense of their own personal welfare. Writing in the February 1985 edition of The 
Internal Auditor, he found that to date such professional support had been minimal.
6.4 ANDY ROBERTSON.
Andy considers that the HA Position Statement raises more questions than it answers. 
Often the internal audit function is not headed by individuals with sufficient weight to 
raise matters of concern at a senior level. Alternatively internal audit may be merely 
cosmetic, an attempt to convince the outside world that due regard is being paid to 
proper practice. Then there are the common situations in which the internal auditor 
reports to the director of finance, and there may be a reluctance to report on areas under 
the control of the Director (Robertson 1991).
According to survey evidence, the situation of the internal auditor reporting to the 
director of finance remained the case in the UK in 56% of the cases, and stayed at this
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figure over the ten years of 1976 to 1985. This was particularly true of local authorities 
and the public sector, and to a lesser extent private companies.What did change 
markedly over the ten year period was a shift from reporting to the chief 
accountant/controller, down from 28% to 7%, and an increase in reporting to the Chief 
executive or equivalent, up from 8% to 18% (Institute of Internal Auditors -United 
Kingdom 1985). In local government there is a legal requirement under sections 23 and 
25 of the Local Government Finance Act 1982 for the internal audit department to 
report to "the responsible financial officer" (Vinten 1990b and 1991a). 
Recommendations to change the accountability to the Chief Executive have not been 
implemented (Widdicombe 1986), mainly due to the opposition of directors of finance.
Andy found himself in two situations during his career in which he believed he needed 
to blow the whistle. Both took place some ten years ago. In the first he was threatened 
by the members of a trades union when he discovered a widespread fraud. The union 
was so powerful that Andy's own manager, the finance director of the company, felt 
unable to change the practice. Andy was disinclined to drop the matter, but pressure 
was applied not to pursue the point. In the second case, Andy worked for a subsidiary 
company, and was asked by the holding company to audit their own purchase function. 
There he found three unethical practices, one of which involved the chairman. Parts of 
the audit report were suppressed because of the nature of the revelations.
Andy found that there was nobody to turn to for help and advice. In the second case, 
his boss suggested that he register the problem with his professional body. When he 
did, he was told that the IIA-UK was unable to help, since it had no policy of 
supporting members with this problem. This was prior to the HA's Position Statement, 
and a response that Andy would not expect to receive today. Andy is among those who 
believe that the HA should extend a helping hand to those who have obtained audit
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findings that they cannot pass on to an 'appropriate' person. Indeed this is the sort of 
facility that he urges that members of the HA have a right to expect. He suggests that 
there should be a Whistle-blowing Committee to which members could defer if they 
found untoward practices which they could not report internally. It is insufficient, he 
says, for the HA to refer to the Standards, and suggest that there should by definition 
be no problem in a properly constituted function.
6.5 VIVIAN AMBROSE OF BCCI.
The Bank of Credit and Conunerce International (BCCI) counts as the world's greatest 
banking scandal (Vinten 1991 and 1992j). This case brings out in a stark way the 
question of public responsibility versus loyalty to the organization. The role of internal 
audit was severely compromised by being denied access to those significant parts of the 
bank in which the fraud was most prevalent, as well as being denied independence and 
effective reporting channels. No evidence has so far surfaced that this ever became a 
matter of comment by the external auditor. Despite this, Mr. Vivian Ambrose of the UK 
regional inspection department decided that matters had gone unchecked for far too long 
at the bank, and he decided to blow the whistle. He wrote to Tony Benn M.P., on 14th 
Junel990 alleging widespread corruption and nepotism and "apparent incompetence by 
executives". Unfortunately the letter was lost in central government bureaucracy when 
Tony Benn forwarded it on 19th June to two relevant government departments. One 
was to to John Major, then Chancellor of the Exchequer. Sue Wallis of the Ministerial 
Correspondence Unit of Her Majesty's Treasury, the Department controlled by the 
Chancellor, replied on 26th June "After consideration, it appears that the matters raised 
are the responsibility of the DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, so I have sent your 
letter to Michael Howard's office with a request that a reply be sent to you direct." The 
reply from Michael Howard on 14th July indicated that redundancy decisions are
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entirely at the commercial judgement of the employer, provided the requirements of 
statute are complied with. However, given the comments in Mr. Ambrose’s letter about 
trading activities, Howard was copying the letter to Nicholas Ridley at the Department 
of Trade and Industry. No reply was ever forthcoming from either him or John Major.
In a letter to Gerald Vinten dated 16th February 1993, Tony Benn stated: " I never 
received a reply from the Chancellor and it was about a year later, when BCCI 
collapsed, that this earlier correspondence was released and the Government was forced 
to hold the Bingham Inquiry, to which I gave evidence.” A further gloss on this story 
was the arrest by the Abu Dhabi authorities in early September 1991, not only of chief 
executive Zafar Iqbal and his predecessor Swaleh Naqvi, but also more than thirty 
others including the former head of internal audit and inspection, Selim Siddiqui. Mr. 
Ambrose made at least some attempt to minimise the economic disaster that was to 
ensue.
In a telephone interview with the writer on 16th September, 1991, Mr. Ambrose stated 
that he did not like the culture of BCCI right from the beginning, but the poor 
reputation of the bank in the banking community made it very difficult to find 
employment elsewhere. One was effectively locked in.
6.5.1 THE ACTORS IN THE DRAMA.
It provided temporary comfort to believe that the worst and long-lasting excesses of the 
U.S. Savings and Loans fiasco could not occur in the U.K. due to the innate 
superiority of the banking supervision system here. The illusion has now been 
shattered for ever by the case of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, and 
the world's greatest ever banking scandal in financial terms. It is clear that the credit
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was best never extended, and any commerce is now in shreds. The official 
complacency over this predictable and avoidable episode is amazing. Let us examine 
some of the actors.
First we have the Bank of England with its constant marginal interventions in the 
banking system, but an inability to cope in a timely fashion where a whole bank is 
rotten to the core. One is reminded of Ian Hay Davison's comment, when trying to sort 
out earlier and continuing problems at Lloyds Insurance, that not only the apples were 
rotten but also the barrel, and the Biblical parable of the mote and the beam. The 
owners and managers of the bank were well known within the City of London banking 
community and the City of London police Fraud squad not to be "fit and proper", yet 
BCCI was allowed to grow like a cancer up and down the country. If there was a tight­
rope walk, then the Bank of England has fallen off.
There was no statutory regulation of such a vulnerable and important industry as 
banking until the 1979 Banking Act. This was a product of the secondary banking 
failure of the early 1970s, and the requirements of the first ever EEC Banking 
Directive. In the by now well-established tradition of crisis management, the 1987 
Banking Act was a conditioned reflex to the Johnson Matthey Bank collapse. The 
trouble is that the two acts were evolutionary rather than revolutionary, and 
nostalgically inhabit the days when a minor facial gesture of disapproval from the Bank 
of England was sufficient to re-establish banking on the straight and narrow. Maverick 
and cavalier banks now in the City are not likely to be so influenced.
Secondly we have the Serious Fraud Office with its stock-in- trade justification for 
inaction that "No one has ever made a complaint ", which is about as convincing as 
"The cheque is in the post". The criminal and fraudulent potential and actuality of the
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BCCI was well-known to fraud squads even before the drug money laundering came to 
light, as revealed in the police interpretation of BCCI as Bank of Criminals and 
Conmen International. Police philosophy always emphasises prevention. Is the 
philosophy now to maximise the criminal damage?
Thirdly we have Ian Brindle of auditors Price Waterhouse trying to argue his way out 
of the imprecision of the external audit. Knowing full well of the irregularities from the 
start. Price Waterhouse chose to leave the reader of the accounts to blow up an obscure 
note to the accounts and realise the full significance. May I remind Mr Brindle of the 
judgement in re London and General Bank (1895) that:
"An auditor who gives shareholders means of information, instead of 
information in respect of a company's financial position, does so at his peril, 
and runs the very serious risk of being held, judicially, to have failed to 
discharge his duty".
In addition, there is a clear distinction between the role of the external auditor under the 
Companies Act 1985, and the reporting accountant under the Banking Act 1987. The 
second will operate out of the public eye direct to the Bank of England, but the first is a 
matter of public record. There is nothing in law or professional practice to suggest that 
Mr. Brindle should exercise personal judgement to conceal findings to serve some 
wider cause, and keep BCCI afloat a while longer. Presumably his firm's fee was 
larger to take account of the complexity and professional liability risks involved in this 
audit. It would be refreshing to find some clients that no self-respecting firm would be 
prepared to take on.
Fourthly, we have Dr Ronnie Lessem (1987, 1989, 1990) of the City University
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Business School whose naivety knows no bounds in naming, in his various writings, 
this bank as the supreme example of 'metaphysical management' to which all 
organisations should aspire. Dr Lessem has provided a spurious and pernicious 
academic underpinning to this bank. If he were representative of management teachers, 
then the whole discipline would be brought into disrepute. He quotes approvingly that 
BCCI is a bridge between us as individuals and the totality of the phenomena of 
existence. Through BCCI we become part of all that is and all that happens. Even if 
you work in a small branch and the objectives seem limited, if you work with love and 
inspiration, you are serving humanity and fulfilling the call of history. Well, fraudulent 
companies, tell your story to Dr. Lessem, and he will be gullible enough to endow you 
with due divinity.
Finally we have the hapless investors. Of these the Western Isles Islands Council has 
lost a staggering £23 million, nearly half its annual budget, and a huge loss to the 
prosperity of an area that needs every penny from its coffers. One can have little 
sympathy for its Director of Finance, Donald MacLeod, who was prepared to 
perpetrate the cardinal error of putting all the eggs in one basket, and showed no 
appreciation of risk management strategy whatsoever. He was simply lending on for 
short-term gain. In a similar situation three years ago, Mr. MacLeod was criticized by 
the Commission for Local Authority Accounts in Scotland for borrowing from and 
lending to English local authorities. £20 million was involved, and the practice was 
denounced by the Commission as unlawful. The revelation that MacLeod's cousin, Iain 
MacLeod, is a director of the Council's main broker in Edinburgh, R.P.Martin, has 
occasioned comment.
One can but agree with the views of Tim Smith M.P., a chartered accountant, that there 
were sufficient journalistic and television coverage of B.C.C.I. to have alerted
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institutional investors. It is a denial of professional responsibility to place reliance on 
the Bank of England's List of authorised banks when the Bank has constantly made it 
clear that all this means is an authorisation to take deposits at the date of the list. 
Nothing is implied about creditworthiness. The two northern banks, Chancery 
Securities and Eddington, which were on the list, but which failed earlier this year were 
adequate testimony to this. When the writer used to carry out financial vetting of 
contractors accounts, which were used by various professional officers as part of their 
decision-making process, it was always made clear that they should not place exclusive 
reliance on the appraisal, but should make their own independent enquiries, particularly 
from their own professional standpoint as architect, quantity surveyor, or whatever. 
Local government finance directors need to demonstrate more expertise in dealing with 
the world of banking after the previous disaster involving the interest rate swaps. 
Former Director of Finance at the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, 
Clive Holtham, was criticised by the Committee of Inquiry for "most serious 
managerial failure", and after he left for a university professorship at the City 
University Business School, his promoted deputy had to ask what an interest rate swap 
was (London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham 1991). Further reference to this is 
made in Chapter 11.
One can but sympathise with the less well-informed investor. B.C.C.I. did everything 
possible to give a spurious air of respectability to its activities. An example was its 
"green" affinity credit card and its charitable sponsorships. Many of its employees were 
taken in as well, and now face unemployment.
One intriguing deus ex machina explanation for this remarkable uncontrolled event is 
secret service involvement. Nobody wiU ever be able to cite the CIA or the like in their 
defence in an inquiry or court of law. Even so, in the U.S. the House Banking
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Committee subpoenaed documents from the CIA as well as banking regulators and 
others in preparation for hearings which opened' on September 11, 1991. If 
professionals care to prostrate their required independence to outside influence, such as 
the secret services, however well-intentioned and in the national interest they believe it 
to be, then they have to be prepared to take the consequences, such as action for 
negligence. Those who have been defrauded will be unimpressed at being pawns in this 
game. It would be pleasant to forecast that lessons would now be learned for the 
umpteenth time, and that the probability of a recurrence would be slight. History 
suggests otherwise.
6.5.2 THE INTERNAL AUDIT PERSPECTIVE.
B.C.C.I. possessed an internal audit department. It always used to intrigue the writer to 
wonder how an internal auditor could possibly survive in an organization that had so 
much to hide. The answer is beginning to emerge. Internal audit was denied access to 
the two key areas of the business from which the fraud could have been detected. 
Internal audit was apparently in place for the same reason as the green credit card: to 
provide bogus respectability. This does raise the question as to what the internal auditor 
should do in such cases. The Code of Ethics seems to simply pose a moral dilemma. 
On the one hand one has to exhibit loyalty to one's organization and not use 
information gained to its detriment. On the other hand one should not be a party to any 
illegal or improper activity. It is likely that the word "personally ' is implied here. In 
other words, it does not deal with the situation of an entire organisation acting illegally 
or improperly, so long as the internal auditor is not part of it. This view is confirmed 
when one looks at the HA Position Paper on Whistleblowing. This indicates what 
should happen in an ideal situation where there is true independence and adequate 
organizational status, and access to an audit committee comprised solely of non-
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executive directors with a written charter setting out the duties and responsibilities of 
both this committee and of the internal audit department. There also need to be adequate 
resources and authority to carry out such responsibilities.
Plainly this was not the case in B.C.C.I. The Position Statement suggests going 
straight to the board of directors if all else fails. Again this would have been futile in the 
present case. The only remaining advice is to seek legal advice. This does not come 
cheap, and one really wonders what a lawyer can contribute that internal auditors could 
not work out for themselves. Mr. Vivian Ambrose of B.C.C.I.'s UK regional 
inspection department decided that matters had gone far enough, and so he wrote to 
Tony Benn M.P. on 14th June 1990. In the letter he alleged widespread corruption and 
nepotism, and referred to "apparent incompetence by executives". This letter was 
forwarded to government ministers, but through administrative error was never 
attended to. By October 1990, certain irregularities surfaced through other means, and 
the President and Chief Executive Officer resigned. Even then the full urgency of the 
situation was not recognised officially, and as the statutory wheels spun slowly, 
investors' money was being sacrificed as if in a game of roulette.
The DLA-UK had decided to seize upon the media opportunity presented by the BCCI 
case. The Blue Arrow case at the Old Bailey, the Central Criminal Court in the City of 
London, had also placed a spotlight on internal auditors. Hugh Hudson, Inspector at 
the National Westminster Bank, which owned Blue Arrow, stated in evidence that he 
had been let down by top management who had withheld vital information from him. It 
also transpired that Mr. Hudson's working papers and diaries made during the 
investigation had been thrown away. The HA press release of 19th July 1991 spoke of 
the problem being the lack of someone of an independent mind for internal audit to 
report to. It was suggested that banks and all other quoted companies should have a
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direct relationship with internal audit/inspection through an audit committee (Izzard 
1991).
6.6 A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CHIEF INTERNAL AUDITOR.
The chief internal auditor worked for a small district council. He wrote to Professor 
Vinten after an article by Professor Vinten on whistleblowing had appeared in Public 
Finance and Accountancy, the journal of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy, on 13th March 1992. In a subsequent telephone interview, the auditor 
recounted how, as part of his internal audit plan, he had decided to conduct an audit of 
the manually recorded flexi-time system. As a result he discovered a number of 
abuses, the worst of which related to the finance department. The secretary to the 
director of finance was mis-recording her time at work to her advantage, and in 
monetary terms, the amount lost to the authority was around £1,000. The auditor 
considered that claiming to be present when absent was tantamount to stealing money, 
and so wanted action taken. Nothing did happen, but he was thanked for his work, and 
reassured that the point had been noted. He continued to press for tangible action to be 
taken. At this juncture he became unpopular in the eyes of the director, who started to 
find fault with his work, and to take a stem and authoritarian attitude. It was about this 
time that the auditor discovered through gossip channels that the secretary was the 
mistress of the director, and had also had relations with other chief officers and 
councillors. The auditor appealed to the chief executive, with whom the secretary had 
not had any relation. The chief executive seemed sympathetic, but reluctant to take on 
the director. It was clear that the culture of the authority was against such a challenge, 
and by having inadvertently settled on the cosy and possibly cormpt relations within the 
local authority, the chief internal auditor had become a persona non grata. The District 
Auditor had been contacted by the internal auditor, but reckoned there was little that he
62
.could do. In discussion with Professor Vinten, the consensus was that the best way 
out was to seek alternative employment, hopefully on promotion, but certainly to avoid 
any loss of salary. However it was highly likely that such a move would entail 
inconvenience, and some monetary loss.
6.7 CHRISTOPHER URDA.
As reported in the London Evening Standard of 6th August 1992, Christopher was an 
internal auditor with the defence company, the Singer Corporation in the U.S. Mr. 
Urda, aged 35, helped prove that his company had cheated the Pentagon out of the 
equivalent of £38.5 million over eight years. As the newspaper reports in its own house 
style:
" Honesty really is the best policy as auditor Christopher Urda discovered after Uncle 
Sam awarded him £3.75 million for shopping crooked bosses ripping off the American 
government."
The judge made the award "under legislation known in America as the Whistleblower's 
Charter, which rewards citizens who report corporate dishonesty."
Mr. Urda stated, "I was just an ordinary guy, but it was the right thing to do. "
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CHAPTER 7, PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION, INTERNAL AUDITING 
AND WHISTLEBLOWING.
This chapter has a twin purpose. One is to explore participant observation and its place 
within the wider sphere of qualitative research as the most appropriate approach to 
researching whistleblowing. The second is to pursue the analogy of the internal auditor 
as participant observer with heightened realism of the organisation within which he or 
she operates, which will include encountering questionable practices. This then means 
that by the nature of the role, the internal auditor is likely to face more ethical dilemmas, 
and need to consider how best to resolve these. In extreme cases, the whistleblowing 
option may present itself for consideration.
The internal auditor is a type of participant observer, and this means that unless a three 
monkeys' philosophy is to be adopted of seeing nothing, hearing nothing and saying 
nothing, then whistleblowing in varying degrees may become part- and-parcel of such a 
role ( Vinten 1987).
"Observation, however, is not a natural' gift but a highly skilled activity for which an 
extensive background knowledge and understanding is required, and also a capacity for 
original thinking and the ability to spot significant events. It is certainly not an easy 
option." (Nisbet 1977,15).
Participant observation is a means of collecting evidence, and as the quotation suggests, 
it requires skill, knowledge and understanding. In its dominant social sciences 
meaning a researcher seeks to become a member of a group, organisation or event 
under study. It originates in ethnographic research, with researchers living in tribal 
cultures in faraway places. Organizations also may be regarded as tribes or a series of
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tribes, with their various traditions, customs and cultures, (Deal and Kennedy 1988) 
and it is for this reason that the participant observation method commends itself. It 
could involve joining a snake-handling religious cult in West Virginia, walking with a 
protest march, or becoming a committee member. By being immersed in the events in 
progress, the researcher hopes to be in a position to obtain much more information and 
a greater depth of knowledge than would be possible from the outside looking in.
One of the most respected management classics, Alfred P Sloan's "My Years with 
General Motors " (Sloan 1986) is a participant observation study, and there is no 
noticeable criticism of such Chairman or Chief Executive accounts on the basis that they 
lack validity or make no useful contribution to management studies. The non-participant 
observer has been referred to as a spectral presence (Zimmerman and Wieder 1977). 
The participant observer will be an intimate part of the very sinews and tissues of the 
organization being researched. One researcher, who devoted three years to observing a 
grammar school as a teacher, described the experience as " the transfer of the whole 
person into an imaginative and emotional experience in which the fieldworker learned to 
live in and understand the new world. " (Lacey 1976). Many more channels of 
communication will be open, and the observer will be able to be much more 
discriminating and selective in the messages that are received. Junkers suggests a 
continuum between participation and observation, with the two intermediate points of 
the participant as observer and the observer as participant (Junkers 1960):
< >
Complete Participation Observer as Complete
participation. as observer participant observer
In practice this can be confusing, and it may be more helpful to classify such research 
roles as: researcher as employee; research as explicit role; interrupted involvement; and 
observation alone. (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 1991, 96). The researcher as
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employee is a role of total immersion, and to all intents and purposes the researcher is 
one with the employees alongside whom he or she will work. The research may be 
undertaken in an overt or covert way, but the covert mode brings forth ethical issues 
that need to be addressed. With research as the explicit role, the researcher negotiates in 
advance with the management and preferably the employees to spend an extended 
period of time in an organisation, and to observe, interview and participate as desired. 
This approach offers maximum flexibility without engendering the ethical problems that 
may reside in the previous approach. The advantages have been described as:
" The participant as observer not only makes no secret of his investigation: he makes it 
known that research is his overriding interest. He is there to observe. The participant 
observer is not tied down; he is free to move around as research interest beckons." 
(Roy 1970)
With interrupted involvement the researcher is only present on a spasmodic basis, and 
so lacks a longitudinal perspective and is unlikely to be able to experience much direct 
participation. Through only attending with a specific purpose the serendipity factor is 
sacrificed. This is such a significant aspect of the research process, but one which 
many researchers seem embarrassed to admit to, since it does not fully fit into the 
rational model, and it appears that their research has benefitted from factors not of their 
own making. In fact serendipity is more likely to occur to lateral thinkers who maintain 
wide channels of openess in their research, and so stand a better chance to benefit from 
the unpredictable leads that are commonplace in research, and so it is a factor present in 
only the best quality research. Observation alone avoids interaction, and so has strictly 
limited use for research to those cases where observation and objective recording alone 
are required.
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An approach in which participant observation is an integral feature is action research. 
The working definition of action research consists of a series of conditions as follows:
If yours is a situation in which
-people reflect and improve (or develop) their own work and their own situations 
-by tightly integrating their reflection and action
-and also making their experience public not only to other participants but also to 
other persons interested in and concerned about the work and the situation (i.e. their 
(public) theories and practices of the work and the situation) 
and if yours is a situation in which there is increasingly
-data gathering by participants themselves (or with the help of others) in relation to 
their own questions
-participation (in problem-posing and in answering questions) in decision-making 
-power-sharing and the relative suspension of hierarchical ways of working 
towards industrial democracy.
-collaboration among members of the group as a 'critical community' 
-self-reflection, self-evaluation and self-management by autonomous and 
responsible persons and groups
-learning progressively (and publicly) by doing and making mistakes in a 'self- 
reflective spiral' of planning, acting, observing, reflecting, replanning, etc 
-reflection which supports the idea of the '(self-) reflective practitioner' 
then yours is a situation in which ACTION RESEARCH is occurring."
(Zuber-Skerritt 1992, page 14)
Action research is by definition a grounded method, rooted in the realities of the 
situation, with a deep-meaning orientation. Limerick (1991) describes it as a concept, a 
philosophy, an emancipatory process, and a methodology of learning, which for many
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years was a trickle of protest at conventional research and learning methods, but has 
now become a major stream of thought, with the Berlin Walls of institutionalised 
education undergoing reluctant collapse.
It is true that the participant observer will not be able to maintain absolutely rigorous 
research procedures, although in action research and other forms of overt participant 
observation, there is plenty of scope for rigour. One cannot always break off in the 
middle of a conversation to take notes, or tape-record everything that happens. It will 
be necessary to be selective in what is reported. The danger of this is that the criteria 
for selection may not be obvious, and a third party may find it difficult to evaluate the 
appropriateness of the criteria used.
In practice this objection may be largely overcome. An observer who is knowledgeable 
about survey sampling methods will be able to compensate in part, and have in mind 
the need to achieve as representative and valid a sample as possible. 
Representativeness could apply to time periods, locations and individuals. There is an 
inevitable trade-off between the observer’s privileged insider status, and the reduced 
level of statistical reliability that is achieved. It has been said that doing description is 
the fundamental act of data collection in a qualitative study. (Van Maanen 1983,9). In 
any case the wider acceptability of the quantitative approach is built on shifting sands 
when one considers the problems of even formulating the questions that underlie 
survey research (Vinten 1988, 1988a, 1988b).This is compounded by the problem of 
the so-called interviewer effect (Bradbum, Sudman et al 1979, Dijkstra and van der 
Zouwen 1982), not to mention non-response and the difficulties of statistical 
application and interpretation (Vinten 1987). It is certainly true that:
"There are however better and worse maps and qualitative researchers seek to construct
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good ones by moving closer to the territory they study in the physical sense as well as 
in the intellectual sense by minimising the use of such artificial distancing mechanisms 
as analytic labels, abstract hypotheses, and preformulated research strategies."
(Van Maanen, 1983, 10).
There are limitations in both the qualitative approach, in which participant observation 
plays a part, and the quantitative approach, which is the predominant model, 
particularly in academia where the promotions may belong, and it is a brave academic 
who is prepared to step outside this framework. Two such criticise the conventional 
and traditionally intolerant and insensitive gatekeeping that refuses to allow material 
such as theirs on green accounting into the public domain. They refer to the Gaia 
theory, according to which the earth in its constant self-regulation and corrective 
processes, creating the conditions which most favour its own stability and survival in 
the face of people-made pollution and the like, could well lead to the extinction of 
animal life, including human. In the light of potential catastrophe of such dimensions, 
they refer to the lethally archaic nature of the claims of the quantitative school:
" Gaia is clearly indifferent to LOGIT models and their ilk and it seems increasingly 
likely that, if we continue to place the generalisability of samples above the exploration 
of the condition of community and planet, we may well cause the fulfilment of the most 
pessimistic predictions." (Gray and Laughlin 1991).
The experienced observer will not rely on participant observation alone, but will 
supplement by using other methods and approaches, including quantitative ones, and 
the secondary analysis of existing data. In this way different methods will be focussed 
on the same topic, and there should result a more comprehensive understanding of the 
matter being studied. There is a variety of observation study that is standardised and
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systématisée! in a highly quantified way. This is called activity sampling, and it is used 
in management services and operations management. Instant observations are made at 
regular intervals of processes or individuals at work. The nature of the activity is 
recorded at each observation period, and given a sufficiency of measurements, it is 
possible to build up a picture of the frequency of each activity as a percentage of the 
total. This is the ultimate for quantification in observation studies, but it is localised and 
restricted in its significance, generally to one type of occupation at a time, and as a 
management aid it is only carried out at their behest, and is completely overt.
7.1 MORE OBJECTIONS TO PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION.
A further objection is that the mere presence of the observer may affect the actions of 
the observed. It is akin to the Hawthorne effect. It is like the unnatural impact a 
television camera makes on some people's behaviour. A local government committee 
once put on a prima donna performance for the writer when he sat at the press desk in 
order to take some notes during a press strike - it was assumed the strike must have 
suddenly ended. In physics it is the equivalent of the Heisenberg principle. According 
to this it is impossible to determine both the mass and velocity of a moving particle. 
The mere act of observation means that the measurement of one or other of mass or 
velocity will be distorted. A similar effect occurs when an anthropologist seeks to 
investigate a remote tribe. There is always the danger that the foreign body will interact 
with the tribe, thereby altering the nature of what is being observed. There is also 
another danger. Some tribes or groups have become so accustomed to being observed 
that they play the anthropologist at the same game. It is not unknown for them to 
invent stories, traditions or actions which an over-credulous outsider is delighted to 
take on board. Anthropological writings contain an element of this. There is an even 
higher likelihood where the anthropologist does not speak, or has not bothered to leam,
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the language of the tribe. Ambiguity and misunderstanding will abound and the 
possibility of a plausible interpretation is remote indeed.
7.2 ENTER THE INTERNAL AUDITOR
Internal auditors will be able to draw parallels with their own situation. By definition 
they are part of their own organisation, and thus they are participant observers, whether 
they recognise it or not. The external auditor or management consultant, by way of 
contrast, are outside observers who enter the organisation for brief periods only. They 
do not participate in any meaningful sense. It is true that interaction does take place, 
and they will make some sort of impact on the organisation. It is reserved for the 
internal auditor to make complete use of the opportunities that full-blooded participant 
observation permits, as well as being aware of the limitations, and how to allow for 
these, or overcome them whenever possible.
Auditors have rarely been identified as participant observers, with perhaps only three 
exceptions (Fetterman 1986, Nich 1987, Vinten 1987). This is surprising, since the 
label can do much to enlighten the nature of the internal audit task. It is additionally 
surprising since internal audit is often regarded by academics and thoughtful 
practitioners as a social science, where the method of participant observation is 
accorded a position of respect. It can help to explain why internal audit independence 
and objectivity are impossible to achieve in any absolute sense. Nevertheless, like the 
need to be as representative as possible in one's sampling procedures, they remain as 
vital background factors to be complied with as far as is practically possible. The 
internal auditor can also identify with the need to identify with the tribe' without 
becoming completely absorbed into it. It is vital to leam the language of the 'tribe' 
especially when attempting an operational audit. If one has not learned the language of
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the department being audited, then the auditor will be unable to distinguish sense from 
nonsense, and the auditee will find it easy to discredit the audit report.
7.3 COVERT PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION
So far we have considered open participant observation, where no secret is made of 
what is going on. There is full disclosure that the participant observer has an ulterior 
motive, however benign. In time the other members of the organisation probably 
forget about this peculiar role of one of their number, rather as the inclusion of the 
cuckoo in the nest achieves acceptance. They return to their normal behaviour, and the 
participant observer is then able to obtain a reliable pictufe.Another option is covert 
participant observation. Here the researcher conceals true identity and plays another 
role. True identity remains a secret to those being observed, as does the nature and 
even the existence of the research. The researcher 'goes native', plays undercover, and 
is identified more with the world of spying and counter espionage.
Jokes are often told about extremist political groups the membership of which consists 
entirely of police undercover agents; also the religious sects stocked up with 
sociologists of religion.. The major advantage may be that the Heisenberg effect can be 
avoided, provided the covert participant observer takes a relative back seat. However, 
if the aim is to be privy to the top decision-making organs of the organisation, it will be 
necessary to adopt a higher profile in order to join the top councils, and then the danger 
of becoming an agent provocateur arises. Let us consider three examples (Bulmer 
1982). Then we will discuss the dangers and opportunities, before suggesting the 
application to audit work, if any. Finally we will draw conclusions as to the use of the 
participant observation method to internal audit work.
EXAMPLE 1. THE PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL
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A group of eight pseudopatients infiltrated a range of different types of American 
psychiatric hospital. They claimed to be hearing voices with unclear messages, but 
which appeared to say 'empty', 'hollow' and thud'. Apart from falsifying symptoms, 
name, vocation and employment, no other changes were made. Immediately upon 
admission the pseudopatients ceased simulating any abnormality and behaved as usual. 
Despite this all were labelled as schizophrenic, showered with tablets (which they 
avoided swallowing, as apparently did many real patients), and treated as being 
mentally ill. The fact that the normal are not detectably sane threw up many questions 
as to how discriminating psychiatric diagnosis is. The effectiveness of such institutions 
is also in doubt. How many 'patients', sane outside the psychiatric hospital, become 
'insane' within it, simply in reaction to their bizarre setting?
EXAMPLE 2. HOMOSEXUALITY
Laud Humphreys posed as a watchqueen in male public restrooms (toilets) in order to 
research male homosexual behaviour. He recorded the vehicle, state, and licence 
number, and used a friendly policeman to trace their addresses. Heavily disguised, and 
after a lapse of time, he visited the men in their homes, claiming to be conducting a 
social health survey. Nobody recognised him, and he was able to collect considerable 
background information. As usual in these surveys, strict anonymity was preserved.
EXAMPLE 3. THE BRITISH POLICE
Simon Holdaway was a police sergeant in a busy, urban police sub- division. He 
considered that covert participant observation was the only viable research method that 
would reveal insights into the true workings of the police force. He catalogued many
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incidents, and found that policing was a sporadic, essentially actionless job, but that the 
lower ranks regarded it as highly action-oriented and had to construct a world of action 
through technology and other devices. He also cut through the rhetoric of police 
professionalism to reveal ineffective management throughout the ranks. Holdaway 
eventually resigned from the police to become a lecturer, and to write up his research.
7.4 DANGERS AND OPPORTUNITIES
The following dangers may be suggested:
1. It is invasion of privacy. The trouble is to define what is public and private. 
There is no absolute right to privacy. Much depends on the circumstances, and similar 
behaviour may be both public and private according to time of day and place.
2. It can jeopardise future research and give rise to a poor image. This is probably 
true of any type of research. One never quite knows the outcome, and some vested 
interest is always liable to come forward and attempt to block future research, and try to 
undermine research itself as a defense mechanism.
3. It places a burden on the investigator. Any investigation can do this, and some are 
more suited to it than others. Certainly care needs to be exercised in selecting 
investigators, with full briefings, support and debriefings being provided.
4. It is discruptive both on the setting and on those observed. This again can 
potentially apply to any form of investigation. It may be desirable at the end to question 
research subjects as to the degree of disruption they felt.
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5. Deception is never justified. This standpoint depends upon a consensus view of 
society. However it may sometimes be more appropriate to adopt a conflict model. If 
subjects employ lies, deceit, deception, fraud and blackmail the investigator may feel 
justified in going covert in order to expose them. Jack D Douglas has suggested that 
the model is best provided by "spies, counterspies, police, detectives, prosecutors, 
judges, psychiatrists, tax collectors, probation officers .... investigative journalists" 
and others. He does not mention auditors, but it seems a fair assumption that these 
would qualify for inclusion in such a list. Douglas believes that his view accords with 
the nature of American society (Douglas 1976).
6. It violates the principle of informed consent. This doctrine goes back to the 1949 
Nuremberg Code. It was formulated at the trials of those charged with carrying out 
unethical medical experiments in Nazi Germany. Voluntary consent, based on free 
power of choice and sufficient knowledge, is seen as essential (Diener and Crandall 
1978).
7.5 OPPORTUNITIES.
The opportunities are that the method permits a fuller and more accurate insight into 
situations than would otherwise be possible. Indeed either overt or covert participant 
observation may be the only way to access certain types of workplace behaviour, 
particularly those organizational processes otherwise sealed off from the outer world 
(Beynon 1988,29). An instructive example took place in the case of the merger of the 
two US banks (Buono and Bowditch, 1989). Whistleblowing is a form of participant 
observation that does not start as such, but is triggered by the illegal or unethical acts of 
the organisation. The potential whistleblower is then motivated to seek evidence in a 
more systematic fashion, and thereby joins the research community, although they are
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more likely to regard themselves as fighting a cause (Vinten 1992 and 1992f).
Participant observation may be the only practical way to achieve an awareness of 
common workplace practices, which are nevertheless easily concealed from external 
observation, including that of the external auditor and management consultant. Gerald 
Mars has shown this in his analysis of occupational crime (Mars 1982).
Another study, which took six years to complete, with 10,000 hours of disguised 
participant observation, collected 451 cases of unconventional practices at work in the 
entertainment industry ( Analoui and Kakabadse 1992). It found unconventional 
behaviour to be an undeniable aspect of workplace activities, and this leads to 
inefficiencies in many organizations. The research led to the suggestion that there may 
be three dimensions to such activities.These are (i) the forms they may take (pilferage, 
rule^breaking, non-cooperation, destructive practices, disruptive practices, and misuse 
of facilities), (ii) the overt and covert styles in both individual and collective forms as 
the expression, and (iii) the motives for their occurrence and the meanings attributed to 
them. This classification formed the basis for an effective development programme that 
would assist managers to deal with such behaviour. Both motivation and control were 
found to be of equal importance, and specific recommendations were made.
This practical and consequential research would have been impossible to conduct 
effectively in any other way. Employees would never trust an investigator for fear of 
results falling into management hands. Additionally managers themselves were 
occasionally indulging in unconventional practices, sometimes in collusion with 
employees. The researcher identified common difficulties with this type of research: 
immersion, empathy, personal bias, taking the reality under investigation for granted, 
inaccessibility to certain information, and the extended time it can take.There was a lack
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of structure and predictability as to the time needed to complete. This is because, 
according to Glaser and Strauss' grounded theory:
" The tempo of the research is difficult to know beforehand because it is contingent on 
the tempo of the emerging theory." (Glaser and Strauss, 74).
One is reminded of the distinction between strategies deliberate and emergent 
(Mintzberg and Waters 1985). The researcher also needs to maintain a position within 
the field of enquiry until the pieces of the jigsaw begin to come together, and 
hypotheses and theories, wherever possible emerge. Constant threats to such research 
are being dismissed or having one’s cover blown before the research is 
completed.There is also the issue of when to withdraw. Premature withdrawal will not 
do justice to the richness of the data. Delayed withdrawal will represent a waste of 
energy and an opportunity cost. There are certainly risks in this type of research - are 
there not in most things? - and careful planning and supervision is crucial:
" Careful planning and piloting are essential, and it takes practice to get the most out of 
this technique. However, once mastered, it is a technique that can often reveal 
characteristics of groups or individuals which would have been impossible to discover 
by other means." (Bell 1987).
All research is a trade-off of benefits and disbenefits. The public interest argument is 
paramount. Do the insights gained justify the possible disbenefits? In the three 
examples given it would seem that they do, although the homosexual example is the 
most dubious. Only in retrospect do the results seem useful. The other two seem very 
much in the public interest, and would otherwise not have been possible.
7.6 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH AS A MODEL.
77
Table 1 was based on an unpublished brainstorming session on the usefulness of 
qualitative research carried out at Social and Community Planning Research, and here 
modified for use in internal auditing. Participant observation forms a part of qualitative 
research, and it shows the countless situations in which the qualitative approach may 
be approporiate.
WHY QUALITATIVE RESEARCH IN INTERNAL AUDITING?
1. To find out in auditees' own words the reasons for an occurrence.
2. To allow the auditees'perspective to emerge,
3. Permits the extent of the auditees' knowledge and understanding to be discovered.
4. For audits complex in definition and scope.
5. To explore organizational stracture and feedback mechanisms.
6. To assess range and variety of experience so that the most significant auditees are 
interviewed.
7. To construct an audit report based on auditees' own viewpoints.
8. To allow auditees to introspect on reasons for carrying out an operation or 
procedure.
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9. To find key auditee phrases which sum up attitudes or experiences.
10. To seek out extra insight into auditee and auditor experiences.
11. To find out the motives, even emotions, behind a decision or situation.
12. To avoid making an auditee feel inhibited or curtailed.
13. To give auditees time to think and develop their responses.
14. To explore in-depth attitudes to comments made in an audit report.
15. To allow auditees to talk freely.
16. To explore the appeal, strengths and weaknesses of a new management 
philosophy.
17. To gain an understanding of informal processes.
18. To discover how responsive internal audit or other service departments are to user 
needs.
19. To investigate apparent contradictions between attitudes and behaviour.
20. To discuss the variations of auditee performance from benchmarking measures.
21. To maximise the creative interaction between auditor and auditee.
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22. To explore auditee rationalizations of audit findings.
23. Cost effective and potentially speedy method.
24. To delve into sensitive issues.
25. As a preliminary to a full audit survey.
TABLE 1: A ROLE FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
Table 2 illustrates the phases of research for which qualitative research is best suited, as 
well as where it may be used as a preliminary or main research method. Suggestions 
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TABLE 2 : SUITABILITY OF QUALITATIVE RESËACH FOR PHASES OF 
RESEARCH PROCESS.
7.7 THE INTERNAL AUDIT APPLICATION
It is arguably only in extreme cases that the internal auditor will wish to employ covert 
investigative techniques. The impetus will be exactly those situations outlined by 
Douglas. Where fraud, deceit and corruption are being practised the auditor, however 
regrettably, may need to respond covertly. The internal auditor, except in a very large 
organisation, will be limited in this response since he or she will already be known.
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However with rapid staff turnover, opportunities present themselves, as does a 
company with separate headquarters and divisionalised audit teams. With the short-stay 
syndrome in internal audit, whereby individuals enter and exit throughout or during 
their career, an element of covert participant observation takes place naturally. This is 
slightly different, since there may be no original intention, but when a member of staff 
from elsewhere is transferred into audit, use may be made of insights already gained. It 
may pinpoint where to look and what the problems are. Professional ethics do suggest 
the individual with a previous involvement should not audit until a reasonable time has 
elapsed.
Covert participant observation may not just be limited to punitive areas such as fraud 
investigation. It may be of use in management audit. The studies on psychiatric 
hospitals and the police throw up many issues regarding efficiency and effectiveness. 
It is debatable whether the internal auditor should be directly involved in such work, 
but the work having been done, there is much the management auditor would wish to 
fasten on to. Auditors on first entering a building may be unknown, and for a short 
time be in a covert situation. It is telling to stand in a queue with the public to see how 
they are treated, just as observing the behaviour of reception staff and switchboard 
operators may subsequently become part of an audit of the organisation's 
communications systems. Auditors, posing as the public, sometimes test out the 
strength of the organisation's security system. These initiatives seem to be more 
constructive than damaging, although much will depend upon how they are treated.
7.8 CONCLUSIONS
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Internal auditors, by the nature of their work, are natural participant observers in their 
organisations. They therefore need to consider the strengths and weaknesses this role 
places them in, and much can be gained from the literature of the social sciences. The 
notion of informed consent, not previously brought into the audit discussion, also 
deserves careful thought. How far and in what circumstances should informed consent 
be sought? If auditee cooperation is to be maximised, or a cooperative partnership 
concept developed, informed consent provides a suitable basis.
The use of covert participant observation, except in its strictly limited and benign form, 
would seem to be counterproductive, unless there are legal infractions that need 
investigating. It may be preferable to take this responsibility away from internal audit, 
and create a special fraud and security section. As part of their desk research auditors 
may well wish to make use of the fruits of others' covert participant observation 
studies.
It is through participant observation that greater insights are to be gained into the real 
workings of organisations and those that work within them. Internal auditors are 
naturally participant observers, with access to a wider range of an organisation's 
workings than applies to almost all other staff. This means that there are more 
opportunities of discovering unethical or even illegal behaviour that might otherwise 
remain concealed, and this then raises the dilemma, if the issue is unresolved, of 
whether a participant observer should blow the whistle.
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CHAPTER 8. THE SOCIAL AUDIT •
T -
In this chapter a variety of audit is examined which, by its very nature, delves into 
matters of social and ethical concern. Such delving may have been inspired by the 
revelations of a whistleblower, by external pressure group activity, or be internally 
generated. If the reaction to such audits is mishandled, there is a high probability that 
whistleblowing may result.
It is difficult to envisage an unsocial auditor. Audit is intrinsically a social activity. A 
Robinson Crusoe auditor, working in splendid isolation, will be of little use within an 
organisation, and will be particularly hard pressed to have recommendations 
implemented. The successful auditor is an up- front individual. Refusing to hide 
behind a mystical smoke- screen of professional jargon and arcane techniques, the 
auditor aims for maximum communication. Contacts are especially fostered on an 
informal basis, since this is where organisations ply much of their business. By being 
social the auditor displays the professional wares, the stock-in-trade, for all to see. 
This means that the auditor's vulnerability is increased. Achievement will bring forth 
praise; mistakes will inspire criticism. Even so, this is a much healthier environment in 
which to flourish than one in which the auditor is not even noticed, even if more risk is 
involved. The social auditor maintains a shop-window within the organisation, and 
actively encourages social contact. This ideal-type of auditor is likely to be more aware 
of the external environment, and in an organisation that decides to try to cover up, this 
could lead to whistleblowing situations.
There is, however, another species of audit that bears the name social audit', and 
which has as its objective to keep organisations on their toes, and in the event of their 
default, to whistleblow on them. There is a connecting strand with our previous
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discussion. Just as the social auditor is the only viable form of auditor, so the social 
organisation (company, central or local government department, voluntary body or 
whatever) is the only viable form of organisation. Any organisation that wishes to 
survive and flourish needs to be in constant and dynamic interaction with the wider 
environment. Customers, investors, employees and the community at large (which 
always includes potential customers, investors and employees) all need to be 
considered. An organisation that constantly creates a negative social impact may find 
the withdrawal of public approval and of the market for its product or services. This 
view, which may seem to be little more than a conventional wisdom, does not go 
unchallenged. The American monetarist economist. Professor Milton Friedman, has 
stated uncompromisingly that social responsibility is
"a fundamentally subversive doctrine....few trends could so thoroughly undermine the 
very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social 
responsibility other than to make as much for their stockholders as possible".
To Friedman the only social responsibility of a corporation is to make a profit - the 
business of business, and the return to investors is paramount. Anything beyond this 
represents a dereliction of duty, a sick perversion that ultimately will undermine the 
stability of the economy and society as a whole (Friedman 1962). An even more 
extreme version of Friedman is represented in Sternberg (1994) where it is argued that 
Friedman was too modest in characterising the use of a company's resources for non- 
profitable purposes as unauthorised taxation. Sternberg regards such activity as " theft : 
an unjustified appropriation of the owners' property - as surely as if they had dipped 
their hands into the till."
85
8.1 THE COMMUNIST CONTRIBUTION.
A strongly contrasting view at the other end of the spectrum was represented by 
Communism. Here the means of production and distribution were viewed as servants 
of the State and subservient to the wishes of the people, as expressed by those 
politicians in control at any particular point in time. All organizations were regarded 
as quintessentially social, just as all audit may be regarded as social. This becomes 
apparent when we examine the names of communist audit organs. Yugoslavia 
established a 'Social Accounting Service' in 1959 with the purpose of watching over 
the legality of the disbursement of (public) social funds through pre-audits, in loco and 
post-audits. East Germany had the 'Workers' and Peasants' Inspection’, with the 
State and People's Control' in Bulgaria, and People's Control' in Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the last country 
providing the blueprint for the other developments.
The People's Control in the U.S.S.R. was an expansive network, operating under the 
direct leadership of the Central Committee of the communist party and of the Council 
of Ministers. It stretched down through all the different levels and geographical 
divisions using a mixture of professionals' and lay people, until at the lowest level 
(villages, offices, institutes, enterprises) the 'people's element' took over completely 
with 600,000 control groups, about as many control posts, and the participation of 
more than 9.5 million people's controllers. There was a gargantuan number of units to 
survey, with over 30,000 industrial enterprises and unions, 24,500 construction and 
assembly enterprises, 20,000 state farms, 90,000 communications units, 265,000 
service organisations, 215,000 shops and 75 per cent of city dwellings. There were 
additionally hundreds of thousands of units concerned with agriculture, consumption 
and housing cooperatives. Characteristically audits were of on-going activities, with ex
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post facto financial audits playing a smaller role, and being undertaken by the internal 
audit divisions of the various ministries, notably finance. Scope was wide and includes 
economic, financial and administrative - organizational activities, and considers legality, 
economy, efficiency and expediency. This meant that the soviet view of the 3 E's 
(Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness) was modified by the substitution of 
expediency for effectiveness. This expediency might include cases where political 
expediency was used as a criterion. Political audit was the same as the people's audit 
which was the same as social audit. Whistleblowing was encouraged under this 
system, but how well it would be received, depended on the identity of the miscreant, 
and whether this person continued out of favour. The informer could be rewarded with 
an upgrading in the housing market, but could suffer recrimination following the 
rehabilitation of the 'whistleblowee' (Szawlowski 1981).
8.2 SOCIAL AUDIT IN A MIXED ECONOMY
Most societies, including the one which bred Friedman and those that play variations on 
the Marxist theme, do not achieve anything like the purity of the doctrine that may be 
attributed to them. The United States of America has so many countervailing 
tendencies, checks and balances that Friedman comes under constant challenge. 
Similarly a country such as the People's Republic of China is undergoing cultural and 
economic change that the purity is diluted. Realistically what we are seeking is the 
middle ground - a social audit suitable for the mixed economy which predominates 
throughout the world. It is a compromise between the no social audit of Friedman and 
the total social audit of Marxism.
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8.3 A DEFINITION
It was in recognition of this much needed compromise that Gerald Vinten attempted a 
definition which hopes to extrapolate between the two opposing polarities of Friedman 
and Marxism (Vinten 1985 and 1990c). The definition is
'A review to ensure that an organisation gives due consideration to its wider and social 
responsibilities to those both directly and indirectly affected by its decisions, and that a 
balance is achieved in its corporate planning between these aspects and the more 
traditional business-related objectives'
Since in practice most of the better-known and publicized social audits have been 
carried out by external pressure groups’ of one kind or another, some have questioned 
use of the word audit. John Humble, who uses the term social responsibility audit' 
comments on the drawback of using the term audit (Humble 1973). It can be seen as 
an entirely quantitative measurement, such as the financial audit, and this the social 
audit is never likely to be. Our present knowledge in this area does not permit us to 
define precisely all the problems, let alone know how to measure all the outputs. 
Nevertheless, John Humble argues, audit' is used in this context because of its rich 
associations with objectivity; comprehensive analysis; regularity, reporting and so on. 
He concedes that 'social responsibility audit' may not be the best or final label, but that 
it does not matter. The concern is with a practical process, not a label, which can 
always be changed. John Humble believes, as I do, that the social audit should be 
primarily internally generated. This does not rule out that someone will take it upon 
themselves to undertake an external social audit. It would mean that such an external 
social audit should not cause quite the same trauma if the organisation had a 
responsiveness engendered already through its existing internal processes, which
88
.should generally remove the cause of whistleblowing. We examine the external 
approach first.
8.4 EXTERNAL SOCIAL AUDIT
There is no statutory requirement for an external social audit anywhere, unless we play 
with words and consider all Communist audit to be social. Even here one could argue 
that there is no concept of 'externality' since the State, or the people, embrace 
everything. External social audit therefore has no particular linkages with accountancy.
For an organisation with no internal social audit capacity, the external social audit is 
likely to come as a shock. < In extreme circumstances, such as Union Carbide, the 
external social audit, in this case conducted via American Congressional hearings and 
by the Indian government, reaches virtually terminal proportions for the organisation, 
which is forced to close down an entire plant. Indeed the viability of the whole 
company is in jeopardy. This company, in a deliberate and calculated fashion, chose 
to ignore its social responsibilities. The profit motive reigned supreme. The outcome 
was mass tragedy on an unprecedented scale, with world public censure, and an 
ongoing external social audit interest through the mass media that never lets up. The 
definition of an external social audit is similar to that for internal, but begins:
"A review to ensure that an organisation is forced to give due consideration...."
8.5 NOT THE 39 BUT THE 5 STEPS
Esther Peterson, who worked as;consumer advisor to Presidents Johnson, Kennedy 
and Carter, and was also consumer advocate with Giant Foods Incorporated, has
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, suggested that business reaction to such external pressure progresses through five 
distinct phases (Peterson 1974), which I have adapted to suit the present case:
Step 1. Deny everything. To accept the legitimacy of such an external social audit 
involves a philosophical and emotional wrench.
Step 2. If denying fails to work, try to discredit whoever made the charge.
An organisation is not prepared to consider the sincerity of external review, and so has 
to question the motives involved
Step 3. When no action results, and legal or legislative action is pursued, oppose 
everything. Organisations are unprepared to see that reasonable and timely voluntary 
reform is the best deterrent to potentially restrictive legislation.
Step 4. If legislation is passed, or regulations written, try to 'defame' anything that 
. is enacted by working against implementation or getting an opponent of the law 
appointed to administer it.
Step 5. Do something about the problems. After repeated frustration, the 
, awakening comes and business realises that service is its first obligation if it is to 
grow and prosper. The best way to cope with the problems is to face the allegations 
seriously, give a fair hearing, and make a serious effort to do something constructive 
to correct the shortcoming.
In lieu of a Step 5 response it is possible that legislation will result. Organisations 
generally prefer non-legislative means as being more flexible and less costly. However 
the State, bearing in mind public opinion or in advance of public opinion, may decide
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that the pace of change is too slow. Hence we have legislation on Health and Safety, 
Equal Opportunities, Race Relations and the like, as well as a wide range of 
government inspectorates ranging through plant health and seeds, river pollution, 
diving, agricultural wages, railways and anatomy (Rhodes 1981). As an example, 
Genture Restaurants Ltd. of Birmingham no douht wished subsequently that they had 
taken race relations more seriously, and taken their own initiative to formulate policy 
(Commission for Racial Equality 1978). Found guilty of various contraventions, 
including a refusal to admit Chinese students, the company was put to considerable 
expense over the investigation, and then compelled to formulate and publicise a written 
policy statement, and to submit to a periodic inspection by the Commission for 
compliance. /
A stipulation of the Fair Trading Act 1973 was the duty of the Director General of Fair 
Trading to :
"encourage relevant trade associations to prepare, and disseminate to their members, 
codes of practice for guidance in safeguarding and promoting the interests of 
consumers in the United Kingdom". '
Such codes have had a measure of success, but where there has been a fragmented 
trade dealing with a complex product, such as the motor car, success has been strictly 
limited. The Advertising Standards Authority may be considered a more telling success 
story in self-regulation. Another example is the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau, which 
started work in March 1981. This was a spontaneously generated development among 
some of the leading insurance companies, and applied only to these companies, which 
had to agree to accept awards of up to £100,000 without dispute. There had been some 
preceding public and official concern about the insurance industry, and so this was a
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.reasonable Step 5 response.
External social audits have been undertaken by a variety of organisations. Some of 
these are specialist pressure groups, such as War on Want investigating the baby killer 
scandal', the promotion and sale of powdered baby milks in the Third World, and 
naming the offending companies (Chetley 1979). The United Kingdom Alliance for 
Temperance Reform has published many reports on the alcohol industry and alcohol 
abuse. In response a trade association, the Brewers' Society, has published a list of the 
socially oriented medical research and educational campaigns that it funds (Brewers' 
Society 1982). Similarly the Tobacco Industry has heen forced to respond to 
widespread criticism (British American Tobacco 1992, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c) as has 
the pharmaceutical industry (Braithwaite 1984). The Soil Association has considered 
chemical additives in food (Soil Association 1984).
8.6 SOCIAL AUDIT LIMITED
More generalised pressure groups include Social Audit Limited and the National 
Consumer Council. Social Audit is an independent, non profit making body concerned 
with improving government and corporate responsiveness to the public generally. Its 
surveys are extremely wide-ranging. In the public sector it investigated the system of 
parliamentary questions and their effectiveness (Medawar 1980). It also considered 
mental hospital nurses and the responses open to them if witnessing patient abuse 
(Beardshaw 1981). In the private sector it provided a comprehensive analysis of the 
social audit of significant aspects of a business, including design, manufacture and 
quality control, packaging and labelling, marketing and competition, after sales and the 
end product (Medawar 1978).
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Its most thoroughgoing and all-embracing social audit was on the Avon Rubber 
Company Ltd (Social Audit Ltd 1976). This report was the first ever of its kind. It was 
carried out with grants from the Social Science Research Council and Joseph Rowntree 
Charitable Trust, and was a unique attempt to describe the major social costs and 
benefits of a company's business operation. A remarkable degree of cooperation was 
achieved with both the company's management and trade unions. In addition access 
was attained on normally secret government files on the company. The 
comprehensiveness of the report can be seen in that Avon's activities are reported 
under some fifty different headings, containing information that most companies treat 
as strictly confidential. These ranged over the business (organisation, management 
style, resource use, investment, financial accounting), employees (pay and fringe 
benefits, job security, participation and alienation, health and safety, training, women, 
race relations, and employment of disabled), consumer products and services (types of 
wheel and tyre, inflatables, advertising and public relations, government and military 
contracting) and the environment and local community (air, river and waste pollution, 
energy use and conservation, external noise, and community involvement and 
donations). This social audit is of considerable interest to internal auditors in its scope, 
coverage and methodology. It ranks with those other two pioneering initiatives - the 
Confederation of British Industry study on Cheshire County Council (Confederation of 
British Industry 1984) and the Audit Commission study on Basildon District Council ( 
Audit Commission 1984). All three reports represent what Brink and Witt refer to as 
integrated operational audit' (Brink and Witt 1982). By this they refer to a composite 
audit, dealing with the complete span of operational activities of a self-sufficient 
company or other broadly based operational unit. My own preferred term for this is 
'corporate audit.
8.7 NATIONAL CONSUMER COUNCIL
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The National Consumer Council has tastes as equally catholic as those of Social Audit 
Limited. It undertook a large survey of the social security system, thus providing an 
external social audit for the Department of Health and Social Security (National 
Consumer Council 1984). In Scotland a study was completed on the public right of 
admission to local authority meetings and on access to information ( Scottish Consumer 
Council 1985). Their work on consumer performance indicators, was described by 
the then Director of the Council as being an area where new ground had been trodden 
(Vinten 1985a) and is set out in an article (Mitchell 1983). This was then extended to 
consider selected areas within local government, such as housing repairs, street 
cleansing, lighting and the education of under 5s.
There are warnings to be sounded as to the extent to which an organisation should 
make use of these external social audits. The social audits we have examined have been 
performed by highly reputable bodies with a sound research capability. This may not 
always be the case. There are three points to bear in mind:
1. It is important to consider the standing, legitimacy and representativeness of the 
external social auditor. It may be that such audits should be ahead of public social 
opinion. On the other hand it is necessary to ensure that minority opinions neither 
exercise disproportionate influence, nor are completely overlooked.
2. The social audits should represent opinions that are relatively permanent. If a 
situation or opinion is fluid, then it is unrealistic to expect organisations to make major 
policy adjustments. If they did it would maximise short term expediency at the expense 
of the longer term trend.
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3. The social audit must involve an informed consideration of the possible range of 
alternatives for coping with the situation.
8.8 INTERNAL SOCIAL AUDIT
The case for an organisation to perform its own internal social audit is compelling. 
Otherwise it becomes a creature of fortune, responding to external stimuli, rather than 
taking the steering wheel. Crisis social management comes expensive. Third party 
liability has become and established legal principle, particularly in the U.S.A. where it 
has a longer antiquity and has developed at a quicker pace. We have already discussed 
that however reluctant an organisation is to enter these waters, the law has already 
compelled some interest to be taken in these areas. Beyond this basic and rudimentary 
enforced social audit concern, the extent of internal social audit depends upon the 
organisation's attitude to business ethics and society, as well as to its more immediate 
stakeholders. The smaller organisation could only be expected to have a limited 
involvement as compared with medium and large size companies. This accords with 
their comparative social and economic influence. Some local communities rely almost 
exclusively on one company. In other areas the local authority has all the social 
responsibilities of being the major employer. It also accords with thinking on financial 
audit which places the small company in a special category.
8.9 MOTIVATION
The motivation for entering into the discretionary waters is variable. It is instructive to 
reapply the categories that Richard Titmuss first formulated with reference to blood 
donation (Titmuss 1973). He distinguishes eight types of donor ranging along a 
continuum from the paid donor at the one end to the voluntary community donor at the
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other. The former is involved in a mechanical, impersonal transaction conducted on a 
private market basis. The price will depend upon supply and demand factors. Some 
refer to this as the mercenary donor. In organisational terms any expenditure on social 
responsibility items will be strictly confined to action without which profitability will be 
jeopardised. There will be no element of philanthropy, and the expenditure must have a 
business justification. The opposite polarity is of the voluntary community donor. 
This is the closest approximation to the idea of a 'free human gift'. Such donations are 
characterised by the absence of tangible immediate rewards in monetary or non­
monetary forms; the absence of penalties, financial or otherwise; and the knowledge 
among donors that they give to unnamed strangers without distinction of age, sex, 
medical condition, income, class, religion or ethnic group. In organisation terms this 
would involve anonymous donations to charities, as opposed to the 'tied-aid' often 
characteristic of government overseas aid. The organisation would not seek publicity, 
but would act purely for the sake of action.
This pure form is rarely found in practice. Few donors are motivated by complete, 
disinterested, spontaneous altruism. Most donors are in the intermediate categories. 
Pilkington, the glass company, is an example of a family firm, steeped in philanthropy, 
which was forced to move away from family charity to the less 'pure' philanthropy 
based upon business rationale, when it went public (Sorell 1989) .The question is does 
this lack of purity matter? If one insisted on Titmuss' Type H (voluntary community 
donor) then there would be little social responsibility activity to chalk up. It may be 
preferable not to question motivation beyond a certain point, but simply to accept the 
activity with gratitude. After all most organisations will seek to exploit their examples 
of social responsibility to a greater or lesser extent.
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8.10 INTEGRATED INTERNAL SOCIAL AUDIT
A social audit conducted in splendid isolation on an ad hoc basis will be of limited use. 
Both the social responsibility activities and the social audit need to be integrated with 
the other activities of the organisation. A board member or senior manager needs to 
adopt a coordination role, and activities should form part of the corporate plans. The 
social audit should therefore arise out of and be fed into the strategic and operational 
planning process. Systematically and organisation-wide, the existing policies and 
practices should be examined, and strengths and weaknesses highlighted. An 
improvement plan, short and long term, should be prepared and this will be balanced 
with other objectives and suitably integrated with them. This was behind the wording 
of my definition. Progress and implementation would be monitored periodically, and 
any modifications agreed and noted. This is like any planning cycle, and social 
responsibility matters simply become a natural and indispensable element in this.
There is no doubting the global influence of the quality movement. It is therefore 
persuasive to note the role that ethical considerations play in various quality award 
schemes, and this furthers the argument towards an integrated approach. Take the 1994 
European Quality Award, which has a section on impact on society which counts for 
6% of the weighting, although ethical considerations appear elsewhere and so the 
overall weighting is much greater. The section reads :
"What the perception of your company is amongst the community at large. This 
includes views of the company’s approach to quality of life, the environment and to the 
preservation of global resources. Evidence is needed of the company's success in 
satisfying the needs and expectations of the community at large. This should be 
expressed as : a -you r company's actual performance
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b~ your company's own targets.
and wherever possible
c- the performance of competitors.
d~ the performance of "best in class "organisations. "
8.11 THE INTERNAL AUDIT ROLE
Marketing involves fulfilling the wants of customers, or of social need, ensuring the 
supply of goods or services, of the right quality at a reasonable price or cost, at an 
appropriate time. Repeat orders are vital, and organisations which flaunts the profit 
motive at the expense of other considerations will achieve a poor image.
If social responsibility affairs are represented in corporate plans and statements then 
there is something to audit. If they are not, then the rudimentary legal framework for 
social responsibility may still be audited, and compliance with this legislation will form 
the topic for the audit. Failing this the auditor may be concerned with expediency, and 
the mix and balance within the organisation. The auditor may draw comparisons with 
competitors, and the extent to which market position is being sacrificed by a too narrow 
focus on the profit motive alone. As already stated, the auditor is on shifting sands, 
and has left the cosy security of the financial audit. Nevertheless auditors who can 
make a contribution here are head and shoulders above their peers, and have really
established their worth to the organisation. If only an internal auditor had performed a
social audit on Union Carbide! One can therefore posit a continuum:
Full social audit No social audit
< >
Whistleblowing unnecessary Whistleblowing possible
The possibility depends on the auditor's ethical perspective and the situation.
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CHAPTER 9. COSMIC WHISTLEBLOWING
It is now time to review briefly whistleblowing elsewhere, and the reaction it excites. 
A small number has achieved fame and acclaim. An example is Leslie Chapman who 
took the exceptional step of breaking civil service convention, if not the Official Secrets 
Act, and speaking out about waste and extravagance in the British Civil Service 
(Chapman 1978). Interestingly enough the problems in his old department, the 
Ministry of Works, now the Property Services Agency, continue to the present time, 
with large collusive frauds having continued even after the formal Wardale Committee 
of Inquiry. Leslie Chapman continued his theme in his next book, but broadened out 
into local government and nationalized industry. Indeed he was deliberately placed on 
the board of London Transport as a result of his first book, and set about rooting out 
abuses there (Chapman 1982). Another whistleblower, on local government and 
nationalized industry, is Alex Henney (Henney 1984) and it is likely that the stands he 
has taken has upset the establishment, and led to discrimination against him.
Clive Ponting O.B.E. received considerable publicity when he sent secret Ministry of 
Defence documents to Parliament revealing Government cover-up over the sinking of 
the Argentinian warship , General Belgrano during the skirmish over the Falklands. 
One has to question an action which was perhaps more aimed at restoring naval and 
government credibility than reaching a diplomatic solution, and which led to substantial 
loss of life, including on the British side in the retaliatory action of the sinking of
H.M.S. Sheffield (Ponting 1985, 1987 ). Ponting was prosecuted under the Official 
Secrets Act, but it appears that the jury was more than sympathetic to the defendant, 
and considered the conspiracy against both Parliament and the public justified the 
means. Karen Silkwood crusaded against her company and its poor safety procedures 
relating to plutonium processing. She was among several who suffered contamination
99
in 1974. Her mysterious death in suspicious circumstances suggested the possible 
dangers of opposing procedures in such a powerful industiy. Another whistleblower 
received film treatment, this time New York policeman Serpico who informed on police 
corruption (Maas 1973).
An instructive variation on the whistleblowing theme took place in the case of the 
merger of two US banks (Buono and Bowditch, 1989). One of the two bank cultures 
was predominant, and those in the less powerful culture felt both threatened and 
aggrieved. An opportunity for them to whistleblow presented itself when the merged 
bank's chief operating officer, formerly the chief executive officer of the dominant 
bank, issued a memo suggesting that every officer should contribute to the industry 
political action committee. This was illegal and led to an investigation by the FBI and 
the Justice Department, and a fine of $17,000 when the bank admitted to violating 
federal law. The counterculture of the dispossessed was delighted at the negative 
publicity, and the group sense of empowerment that it provided. Apparently the practice 
was common at both banks prior to the merger, but had never been committed to 
writing. It was this that permitted the opportunity for the attack on the emerging power 
culture and cultural orientation, even though the fine was comparatively small.
In periods of recession and high unemployment the corporate culture may be too 
intimidating to encourage even internal whistleblowing. Thus in Costain Engineering 
and Construction, which by 1993 had shed 40% of its staff, mostly through 
redundancy, the metaphors of "laying low" and "refusing to rock the boat " were being 
used to describe the staffs attitude towards speaking out about their company. In a 
confidential and anonymous report dated 15th June 1993, a manager reported the 
problems he found in introducing creative management techniques into his part of the 
company, since employees required strict anonymity. Of eight staff who agreed to take
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.part in some group exercises, one withdrew at an early stage, believing that exploratory 
creative group work on how best to handle change management would rock the boat, 
and result in the lead manager being fired. Another employee (building graduate, age 
25, 3 years with the company) commented that the company is largely made up of old 
school tie / boys abroad networks with lots of back-scratching which will not be given 
up without a fight. She also referred to Costain's major failing being communication, 
together with their double standards. Another employee (site engineer, age 26,5 years 
with company) said that some people, especially those who had been with the company 
for a long while, had created a comfortable position for themselves, and so opposed 
change for fear of having to give their privileges up. Another relevant factor is that this 
is a family company, and this makes it difficult to bring about changes to undesirable 
practices if it means confrontation with the views of the family members.
. . '  ,  . . .  ■
The trouble with whistleblowing, either internal or external, is that there is plenty of 
material through which to blow. Gerald Mars has shown that occupational crime, 
sometimes referred to as part-time crime’ (Ditton 1977), is an accepted part of 
everyday jobs. 'Fiddling' is not exceptional, but endemic; it is not marginal but 
integral to the organization and rewards of work. Whether it is called 'pilfering' or the 
fiddle' (UK), skimming' or 'gypping' (US), 'le travail noir' (France), or rabotat 
nalyevo' (USSR), Mars argues that it is far from the trivial pursuit it is often made out 
to be. , Mars divides jobs into four categories, and finds that they share similar 
arrangements to rob, cheat, short-change, pilfer and fiddle customers, employers, 
subordinates and the state. Category one, hawks, are individualists. They perch 
unhappily in organizations, and when in them they generally bend the rules to suit 
themselves. These are the entrepreneurs, innovative professionals and small 
businesspeople. They aim to make it'. Donkeys are highly constrained by rules, and 
tend to be isolated from each other. Examples are machine minders, supermarket
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. cashiers and some transport workers. Their response is to resist by disruptive 
sabotage, breaking the rules. Wolves, such as dockwork gangs, work and steal in 
packs. They pilfer according to agreed rules and have a well-defined division of 
labour, with hierarchy, order and internal controls. They distinguish leader and led, 
and punish their own deviants. Vultures need group support, but act on their own at 
the feast. They are linked and supported from a common base, depending on 
information and support from colleagues, but are competitive and act a lot in isolation. 
With the paradoxical combination of competition and co-operation, instability and 
turbulence often result for the like of waiters and travelling sales staff. (Mars 1982).
In the hotel and restaurant industry, there are pressures to operate under what three 
authors call ad hoc management', and this in turn tends to work alongside a system of 
devious reward which compounds the management problems ( Mars, Bryant and 
Mitchell, 144). This then leads to local management's principal concern, which " is to 
set parameters beyond which pilferage will bring sanctions, but within which it will 
generally be tolerated" (Ibid, 7). Management exercises considerable control in this 
situation, since troublemakers' can be instantly dismissed for pilferage, even though 
the practice is institutionalised, and those opting out of the pilferage tradition, which is 
part of the reward structure, are likely to be subjected to peer pressure ( Ibid, 8). With a 
lack of collectivism, waiters are more entrepreneurs than employees, with significant 
elements of their income deriving from tips, and this makes the activities of any 
potential whistleblower all the more sensitive, since it is striking both at the 
organisation as well as the livelihood of individuals with some of the characteristics of 
being self-employed.
The benefits obtained rarely feature in audit reports or official statistics. Covert 
rewards are so intimately connected with some occupations, that it is impossible to
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understand whole sections of the economy without reference to them. There are, 
therefore, no problems of finding examples if you want to be a management mole 
(Mole 1988). However it does appear necessary to be highly selective, if one is not to 
become a professional full-time whistleblower.
The path of the whistleblower is not easy, and the bee sting phenomenon may apply. 
One has only one sting to use, and using it may well lead to one's own mortality, in 
this case career-wise. In a survey of 87 American whistleblowers from both the civil 
service and private industry, it was found that all but one experienced retaliation, with 
those employed longer experiencing more. , Harassment came from peers as well as 
superiors, and most of those in private industry and half of those in the civil service lost 
their jobs; Of the total, 17% lost their homes, 8% filed for bankruptcy, 15% got 
divorced,.and 10% attempted suicide. (Soeken and Soeken 1987). A similar result 
emerged from a six year long US study of 64 whistleblowers, ethical resisters who felt 
impelled to speak out because they had witnessed a serious violation of legal or ethical 
standards. To qualify for inclusion, each resister needed to have persuasive evidence to 
corroborate observations, and those appearing to be engaged in personal vendetta or 
making a deal when charged with improper conduct by a prosecuting attorney were 
excluded. Most were in their thirties or forties, and were conservative people devoted 
to their work and organizations. They had built their careers by conforming to the 
requirements of bureaucratic life. Most had been successful until they were asked to 
violate their own standards of appropriate workplace behaviour. ' Whistleblowing was 
accompanied by economic and emotional deprivation, and led to career disruption and 
personal abuse (Glazer and Glazer 1989).
In another survey, a questionnaire was completed by 161 whistleblowers; 80 percent of 
whom were government employees. Severe retaliation and overwhelming personal and
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professional hardship were reported by many in this group, which was found to be in 
many ways exceptional and tending to exhibit a distinctive approach to moral issues and 
decision-making. Committed to certain values, the group was capable of acting on this 
sense of obligation despite the strong organizational and situational pressures to the 
contrary (Jos, Tompkins and Mays, 1989). Few studies of this magnitude have been 
undertaken in the UK, but those that have come to a similar conclusion. One was on 
mental hospital nurses (Beardshaw 1981), and another looked across a wider spectrum 
(Winfield 1990). More individualized biographies also confirm the same point. There 
could be fewer more tragic stories than of Stanley Adams, a former executive with 
Swiss-pharmaceutical manufacturer Hoffman La Roche, who was imprisoned under 
Swiss law for exposing in 1973 the company's illegal price-fixing methods to the 
European Commission (Adams 1984). His wife's probable suicide, financial ruin, and 
lack of useful support from the European Commission are all graphically portrayed in 
the film 'Song for Europe'. With an ironic twist, he was arrested at Bristol railway 
station in 1993 for plotting to kill his new wife.
Not all commentators favour whistleblowing. In 1971 the Chair of General Motors, 
James Roche, expostulated that:
"Some of the enemies of business now encourage an employee to be disloyal to the 
enterprise. They want to create suspicion and disharmony and pry into the proprietary 
interests of the business. However this is labelled - industrial espionage, 
whistleblowing or professional responsibility - it is another tactic for spreading disunity 
and creating conflict." (quoted in Walters 1975,27)
General Motors has had more than its fair share of turbulence, as one can divine from 
reading Sloan's reprinted classic of 1963 on the early years (Sloan 1986), and from a
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more explicit source which details sixty years of conflict at General Motors, and the 
serious lacks of corporate and social responsibility, with cover-up and deceit the order 
of the day (Neimark 1992), As just one example, a joint General Motors - Union of 
Auto Workers study of 1989 found that workers at the Lordstown, Ohio complex are 
dying from cancer at a substantially faster rate than the general population, yet the 
company's initial claim was that "records and test data indicate that there is no 
problem." (op cit 169) It is clear that James Roche may be regarded as a vested 
interest, rather than someone who is likely to be considering the wider public interest, 
which the company seems to have a legacy of ignoring. The situation in Britain is little 
better (Plowden 1973, Vinten 1985b).
The most notable anti-whistleblower is Peter Drucker, whose original Spring 1981 
article in The Public Interest has been reprinted (lannone 1989). His view is that 
whistleblowing is simply another word for informing'. He suggests that the societies 
in Western history that encouraged informers were bloody and infamous tyrannies - 
Tiberius and Nero in Rome, Inquisition in the Spain of Philip II, the French Terror, 
and Stalin. Mao is an Eastern example. To Drucker, under whistleblowing no mutual 
trust, no interdependencies and no ethics are possible. He roots ethics in an 
individualism that he attributes to Confucius, and considers that whistleblowing 
interferes with this. Drucker's view has not gone unchallenged. Courtemanche is a 
disciple, and Milton Friedman is also in this school of thought. One critic has stated:
"But 'informing' is itself a value-laden interpretation, not a neutral description, of 
whistleblowing. It is by no means self-evident that whistleblowing is 'informing', and 
Drucker offers us no support for his claim. Such support requires as its basis rigorous 
normative reflection; and it is reflection of this kind that is precisely the province of 
business ethics". (Hoffman and Moore 1982)
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There was also an editorial survey in Business and Society Review, (Orr 1981) in 
which a group of leading businessmen and thinkers were invited to comment on the 
Drucker article. Although there was a variety of views, Drucker was generally found 
oversimplistic, and Monte Throdahl, senior vice-president of Monsanto, said that his 
company had made a virtue out of whistleblowing, particularly in relation to safety and 
environmental issues. Alan Westin reckoned that Mr. Drucker and those like him who 
referred to whistleblowers as rats, and whistleblower protection legislation as rat 
protection, more properly deserve the label of totalitarian. They would, he suggests, 
elevate silent loyalty to employers who act unlawfully or in clear disregard of public 
interests above any moral or social duty.
Whistleblowing sounds like a less exotic response to organisational life if you argue 
that the study of ethics in business is primarily concerned to help individuals operating 
in organisations to identify behaviour which will not be detrimental to human welfare, 
and more positively to encourage behaviour which will benefit it. It follows that ethics 
will also help to determine which organisational systems make the attainment of ethical 
behaviour more or less difficult for the individual (Blois, 1985,220). It can certainly be 
argued that evading questions about the ethical implications of one's actions constitutes 
moral negligence ( Lewis, 1972 ). Sound ethical thinking must be based on as full an 
understanding of a situation as it is possible to obtain in a given situation (Fletcher, 
1966), and there is also a need to consider unintended or undesirable consequences of 
decisions (Schelling, 1981). Any view of life that stops short of a rigid totalitarian 
attitude must make allowances for the legitimacy of individuals asserting alternative 
moral standpoints, and occasionally, in extremis, blowing the whistle. Otherwise the 
Kantian categorical imperative must be stifled, as must sometimes also the utilitarianism 
principle of the greatest good of the greatest number.
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The Director of the University of Leeds Centre for Business and Professional Ethics 
has raised the intriguing question as to whether we should credit whistleblowers with 
having acted from a sense of duty if they are known to have grudges against their 
employers. She considers that this is a Catch 22 aspect to the whistleblower's 
predicament. If they blow without having exhausted internal channels, their deed seems 
irresponsible; they do harm without being able to show that it was necessary. Yet if 
they do exhaust all internal channels before they blow, they must surely have acquired 
grouses against their employers - if they did not have them already, since their 
employers have failed to heed their appeals. Thus, she argues that whistleblowers, it 
may seem, never deserve our respect : they either act irresponsibly or they act 
maliciously. The rest of her exposition shows that mixed motives are conunon, and that 
it is necessary to examine the evidence on each separate occasion. A business:may 
; donate to charity through, at least in part, compassion. As long as this enhances the 
- image of the business, who knows? If the charity should suddenly go out of fashion, 
and the business inunediately withdraws support, does this demonstrate that their was 
never any real compassion? Jackson argues that this is not necessarily true. The 
business may have cared, and still care, but not so much as to place the business at risk:
, there are other duties - to family, to employees, which take priority. She concludes that:
. ■ . . .  . "
" Arriving at a fair and accurate account of someone's motives including one's own, is 
fraught with difficulty. Often there are several plausible motives behind our actions :
, some flattering, some unflattering. The most plausible interpretation of an individual's 
behaviour is not neccesarily the right one. People can act out of character. Because of 
the obscurity of motives and the importance of motive in the exercising of virtue, there 
is no easy and certain way of - assessing moral character." 
(Jackson 1992).
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Another writer has drawn comparisons between civil disobedience and whistleblowing 
(Elliston 1982). A text on strategic management includes a chapter on business ethics, 
and the contributor suggests that thoughtless observers may criticize whistleblowing as 
'squealing', an adult version of the school child's criticism of 'tattling'; whereas in fact 
any enforcement of law and ethics must rely partly on whistleblowers. (Benson 1990) 
Examining specific cases would certainly seem to suggest the public good emanating 
from whistleblowing. We have the case of the problems with the cargo doors on the 
DC-10 aircrafts in the 1970's (Beauchamp 1989, 40-47) and the security guard in the 
shopping mall who refused to let drunk drivers on to the public highway, calling in the 
police, as the Security Officer's Manual dictated. He was dismissed, and the National 
Labor Relations Board found against him, since whistleblowers were legally protected 
only if they engaged in 'concerted activity' together with their fellow workers (Ibid, 48- 
52). This shows the vulnerability of whistleblowers under labour law. Protections 
may not be perfectly improved even where there is specific legislation, such as the Civil 
Service Reform Act, since the regulator, the Office of the Special Counsel, was at the 
outset accused of being ineffective, sometimes deliberately so (Devine and Aplin 1986).
The best approach from the perspectives of organisation, employees, and the public 
interest, is to institutionalize and internalize whistleblowing. Managers may prefer to 
find out about nasty problems before the story hits the 11 O'clock News, and 
companies with foresight are now setting up telephone hot lines to the top, and 
employing ombudspeople and encouraging employees to use them (Brody 1986). 
Other companies may use itinerant company lawyers as the channel of communications 
for whistleblowing (Andrews 1989, 198). Another approach is to set up consumer 
advocates with independence and a direct line to the top (Adamson, 1982). Government 
has various channels to assist, with a requirement for supporting documentation and
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periodic audit of it (General Accounting Office 1988). The question still remains as to 
what protections there need to be if, under pressure of competition, company policies 
bend, and the ombudsmen and advocates become co- opted into the company agenda 
(Newton and Ford, 1990, 64).
9.1 THE CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
It is difficult to make a systematic study of whistleblowing, since there is no available 
sampling frame. This is a sensitive subject, and not all wish to maximize publicity. 
Most researchers try to accumulate leads from whatever sources present themselves. 
Thus the Glazers' six years of travels throughout the U.S. interviewing whistleblowers 
was based on those few mentioned in previous academic studies, on journalistic 
accounts, those known to the Government Accountability Project, the major 
whistleblower defense organization situated in Washington D C., and self-reports from 
those who learned of the research. (Glazer and Glazer 1989, xiii). Another study 
refers to the problem of having to rely on the anecdotal evidence of those who choose 
to sound their concerns, but they too had to rely on a networking of contacts to achieve 
their sample of 213 individuals. (Jos, Tompkins and Hays 1989).
In the European case the problems are compounded since no one researcher will have 
regular access to all the academic and particularly journalistic sources, let alone have the 
language skills necessary. Pan-European journals are rare, and their coverage has to be 
so wide, that coverage of whistleblowers is likely to be spasmodic and probably non­
existent, since few have significance outside national boundaries. The European 
Parliament Press Office in London has stated that it is an open institution, and thus 
whistleblowing is rendered unnecessary. The European Commission Press Office in 
London indicated that it believed that the Stanley Adams affair was one-off, but it was
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keen to point out that this was whistleblowing on behalf of the Commission, not 
against it.
Lord Stanley Clinton-Davis, interviewed by Gerald Vinten at the office of solicitors S J 
Berwin and Co. on Friday 3rd May 1991, confirmed that during his time as either 
Transport or Environmental Commissioner there was no instance of employees 
informing on their organizations. There were, however, quite a number from ex­
employees who might be members of pressure groups such as Greenpeace or Friends 
of the Earth. Lord Clinton-Davis agreed with the Commission Press Office in being 
unaware of anything similar to the Stanley Adams case. In the twin cases of 
environmental abuse and price-fixing the Commission was duty- bound to act on 
information received, and this led to a prolonged but democratic process at no cost to 
the informant. Lord Clinton-Davis also indicated some decisions about which he 
would have been prepared to blow the whistle had matters turned out differently, and 
one in which he did.
In this last case be broke the convention of maintaining the confidentiality of Council of 
Ministers deliberations relating to the export of fertilizers and pesticides to the Third 
World, notably to Africa. These were banned in Europe because of public health 
hazard. The European chemical companies lobbied hard, expressing concern about the 
lack of competitive trade with Japan if the export were banned. Lord Clinton-Davis 
achieved two conditions:
1. Importing countries should be notified of the chemical constituents
2. More importantly there should be a cooling-off period of 90 days providing the 
opportunity to decline the contract.
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Lord Clinton-Davis was subsequently forced to water this down to 60 days, and got the 
conditions through on the basis of that compromise. World Health Organization 
statistics showed vivid and appalling consequences from the use of these chemicals, 
and Lord Clinton-Davis considered that the quicker he blew the lid off the Council of 
Minister procedures, leading to the European Community's worst failure in his 
opinion, the better it would be. However he did suggest a need for reticence in whistle­
blowing since there could be a knock-on effect that could jeopardize other European 
Community negotiations.
The discovery of wine fraud is documented to have been attributable to informers on 
certain occasions. The Bordeaux 'Winegate' trial of 1974 involving the Cruse family's 
doctoring of wines was one such example, although the fraud was so widespread, with
30,000 hectolitres of counterfeit wine produced within four months, that it is surprising 
that an informer was necessary. In Germany there was the monumental invert sugar 
scandal. For just one kilo of invert sugar, 46 bottles of humble tafelwein could be 
converted into aristocratic and expensive auslese wine. One Mosel company alone was 
reckoned to have produced more than thirteen million bottles of illegally sweetened 
wines. Four years prior to the fraud hitting the headlines in 1980, a government wine- 
chemist had told her superiors that she suspected that the wine of the then President of 
the German Winegrowers' Association was fraudulent. She was warned against 
mentioning her findings to the prosecuting authorities, and received anonymous death 
threats. (Fielden 1989). The North Sea oil rigs are another example (see chapter 10.2).
Other cases to hand rely more on distant memory or brief mention in newspapers:
FRANCE. In about 1973 a civil servant disclosed tax irregularities. He was
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dismissed - or sued for defamation.
Following the murder of the Greenpeace photographer when the 
French secret service sunk the ship 'Rainbow Warrior' in Auckland 
harbour, New Zealand, using explosive devices, two members of 
the service went public. They were arrested on espionage charges 
which were subsequently dropped.
GERMANY. A civil servant published on article on deficiencies in his department.
He applied to the European Convention on Human Rights.
HUNGARY. A security service member revealed the continuation of the
monitoring of Members of Parliament and the like after the 
liberalisation of the country. He was prosecuted and convicted, 
because he should have gone through the official channels.
ISRAEL. In 1986 Vanunu revealed to the Sunday Times the existence and 
details of nuclear plants, which officially did not exist. He was 
enticed from England to Italy by a femme fatale, since it was 
considered easier to kidnap him from there. He was abducted to 
Israel, convicted, and given a twenty five year prison sentence. He 
is regarded there as a traitor.
SWEDEN. Three members of the Information Bureau, an intelligence agency 
whose existence was not known to Parliament, disclosed its 
existence to journalists, and articles and a book resulted. All three 
were convicted of espionage. Ian Guillou is now a TV presenter;
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Peter Bradt wrote The I.B. Affair’, and Hakon Isakson now works 
for the Stockholm Education Service, as a result of which he feels 
unwilling to discuss the affair.
SWITZERLAND .In the Swiss files affair, in about 1989, the female Justice Minister 
disclosed to her banking husband that an investigation was 
underway on money laundering that involved him, and that wires 
were being tapped. Although acquittals followed, the outcome was 
the revelation that the secret service had dossiers on many more 
citizens than were known about.
NORWAY & 
DENMARK
Cases here tended to rely on use of public sources 
rather than inside information.
EUROPEAN Solicitor Patrick Latham of the Consumer Policy 
Conunission Group of the European Conunission had his 
advice overruled. He resigned, and is currently bringing a 
case before the European Court.
It is clear that more research is needed. The way forward could be a collaborative 
venture through the European Business Ethics Network whereby local correspondents 
would take responsibility for their own country, and a co-ordinator would bring the 
various strands together, as editor of a major and worthwhile publication.
Acknowledgement. This section benefitted from discussions held with Lord 
Stanley Clinton-Davis and for the country examples with James Michael of the Law 
Department of University College, London.
113
CHAPTER 10. WHISTLEBLOWING ON DISASTERS.
"This is the excellent foppery of the world...we make guilty of our disasters the sun, 
the moon and the stars, as if we were villains by necessity, fools by heavenly 
compulsion, knaves, thieves and treachers by spherical predominance, drunkards, 
liars, and adulterers by an enforced obedience of planetary influence."
Edmund, bastard son of Gloucester. Shakespeare, King Lear, 1 ii. 132 (Wells and 
Taylor, 1987, 1239).
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Disasters represent a situation in which the value of the whistleblower acting in the 
public interest is more difficult to malign. Retrospectively, although rarely 
prospectively, the whistleblower may be transformed from organisational nuisance to 
public hero. Examples are drawn from the oil, defence and nuclear industries, 
commercial aircraft and space exploration.
All crises and disasters that are not acts of God may be attributed to systems failure, 
whether they involve incidents like the accident at Three Mile Island nuclear power 
station, the capsizing of the Alexander L Kielland rig in the Norwegian oil and gas 
fields in the North Sea (Bignell and Fortune 1984), the Ronan Point Tower Block 
collapse, the foundering of the Motor Vessel Burtonia off Lowestoft, the crash of the 
Trident Papa India in a field near Staines (Bignell, Peters and Pym 1977), great 
planning disasters such as San Francisco's BART System (Hall 1980 and Anderson 
1980), or notorious commercial disasters (Winkworth 1980). The need to undertake a 
systems audit was present in all these examples, but it becomes particularly acute where 
the consequences of the system failure are life-threatening. Even with acts of God, it is
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possible to formulate disaster recovery or contingency plans, and to exercise 
appropriate risk management. It is possible to distinguish active and latent failures. It is 
the practice for accident investigators to concentrate on the first rather than the second. 
We are concerned here with the latent category, since the time period of active cases is 
too rapid to permit much by way of whistleblowing. There are always potential 
whistleblowers in such latent situations, with the time to reflect and decide whether to 
go ahead and take the personal risk of external disclosure.
These situations were all matters of high public and often global concern : Piper Alpha 
in the North Sea with 165 dead, Karen Silkwood and plutonium contamination, the 
attempted launch of the Challenger space shuttle, defective doors on the DC 10 aircraft, 
the dubious sinking of the General Belgrano and the retaliation in the Falklands 
conflict, the ecological damage caused by the Exxon Valdez spillage, and the economic 
ruin and destabilisation occasioned by the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International. In each case warnings from those with an awareness of the hazards and 
risks went unheeded, and the whistleblowers suffered severe penalties for their public­
spiritedness.
10.2 EXAMPLES OF WHISTLEBLOWING ON DISASTER.
The North Sea oil rigs are an important source for the world oil markets. Despite the 
high safety risks and the precautions that need to be taken, there has been one major 
disaster, and several less serious ones. One commentator refers to the repetitive litany 
of yet another committee of enquiry, this time Lord Cullen's findings (Cullen 1990) on 
the Piper Alpha disaster with the death of 165 workers. The writer suggested that it 
would almost be possible to write a common core report that would readily apply to 
every variety of disaster: the findings of previous reports concealed or not actioned;
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Jack of independence or effectiveness of inspectorates; failure to adopt a participative 
management style and, worst, the "not required back" stamp for those employees who 
dare complain of health and safety abuses, particularly those who threaten to or actually 
blow the whistle. The Norwegians have much more humane industrial relations 
practices, with whistleblowing being internalized and readily actioned. If it is 
impossible to emulate Norwegian practice in the over-secretive United Kingdom, then 
at the very least anonymous telephone hotlines should be introduced, and safety 
ombudspersons appointed, so that those who know, and will suffer the consequences, 
will have a sure means of communication, and penalties of the highest magnitude may 
be applied to those who opt to ignore them (Vinten 1990d, 1994).
Vaughan Mitchell was a North Sea oil rig worker dismissed after reporting unsafe 
practices relating to welding, and the possibility that the whole rig could blow up. The 
amazing fact was that he was expressing his concerns just two months after the Piper 
Alpha disaster. Far from finding a ready audience, he found himself out of work and 
having to lease his flat and run up debts which took years to pay off. The Department 
of Energy had notices displayed around the rigs guaranteeing confidentiality to anyone 
who contacted them about safety problems. Vaughan found that this was not observed, 
and neither was the Department concerned about the predicament and financial loss 
and emotional upheaval to which he then became subjected.
Mercifully in 1992 came the realisation from Department of Employment Minister 
Michael Forsyth, following a recommendation of the Cullen Report, that offshore 
safety workers must not be victimised. Hitherto, workers dismissed for raising valid 
concerns could make a complaint of unfair dismissal to an industrial tribunal provided 
that they met the qualifying conditions - two years continuous service for those 
working 16 hours or more a week, and five years continuous service for those working
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between 8 and 16 hours a week. The Offshore Safety (Protection against Victimisation) 
Act 1992, which became law on March 16th, gave additional protection to safety 
representatives and safety committee members who work offshore. They may now 
complain to an industrial tribunal regardless of their length of service or hours of work. 
On July 10th 1992 the Minister announced that he intended to extend the legislation in 
two ways. Firstly it would now extend to onshore workers, and secondly it would 
apply to all workers.
He reiterated the message when he visited Shell/Esso's St. Fergus gas terminal, near 
Peterhead on 2nd October 1992. Baroness Turner introduced a private member’s bill at 
the end of 1992, and it was implemented in 1993. A complementary measure was the 
"safety case" regulations of the autumn of 1992, which require operators of offshore 
installations to demonstrate that all major safety risks have been comprehensively 
reviewed and rigourous controls put in place (Health and Safety Commission 1992). 
Implementation was the end of May 1993 for new installations, and November 1993 
for existing installations. A safety case' is a top to bottom assessment of the major 
risks posed on the installation, and how management is going to identify and control 
them to the satisfaction of the Health and Safety Executive.Companies will need to 
invest to achieve the higher standards required, and the Minister was unapologetic for 
making the protection of people on offshore installations paramount, even where 
substantial cost to industry may be involved.
The Karen Silkwood case, movingly depicted in the 1983 film "Silkwood", shows the 
sinister pressures that can be placed on whistleblowers who dare to take on powerful 
organisations (Halbert and InguUi 1990, 200-213). Karen was a laboratory analyst for 
Kerr-McGee at its Cimmaron plant near Crescent, Oklahoma. The plant fabricated 
plutonium pins for use as reactor fuel in nuclear power plants. During a three day
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period in November 1974, she was contaminated by plutonium, by day three to a high 
level, and contamination was also found in her flat, leading to the destruction of many 
of her personal belongings. As a not unsurprising reaction, she became even more 
concerned at the health and safety of the plant than she had been three months earlier 
when she had attended union headquarters with a view to mounting a campaign. In 
September and October she had been actively involved on behalf of the union, helping 
to educate workers about plutonium, recruiting votes for the recertification of the plant, 
and recording instances of contamination. She had been present at bargaining sessions, 
including one on the day of her death. The fatal car crash happened when she was 
leaving one such session, and on her way to meet a reporter from the New York Times. 
She had a folder of evidence documenting not only contamination, but also proof that 
the company was doctoring its quality control records and processing defective rods. 
The file was never discovered, and many believed that it was a matter of murder rather 
than an accident.
In the legal case that Bill Silkwood, her father, brought, it transpired that the company 
did not always comply with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) standards. The 
case went as far as the US Supreme Court (104 S. Ct 615, 1984), which upheld the 
jury verdict in favour of Silkwood, with $500,000 for personal injuries, $5,000 for 
property damage, and punitive damages of $10 million. The NRC has estimated that a 
worst case accident at a nuclear plant could cause as many as 100,000 deaths within a 
year, and as much as $300 billion in damage. The 1957 Price-Anderson Act, an 
amendment to the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, established an indemnity scheme under 
which operators in licensed nuclear facilities could be required to obtain up to $60 
million in private financial protection, with the government topping this up by another 
$500 million, with the $560 million being the limit of liability for any one accident.
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Another classic case was the Challenger launch decision, which took place on 28th 
January 1986 (Liedtka 1990). NASA originally had had a "get there - safely" culture, 
and had actively encouraged internal whistleblowing, which was viewed as supporting 
the drive for safety. This single and simple goal came to be replaced by a multiplicity of 
conflicting goals, "get there safely, cheaply and on time". Managers and administrators 
were left to satisfice as best as they could. As early as April 1985, serious problems 
were identified in the rocket booster seals. In July Morton-Thiokol engineer Boisjoly 
warned in a memo to his senior management that there could be catastrophic losses if 
improvements were not made. The decision was made to fly "as is" until modifications 
could be made. By the time of the launch, NASA was concerned to regain face by 
launching as far as possible to schedule, since there had been long delays and 
cancellations in previous projects. Thiokol engineers were aware of the hazards, but 
were persuaded by administrators to place their objections aside, on the basis that they 
were speculative, with little conclusive data. Why the engineers did not blow the 
whistle, as required by their professional code of ethics, may be explained by the 
hypothesis of exit and voice, that the effort an interested party makes will be in 
proportion to the advantage to be gained from a favourable outcome multiplied by the 
probability of influencing the decision. For the engineers, the balance sheet seemed to 
be negative. The personal advantage was, at best, keeping their jobs, at worst losing 
them, even if they were successful at stopping the launch. There was only a small 
probability of influencing the decision. There was no heroism in stopping the launch in 
advance, since no one could predict that an explosion would occur. This is a splendid 
example of the latent type of failure.
A similar situation pertained to the defective doors on the DC-10. Convair were 
subcontracted to build the fuselage and doors. Problems with the doors had shown up 
during the test flight, and in subsequent testing ( Beauchamp 1989,40-47). Indeed on
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12th July 1972, an aft cargo door had blown out 11,750 feet over Windsor, Ontario 
during a flight from Los Angeles to New York. Structural damage was caused, and 
nine passengers and two stewardesses injured. Convair's Director of Product 
Engineering wrote a memo in which he stated:
" It seems to me inevitable that, in the twenty years ahead of us, DC-10 cargo doors 
will come open and I would expect this to usually result in the loss of the airplane."
There were worries in Convair that the cost of modification might fall on them, and 
McDonnell Douglas had already shown itself less than eager to incorporate more than 
band-aid type modifications. The hierarchy above the Director decided to take no 
action, and he simply filed his memo. It was in 1974 that a DC-10 owned by Turkish 
Airlines crashed near Paris, killing all 335 passengers and 11 crew. Experts agreed that 
the immediate cause of the accident was a blow-out of the rear cargo door twelve 
minutes after lift off. Sanford Douglas, President of McDonnell Douglas, whom the 
writer once met in St.Louis after a speech he gave on business ethics (McDonnell 
1991), denied the cause.
The Clive Ponting case was discussed in chapter 9.
The Exxon tanker "Exxon Valdez" ran aground on 23rd March 1989 in Prince William 
Sound in Alaska, spilling 11 million gallons of crude oil over an area of 100 square 
miles that is of strategic significance to the global environment, and with after-effects 
that will last well into the next century. Half a million birds and thousands of animals 
died, including seals, killer whales, and sea otters. Captain Joseph Hazelwood was not 
on the deck at the time, despite this being a period requiring his command, and he was 
known to have an alcohol problem. A female crew member had twice reported a red
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buoy to the starboard bow that should have been to the port side, but this was ignored 
until it was too late. The cost to Exxon of the clear-up was $2.5 million. The response 
of the Alyeska Pipeline Terminal, a coalition of seven oil companies, was slow and 
inadequate, given the criticality of the first few hours after a spill. Permissions had been 
granted to oil companies on the basis of the adequacy of response, but this agreement 
was not honoured. The District Supervisor of the Alaska Department of Environmental 
Conservation (ADEC), Dan Lawn, spoke out about the huge inadequacies that had been 
apparent for some time before, and for his whistleblowing' he was dismissed from 
his post. In January 1992 a court ordered his reinstatement, but this has yet to happen. 
Exxon had experienced 20 years with no spills, but had now had two spills in the one 
year, the Hawaia having earlier spilled 35,000 gallons, which were rapidly cleared up. 
The BP tanker, Thompson Pass, had spilled 70,000 gallons in Alaska in January 1989.
Just before the disaster, the Exxon shares attracted an premium over the rival 
companies of $2 to $4. Afterwards, a discount of $2 to $8 applied. It can be calculated 
that this loss of $4 to $12 per share indicated market expectations that Exxon would 
need to spend between $5 billion and $15 billion for the clean-up operation. This 
contrasts with direct costs of around $2.5 billion, plus the fine of $1.5 billion. Exxon’s 
profit figure for 1989 was $5 billion. It can be seen that the share price reduction was 
far in excess of the costs involved.
The Bank of Credit and Commerce International case has already been discussed in 
section 6.5.
It is clear from all these disaster cases that there is an overwhelming public interest in 
encouraging potential whistleblowers to come forward. If they are to come forward, 
there is equally a need to provide adequate employment and financial protection.
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CHAPTER 11. LEGAL PROTECTION FOR WHISTLEBLOWING?
In comparing the legal situations relating to whistleblowing in the US and the UK, we 
are immediately confronted by a paradox. At first sight it appears to be a comparison of 
the liberal with the illiberal. The US has a whole series of acts which collectively are 
referred to as whistleblower protection acts ( Kohn and Kohn 1986). It also has a 
Freedom of Information Act which should reduce the incidence of whistleblowing. By 
contrast, on the other side of the Atlantic in the UK we have the Official Secrets 
Acts,1911-1989. Prior to the 1989 Act, Section 2 of the 1911 Act criminalised leakages 
of official information which represented simply a betrayal of trust, or an 
embarrassment to the government (Thomas 1991), There are now, under the 1989 Act, 
six specific areas of information protected " in the public interest These are:
1. Security and intelligence.
2. Defence.
3. International relations
4. Crime and special investigation powers.
5. Information resulting from unauthorised disclosures or entrusted in confidence.
6. Information entrusted in confidence to other States or international organizations.
A harm test applies to most of these areas, so that the jury rather than the Minister will 
decide the extent of harm.
The liberality - illiberality comparison starts to fall down, however, with the centrality 
in US law of the employee-at-will doctrine, which sees both parties as equal in the 
employment contract, and therefore either may terminate the contract at will for no 
reason at all. An employee hired for an indeterminate period of time may be discharged
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at any time for any reason or no reason at all. The idea was that there was a pleasing 
symmetry between the right of a person to sell labour upon such terms as is deemed 
proper, and the right of the purchasers of labour to proscribe the conditions of such 
labour, including termination-at-will. The British adhered to this doctrine until the the 
1971 Industrial Relations Act, which gave an employee the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed by an employer. Even before this Act, there was case law indicating that 
there is a public interest defence in the unauthorised disclosure of confidential 
information, and this is seen as applying to a wide range of matters, of which iniquity 
on the part of the employer is only one example (Smith and Wood 1986).
The US has seen a relaxation of the severity of the employee-at-will doctrine over the 
years, and so where a discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy, an action for 
wrongful discharge may be upheld against the employer (Feliu 1979-1980). In the 
public sector there are explicit safeguards for whistleblowers in the so-called 
Whistleblower Protection Acts (see Appendix 3). There has been criticism of their 
effectiveness (Devine and Aplin 1986), but some more recent optimism (Fong 1991).
The Office of the Special Counsel was established in Washington DC 1979 with a 
direct remit to protect genuine whistleblowers. There was a concern that the Office was 
sometimes becoming the refuge and protection of the incompetent and the problem 
employee, rather than protecting employees from arbitrary and capricious management 
actions (Office of the Special Counsel 1985, 2). The reason for setting up this 
expensive mechanism was that whistleblowers were seen as fulfilling a useful role in 
helping to eliminate inefficiency, corruption, mismanagement, abuse of power and 
other inappropriate activities, which became more frequent as the federal government 
grew larger and more complex (Leahy 1978). The whole process has been subjected to 
periodic audit (General Accounting Office 1985, 1988) with a view emerging that the
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process operates adequately and as intended, although there is a need for there to be 
more publicity about the available remedies, and some executive agencies fail to carry 
out their responsibilities in a timely fashion.
What is the legal position should an employee decide to blow the whistle, or be asked 
to deal with an employee who has so done? In the U.S. increasingly the courts have 
been prepared to admit to a defence based on noteworthy public interest. This will 
depend on the substantiality of the relevant public policy, where and in what context it 
was announced, how it fares when weighed against the employer's and society's 
broader interests, and whether the violation was so offensive as to justify carving an 
exception to the all-pervasive employer-at-wiU doctrine. Public sector employees in the 
U.S. enjoy considerable protection under the so- called whistleblower protection acts, 
with compensation of up to $500,000, and an independent protection agency, the 
OfAce of the Special Counsel.
Under English law there is an implied duty not to misuse confidential information 
belonging to the employer, and this duty may continue to operate after the termination 
of the employment. There are, however, practical difficulties in dealing with ex­
employees, and where matters of confidentiality are likely to be significant, the best 
course is to extract from the employee an express restraint clause. Not only is this more 
certain and effective, but if valid it may also stop the former employee from entering 
employment in which there is a high probability that the information may be used. The 
one exception to the duty not to misuse confidential information occurs where 
disclosure is in the public interest. This may apply where the employer is committing a 
criminal offence, but it goes beyond this to include situations where the public has a 
serious and legitimate interest in the revelation.
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The law will often weigh up the benefit versus the disbenefit of public disclosure. In 
the 1975 case of Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Times Newspapers Ltd publication 
of documents obtained during the discovery process for judicial proceedings was 
prevented. This was on the basis that the public interest in the proper administration of 
justice was greater than the public interest to know the contents of these particular 
documents. In contrast, in the 1984 case of Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans, which 
involved the potential inaccuracy of the Intoximeter 3000 which was being used to 
substantiate evidence in court, there was considered to be a right even a duty for the 
press to publish, irrespective of the unlawful means used to obtain the information, the 
'flagrant breach of confidence', and the motives of the informer. In a similar view of 
the ends justifying the means, in the 1979 case of Malone v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner a defence of just cause was allowed where the information obtained by 
telephone tapping was found to be completely innocent, on the basis that there had been 
reasonable suspicion. Appendix 3 sets out case law with a bearing on whistleblowing.
What remedies are there available to the employer in the event of misuse of confidential 
information? For an existing employee, there may well be good grounds for dismissal, 
which the courts will probably uphold as fair. For an ex-employee, an injunction may 
be sought restraining from passing on information, or claiming damages for breach of 
the implied duty. If the information has already been passed on to a third party, such as 
a competitor company, then legal remedies are possible against this third party.
The question remains as to how much protection this really affords the whistleblower. 
What is most likely to happen is that the whistleblower will be dismissed and may then 
have recourse to an industrial tribunal. The odds here tend to be against the 
complainant, but success is less likely to result in reinstatement, and even where it 
does, the employer can ignore the order and simply pay damages, assuming that the
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complainant has the energy to take another legal action.
An award of damages is the more likely successful outcome, but this will rarely be any 
more than a token payment in view of the financial loss that most whistleblowers 
experience. As the late Brian Raymond, senior criminal partner of Bindman and 
Partners and defender of famous whistleblowers such as Clive Ponting, Dr.Wendy 
Savage, Dr .Helen Zeitlam and Charge Nurse Graham Pink J.P., expressed it to me, 
whistleblowers are left practically naked in terms of the law, and the best redress is to 
rely on public opinion and the political process. Before employers start to rejoice, they 
do need to consider the large amount of staff time and costs needed to fight such cases, 
as well as the possibility that the organisation may be shown up in unfavourable light. 
European legal decision in 1992 removed the ceiling on payments of damages, and so 
dealing with whistleblowers who are vindicated could be more expensive.
There is a form of legalised "whistleblowing" in English and Welsh local government. 
According to advice in 1985, the Chief Financial Officer, under the Local Government 
Act 1972, is prevented from acting in any way which would encourage or assist 
unlawful conduct by his authority. He or she needs to disassociate from such conduct, 
and report to the ratepayer (CIPFA 1985). This received statutory support under section 
114 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988 which places a duty on the officer 
responsible for the financial affairs of a council in England and Wales to report where it 
is believed unlawful expenditure may be or has been incurred, where a loss or 
deficiency is likely to arise from an unlawful action, or where an unlawful item of 
account is to be entered. Further reinforcement was provided by section 5 of the Local 
Government and Housing Act 1989, which also applies to Scotland, and the 
designation of a Monitoring Officer with a duty to report on contravention of any 
enactment, mle of law, or code of practice underpinning any enactment.
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One of the most momentous to impact the public sector accountant in the past few 
years involved interest rate swaps, the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham 
taking a pioneering role. The House of Lords in Hazell v London Borough of 
Hammersmith and Fulham 1991 ruled that a local authority has no power to speculate 
with the public's money and it cannot therefore lawfully trade in interest rates whether 
for purely speculative purposes, or in the hope of reducing the burden of interest 
payments or increasing the proportion of variable rates to fixed obligations, or as an 
interim strategy to rectify potential loss from previous unlawful swaps.
The Committee of Inquiry set up by the Borough (Veeder et al 1991) found in the 
Director of Finance, Mr. Clive Holtham, a most serious managerial failure to ensure 
adequate supervision and control, and that the difficulties would not have developed as 
they did, but for that failure. The deputy suffered dismissal, and it is clear that Mr. 
Holtham would have suffered the same fate had he not have left to take up an academic 
position at the City University Business School (Vinten 1992n). Following this, and 
local authority losses in BCCI, two codes of practice were quickly formulated to 
provide a link between section 114 of the 1988 Act and section 5 of the 1989 Act and 
the treasury management function (CIPFA 1992,1992a).
Thé law in itself can never be fully satisfactory, and one only has to think of legislation 
on equal opportunities and race relations to bear this out. On the issue of sexual 
harassment it has been suggested that "Employees cannot rely on the societal 
consciousness of individual managers, faced with conflicting priorities, to meet their 
need for a safe and respectful work environment." (Wright and Bean 1993) This then 
leads to the desirability of an effective sexual harassment policy which should:
(1) provide employee education as to what constitutes sexual harassment, and
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how the victim can seek remedy within the company;
(2) provide fair and prompt investigation;
(3) protect against fAse accusations;
(4) provide effective discipline of harassers. (Frierson 1989)
On the other hand, those who are forced to wrestle with all the uncertainties of basic 
employment law would be delighted to have the reassurance of whistleblower 
protection legislation. Reasonable certainty in law is supposed to be a cardinal 
principle, and one that litigants have a right to expect. At least it would provide a strong 
impetus for miscreant organizations to improve their performance. Beyond this, as 
always, the responsibility rests with the various organs of society, and controls will 
need to be introduced here to ensure that abuse does not take place. Without the 
legislation, abuse of valid whistleblowers is easy and may soon become endemic.
The Sun newspaper on 30th June 1993 reported an interview with Radio One controller 
Johnny Beerling. He had sacked comedian Kenny Everett in 1970 for an interview he 
gave to the music paper, the New Musical Express, in which he was mercilessly critical 
of the BBC. The managing director of the BBC, Ian Trethowan, called in Beerling to 
say that Everett had been guilty of gross insubordination and would have to go. There 
was a clause in Everett's contract forbidding him to speak to the Press without going 
through official channels, and he had clearly done that. Beerling appealed for him not to 
be sacked, but he was, the same day. "Gagging clauses" may be present in job 
contracts, and imposed on whistleblowers as part of any legal settlement reached.
In summary, the legal protections accorded the whistleblower in the U.K. are uncertain 
and inadequate. There are more far-reaching protections in the U.S. Since the law can 
only provide limited help, it is more sensible to "legislate" at the level of the individual 
organisation, through corporate codes, and that forms the content of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 12. A CODE OF ETHICS FOR WHISTLEBLOWING
There is much value in companies setting up codes of practice for whistleblowing. 
This can work to their advantage, as well as protecting whistleblowers. On the other 
side of the coin, there is a case for setting up a code for the whistleblowers themselves. 
Two experts in corporate culture have indicated in their categories of the storyteller and 
spy that, despite their titles, both are essential to the cohesiveness of an organization. 
Both are harnessed for the greater good of the organization, but if they are not, then it is 
easy to see how they could engage in a form of external whistleblowing that would 
potentially damage their organization (Deal and Kennedy 1988). As with any other 
activity, there are degrees of validity, with extremes of unacceptability and 
acceptability.
Thus we have Norman Bowie's (1982, 143) ideal requirements of justifiable acts of 
whistleblowing:
(1) that the act of whistleblowing stem from appropriate moral motives of preventing 
urmecessaiy harm to others;
(2) that the whistleblower use all available internal procedures for rectifying the 
problematic behaviour before public disclosure, although special circumstances may 
preclude this;
(3) that the whistleblower have "evidence that would persuade a reasonable person";
(4) that the whistleblower perceive serious danger that can result from the violation;
(5) that the whistleblower act in accordance with his or her responsibilities for 
"avoiding and/or exposing ihoral violations";
(6) that the whistleblower's action have some reasonable chance of success.
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Other writers have suggested practical points for whistleblowers to ponder. Velasquez 
(1988, 381) has made a composite, based upon several other writers:
1. How comprehensive is the worker's knowledge of the situation? Is the worker's 
information accurate and substantial?
2. What, exactly, are the unethical practices involved? Why are these unethical? What 
public values do these practices harm?
3. How substantial and irreversible are the effects of these practices? Are there any 
compensating public benefits that justify the practices?
4. What is the employee's obligation to bring such practices to an end? Can the 
employee do more to end the practices by working within the organization or by going 
outside? What probable effects will either alternative have on the company's practices? 
On society? On the firm? On other organizations? On the employee?
Similarly Sissela Bok catalogues three levels of moral conflict, which one may regard 
as in a cascade. First is to consider whether whistleblowing truly is in the public 
interest. Secondly there is the professional ethic requiring collegial loyalty, with codes 
of ethics often stressing responsibility to the public over and above duties to colleagues 
and clients. Thirdly there is the fear of retaliation (Bok 1980). Another writer refers to 
ethical tension points (ETP's) in whistleblowing, and distinguishes procedural ETP's, 
such as does the whistleblower have low tolerance for shortcomings, and how often 
and with what intensity does one blow the whistle, and the more agonizing substantive 
ETP's, which are one's obligation to the organization, colleagues, the profession, 
one's family, oneself, the general public, and to strengthening basic values, such as
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truth, independence, fairness, co-operation and loyalty. (Jenson 1987)
Richard T De George (1986) has suggested three conditions which may turn 
whistleblowing from being an act of disloyalty, damaging an organization, to being 
morally justifiable:
1. The firm, through its product or policy, will do serious and considerable harm to 
the public, whether in the person of the user of its product, an innocent bystander, or 
the general public.
2. The matter should be reported to the immediate superior and the moral concern 
made known. v
3. If no action results, the employee should exhaust internal procedures and 
possibilities. This usually involves taking the matter up the managerial ladder, and, if 
necessary and possible, to the board of directors. .
In James' (1994) analysis, that relies heavily on De George, the following list of 
considerations is provided : • *
. ‘' f  f
1. Make sure that the situation is one that warrants whistleblowing.
,2.  Examine your motives
3. Verify and document your information
4. Determine the type of wrong-doing involved and to whom it should be reported
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5. State your allegations in an appropriate way.
'  .
6. Stick to the facts
7. Decide whether the whistleblowing should be internal or external
8. Decide whether the whistleblowing should be open or anonymous
9. Decide whether current or alumni whistleblowing is required
10. Make sure you follow proper guidelines in reporting the wrong-doing
11. Consult a lawyer
12. Anticipate retaliation.
Under point 9, some blow the whistle after they have left their organisation ('alumni 
whistleblowing') to avoid direct recrimination, and in the knowledge that the law 
relating to employee confidentiality of company practices and procedures is often 
impractical to enforce on ex-employees, even if there were not a public interest defence.
Some of the problems of the over-ready countenancing of whistleblowing have been 
outlined by Alan Westin (1981):
1. Not all whistleblowers are correct in what they allege to be the facts of 
management's conduct, and determining the accuracy of charges is not always easy.
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2. There is the danger that incompetent or inadequately performing employees will 
whistleblow to avoid facing justified personnel sanctions.
3. Employees can choose some ways of whistleblowing that would be unacceptably 
disruptive, regardless of the merits of their protest.
4. Some whistleblowers are not protesting unlawful or unsafe behaviour but social 
policies by management that the employee considers unwise.
5. The legal definitions of what constitutes a safe product, danger to health, or 
improper treatment of employees are often far from clear or certain.
6. The efficiency and flexibility of personal administration could be threatened by the 
creation of legal rights to dissent and legalized review systems.
7. There can be risks to the desirable autonomy of the private sector in expanding 
government authority too deeply into internal business politics.
An example of the equivalent of the vexatious litigant in organisational terms has been 
referred to in the US context as the troubling employee (Ripley and Ripley 1993). 
These are employees who have entered into an "I'm entitled" mental set through Equal 
Opportunities legislation. Affirmative Action, Supreme Court decisions and other 
special interest perpetuations originally initiated for defensible, idealistic, human 
reasons. Such individuals are, Ripley and Ripley argue, at an arrested development 
level of business maturity behaviour, and expect advancement on the basis of their 
special privilege rather than through merit. It is possible to help such individuals to
133
grow up and mature with training and a suitable organisational environment. Although 
the authors do not make this connection, it is a logical deduction that the potential for 
troubling employees to become whistleblowers is much higher than the average.
The Government Accountability Project has produced a useful and realistic survival 
guide for whistleblowers which suggests that: " A well-planned strategy has a chance 
of succeeding, but unplanned or self-indulgent dissent is the path to professional 
suicide." (Devin, Rasor and Stewart 1989) The problems of reaching an ethical balance 
sheet are well rehearsed in the extended case study of the Bay Area Rapid Transit in 
San Francisco (Anderson et al 1980). The authors could have presented either the three 
whistleblowing engineers or the BART organization in various shades of purity or 
chicanery, but find it unrealistic to do so. They do point out that there was far from 
overwhelming public support for the idea of BART, and that there was considerable 
public relations initiative, as seen by the appointment in 1963 of B R Stokes, a former 
newspaperman and BART'S first public relations director, as general manager. 
Management had to work with a politically fragmented and, therefore, relatively 
ineffective Board, and so moved by default into the power vacuum. Relations with the 
relatively small number of in-house engineers were far from satisfactory. They could 
observe all the problems, but had little power to intervene. Whether the matters over 
which they went public were trivial or material is less significant than that in the 
political rough-and-tumble of organizations such conflicts are bound to happen.
Apart from considering procedural and substantive ethical codes for individual 
whistleblowers, it is also vital to find reciprocation of organizations being prepared to 
act positively towards ethical whistleblowers. In the US organizations such as the 
Government Accountability Project have been attempting to protect the rights of 
legitimate whistleblowers (Devin, Rasor and Stewart 1989). In many cases this may be
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a last port of call. One needs to have procedures at organizational level. Corporate 
codes of conduct will often be a formal safeguard, and that of J C Penney Company 
Inc. goes into considerable detail. (Cangemi and Brown 1989). On the professional 
side the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales issued, in December 
1990, Guidance for Members in Business, and this certainly recognizes the possibility 
of whistleblowing. The establishment of the Chartered Accountants Advisory Service 
on Ethics (CAASE) in January 1991 to supplement the existing advisory service for 
members in business, IMACE, is another significant development. This may be 
contrasted with the statement in 1984 that, except in accountancy firms, when the 
position of an employer is challenged, " the institutional structure of the various 
professional associations can provide little or no protection to the individual." (Loeb 
1984, 6) Counselling is a help, but once the act of whistleblowing has taken place, the 
professional associations are in no stronger position than at that time. The Chartered 
Association of Certified Accountants has issued helpful advice on whistleblowing:
"Whistleblowing involves a breach of trust by an employee and cannot therefore be 
justified on a strict interpretation of what constitutes proper professional conduct'. In 
normal circumstances the course of action advisable for a member, if faced with action 
which is deemed to be ethically unacceptable, is to follow a series of steps:
(a) Bring the matter before the superior, except where the superior is involved, in 
which case the matter should go to the next level up. If there is no satisfactory 
outcome, go to the next managerial level up.
(b) If the superior is the Chief Executive, go to a relevant authority such as the Board, 
the Audit Committee or the owner(s). Unless the superior is involved, such 
consultation should be with the superior's knowledge.
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(c) If the matter is unsolved after (a) or (b) above, a member may have no alternative 
but to resign, putting the matter in writing for the record.
If in doubt, established procedures should be followed first and at any stage a member 
should feel free to consult the Association's Legal Department or take other advice.
The difficult issue in this area is where resignation does not appear to be enough of a 
remedy and where there is criminal action by the directors. Whilst public disclosure 
might be justified in the public interest, no definition of "public interest" has ever been 
given by the courts and a member is not therefore offered protection on precise legal 
terms. Nor have whistleblowers been generally well- regarded by existing fellow- 
employees or future employers. With such a wholly unsatisfactory degree of 
protection, a member will have to make a judgement about whether, having consulted 
the Association's Legal Department, taken legal advice and bearing in mind all the 
personal and other considerations and risks, the drastic step of public disclosure can be 
justified." (Likierman and Taylor 1990).
One is reminded of the northbound train dilemma according to which a person wants to 
go south, but is on a northbound train. There are three choices;
1. To consider that the north is not such a bad destination after all.
2. To alight from the train and find some other way of travelling south.
3. Attempt to have the train change direction.
The Stonefrost Committee in 1990 reported on the workings of the Honours system, 
and even suggested that whistleblowers might be included in the Honours List 
(Stonefrost 1990). "As to whistleblowing', we all regarded this as an important part 
of citizenship. We had no special problems with this issue as an element of citizenship
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although if there was too much 'whistleblowing' its effective value could be drowned 
by the noise." (Personal Communication, Maurice F Stonefrost, 21 September 1990). 
The final development is the possibility of an arbitration and advisory scheme just for 
whistleblowers. : This would expect to encourage the use of corporate codes of 
conduct. Interestingly, Guardian Royal Exchange, with its experience of 
whistleblowing tax accountant Charles Robertson, has agreed to participate in the 
scheme. Hopefully in the future this will go some way to minimizing the casualty rate.
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CHAPTER 13. CONCLUSION.
The external auditor is attracting a duty and right to whistleblow in certain 
circumstances. No such duty exists in the case of internal auditors, and any rights are 
those arising in general employment and civil law, rather than emanating from any 
professional code. Indeed, internal audit professional proclamations about 
whistleblowing are negative, warning about the consequences and virtually requiring 
the internal auditor to resign his or her job. The reason for the difference may be based 
on the observation that whistleblowers who are relatively powerful ( that is, less 
dependent on the organisation) are expected to suffer less retaliation (Near and Miceli 
1986, 137). An experiment involving the prediction-task judgements of 106 internal 
auditors from the public and private sector, found internal auditors much less likely to 
whistleblow than external auditors (Arnold and Ponemon 1991).
The internal auditor, qua participant observer, and through involvement in social, 
business ethical, and environmental audits, is in a better situation than the external 
auditor to scrutinise an organisation's ethical stance across the totality of the 
organisation's involvements. This presents many more opportunities for ethical 
dilemmas. Most should be resolved internally, and to this end it is recommended that 
organisations formulate codes of ethics, which will clarify what is expected when 
wrongdoing is uncovered. Legal protections need to be regarded as residual, since they 
will only be brought into place when all else has failed, and the prognosis is less than 
optimal. What legal remedies there are are unsatisfactory, and full of uncertainty.
Whistleblowing should always be the exception rather than the rule, but the 
disappointment is the failure of the IIA to be able to support whistleblowing in any 
shape or form, including the situations outlined in the internal audit case studies and the
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general case-studies. These are cases in which the public interest should be paramount, 
yet the IIA considers that the whistleblower is on their own. This position is reactionary 
and lacking in both moral integrity and the realism of the situations confronting their 
members. Other professional bodies, such as the Chartered Institute of Secretaries and 
the Royal College of Nursing, are much more open to help their members, and the 
chartered accountancy bodies are also providing constructive advice services, in the 
case of the Chartered Association of Certified Accountants including employing a 
barrister full time.
Corporate governance is another angle that is relevant. With suitable corporate 
governance, whistleblowing should be rendered even more rarely necessary. 
Corporate governance has been sadly lacking in quality in the past, and continues to 
give rise to concern, despite attempts at reform. The Cadbury Committee was the^  latest 
in a series of committees to consider the matter. The voluntary principle so beloved in 
this country is fine if it works, and if business ethics may be assumed to be at a 
tolerable level. However we may have just passed the point at which this argument may 
be sustained. Sir Brandon Rhys Williams' life-long crusade to make an audit committee 
compulsory for all large companies is a measure that needs to be given all party 
support, and legislation introduced as quickly as possible. Non-executive directors 
should predominate on such committees, and there should be a clear mandate to 
safeguard the interests of not only shareholders, but also customers, creditors, 
employees and other involved parties. Why, after all, should this happen in the case of 
corporate insolvency, but not prior to the failure of a company, by which time it is 
invariably too late? Prevention is far preferable to disaster.
Another matter to consider is the selection and training of directors, particularly the 
non-executive ones. The old boys' network in our class-ridden society equally has
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served well at producing Russian spies! Colin St Johnston, Managing Director of PRO 
NED (Promotion of Non-Executive Directors), has indicated to me that the basis of 
selection is on too narrow a front, and that "This shuts off a great many people who 
have had successful careers and who have a great deal to contribute". The Institute of 
Directors has performed a sterling service in the training of directors. Perhaps the HA 
could play a role here corresponding to the positive contribution played by the IIA on 
the Treadway Committee in the U.S., the findings of which are extremely relevant to 
the current discussion.
Radical suggestions are as follows. Where an organization is in an area where there is 
considerable public exposure and concern, such as banks, building societies, and 
insurance companies, not only should an audit committee be compulsory, but also the 
existence of a viable internal audit department, which would have to prove conformance 
to a recognised set of standards. External audit should be legally required to report on 
the extent to which internal audit is of adequate quality to assist them in their own 
work. Moreover they should now be mandated to report to the appropriate regulatory 
body in the public interest any serious illegality or dubious practice as soon as they 
encounter it, and a similar obligation should be placed on the internal auditor, together 
with safeguards as to the anonymity of informants. Only corrupt organizations have 
anything to fear from this. In reputable organizations much of this is already custom 
and practice. A closer reporting relationship between internal and external audit has 
long been a characteristic of the public sector.
Too many people are suffering too frequently from the small but highly significant 
number of rogue companies and rogue directors. For too long these criminals have 
been able to count on being aided and abetted by their auditors. It is now time for 
auditors to consider that attribute of a profession most neglected by them: responsibility
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to the public. As the IIA celebrates beyond its 50th anniversary it is instructive to 
remember that included in the first ever research programme was the relationship of the 
internal auditor to the public. No such research materialised. The present would be a 
suitable opportunity to resurrect this topic.
Whistleblowers may never have it easy. Career mortality and occupational morbidity 
should be maintained at the lowest possible level. Positive whistleblowing should be 
recognised as in the general good. It is to be hoped that the IIA will recognize that it is 
swimming against the stream, and that the reactionary but honestly held attitudes of the 
like of Gil Courtemanche will increasingly become anachronistic. The increase in the 
teaching of business ethics should also improve the quality of debate and action. The 
HA should institute a special award for those of its members who blow the whistle, and 
publicise them as an inspiration to all, rather than as individuals to be side-stepped and 
to be ashamed of.
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APPENDIX 1.
The Institute of Internal Auditors Professional Issues Committee
IIA POSITION PAPER ON WHISTLEBLOWING
Whistleblowing - The unauthorised dissemination by internal auditors of audit results, 
findings , opinions, or information acquired in the course of performing their duties to 
anyone outside the organisation or to the general public.
The Institute of Internal Auditors' (IIA) Code of Ethics and standards for the 
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing provide internal auditors with sufficient 
mechanisms for the reporting of audit results, findings, opinions or information 
acquired in the course of performing their duties, without their bringing such matters to 
the attention of persons outside the organisation. This reporting may involve violations 
of law, rules, or regulations, or damage to public health or safety.
Such mechanisms include reporting to the appropriate level of management, the audit 
committee of the board of directors (or its equivalent), or the board of directors as may 
be appropriate. Implicit in this process is the resolution of problems and improvement 
of internal controls. Accordingly, The IIA believes that for organisations with internal 
audit functions that adhere to the standards and Code of Ethics of The HA and that are 
headed by an audit conunittee, there should be no need to report in an unauthorised 
manner to anyone outside the organisation.
The HA maintains a Professional Standards Conunittee to assure that The Institute's
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Standards and Code o f Ethics provide the internal audit professional with guidelines 
and support for dealing with all issues that confront its members. Reporting to the 
Board of directors satisfies the requirements of the professional Standards.
Some internal auditors, however, may not be afforded a means to deal appropriately 
with findings that involve violations of law, rules, or regulations, or damage to public 
health or safety. Internal auditors may find resolving such matters difficult if they do 
not have access to an audit committee comprised solely of independent directors with a 
written charter setting forth the duties and responsibilities of the committee, and with 
the adequate resources and authority to discharge committee responsibilities. Also, the 
problems may be compounded if the internal audit organisations are not independent 
when they carry out their work and do not have organisational status sufficient to 
permit the accomplishment of their audit responsibilities in accordance with IIA 
Standards. In such situations, the auditor is obligated by The HA Standards and Code 
of Ethics to report through the normal channels and ultimately, if necessary, to the 
board of directors; and to ensure that the matter is resolved satisfactorily within a 
reasonable period of time.
If the matter is not resolved satisfactorily, or the auditor is terminated or subject to other 
, retaliation, the auditor should secure the advice of outside counsel regarding further 
action.
This position paper is not to be interpreted to restrict any internal auditor from 
exercising rights granted to him or her any state whistleblowing statue or any 
comparable federal law or rule.
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APPENDIX 2.
CODE OF ETHICS, INSTITUTE OF INTERNAL AUDITORS.
Purpose
A distinguishing mark of a profession is acceptance by its members of responsibility to 
the interests of those it serves. Members of The Institute of Internal Auditors 
(Members) must maintain high standards of conduct to effectively discharge this 
responsibility. The Institute of Internal Auditors (The Institute) adopts this Code of 
Ethics for Members.
Applicability
This Code of Ethics is applicable to all Members. Membership of the Institute is a 
voluntary action. By acceptance. Members assume an obligation of self-discipline 
above and beyond the requirements of laws and regulations.
The standards of conduct set forth in this Code of Ethics provide basic principles in 
the practice of internal auditing. Members should realise that their individual judgement 
is required in the application of these principles.
Members who are judged by the Council of The Institute to be in violation of the 
standards of conduct of the Code of Ethics shall be subject to forfeiture of the their 
membership in The Institute.
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Standards of Conduct
i. Members shall exercise honestly, objectively and diligence in the performance of 
their duties and responsibilities.
ii. Members shall exhibit loyalty in all matters pertaining to the affairs of their 
organisation or to whomever they may be rendering a service. However, Members 
shall not knowingly be a party to any illegal or improper activity.
iii. Members shall not knowingly engage in acts or activities which are discreditable to 
the profession of internal auditing or to their organisation.
iv. Members shall refrain from entering into any activity which may be in conflict with 
the interest of their organisation or which would prejudice their ability to carry out
, objectively their duties and responsibilities.
V. Members shall not accept anything of value from an employee, client, customer, 
supplier or business associate of their organisation which would impair or be presumed 
to impair their professional judgement.
vi. Members shall undertake only those services which they can reasonably expect to 
complete with professional competence.
vii. Members shall adopt suitable means to comply with The Standards for
the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
viii. Members shall be prudent in the use of information acquired in the course of
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their duties. They shall not use confidential information for any personal gain nor in 
any manner which would be contrary to law or detrimental to the welfare of their 
organisation.
ix. Members, when reporting on the results of their work, shall reveal all material facts 
known to them which, if not revealed, could either distort reports of operations under 
review or conceal unlawful practices.
X.  Members shall continually strive for improvement in the proficiency, effectiveness 
and quality of their service.
xi. Members, in the practice of their profession, shall be ever mindful of their 
obligation to maintain the high standards of competence, morality and dignity 
promulgated by The Institute. Members shall abide by the Articles and uphold the 
objectives of The Institute.
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APPENDIX 3.
CASE LIST ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 
KEY CASES SUMMARISED
The contract of employment
Post Office V Roberts 1989 EAT: Mr Justice Talbot asserted : "But in each 
case, in our view, you have to look at the conduct of the party whose behaviour is 
challenged and determine whether it is such that its effect is to disable the other party 
from properly carrying out his or her obligations. I f  it is so found that this is the result, 
then it may be that a tribunal could find repudiation of a contract. "
Duty of mutual trust
Thornley v A ircraft Research Association Ltd 1977 EAT 669/76: The
Employment Appeal Tribunal ruled that Thomley's publishing of his research findings 
on the Tornado aircraft in a letter to THE GUARDIAN justified his dismissal because 
he had signed an undertaking not to disclose the results of the research. He was guilty 
of a 'breach of trust to his employers’ and this constituted misconduct regardless of his 
motives or the accuracy of the disclosures.
Woods V W.M. Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd 1982 ICR 693 CA:
The Employment Appeal Tribunal rejoined "In our view it is clearly established that 
there is implied in a contract of employment a term that the employers will not, without 
reasonable and proper cause, conduct themselves in a manner calculated or likely to 
destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer 
and employee.... ' In the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning ruled, 'Just as a servant must
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he good and faithful, so an employer must be good and considerate.
'  I
Smith V Youth Hostels Association (England and Wales) 1980 IT:
This probed both the implied term of mutual trust and the duty of the employer to 
support employees in carrying out their jobs. Smith acted as a storeroom supervisor. 
He reported a systematic loss of stock, and was pressured by the managers to conceal 
it. When he eventually became ill with the stress, he was threatened with dismissal for 
his continuing absence, and his job was advertised. He resigned, claiming constructive 
and unfair dismissal. The industrial tribunal agreed, "Not only were the respondents in 
breach of his contract by making it impossible for Mr. Smith effectively to carry out his 
job,..we also considered that their attitude was such as to be a breach of the implied 
term in any contract o f employment that there should be a relationship o f trust or 
confidence between the parties'.
; . . . . . ' ' . »
Bliss V SE Thames Regional Health Authority 1985 IRLR 308, CA:
. in this wrongful dismissal case. Lord Justice Dillon indicated that there was now ample 
authority to warrant the implication of a term in employment contracts that a party 
"would not without reasonable cause conduct itself in a manner likely to damage or 
destroy the relationship o f confidence or trust between parties as employer and 
employee. ? . .
Duty of reasonable support
Wigan Borough Council v Davies 1979 ICR 411:
The Employment Appeal Tribunal accepted that there was an implied term that 
employers would take such steps as were reasonable to support an employee in 
carrying out duties without harassment or disruption. Here, the breach of duty derived
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from Wigan Borough Council’s failure to give proper support to a junior manager in an 
old people's home who had been 'sent to Coventry' by other staff.
Adams v Southampton & S W Hants Health Authority COIT 1560/156:
A hospital contravened the implied term of reasonable support by its inability to take 
proper steps to protect an employee who was abused and harassed to the verge of 
leaving after she had continued to work normally during a strike. This implied duty 
was affirmed in the case of the London Borough of Islington v Richards EAT 
649/86.
Callanan v Surrey Area Health Authority 1980 IT:
Callanan was a student nurse at a psychiatric hospital. He penned a confidential letter to 
the hospital nursing officer about a senior charge nurse assaulting patients and giving 
overdoses of drugs. An investigation began and the charge nurse and colleagues 
refused to work with Callanan. Moreover he was turned away by management when 
reporting for duty. Expulsion from the Confederation of Health Service Employees 
then resulted, and the hospital's management committee dictated that he should not 
return to work, but rather return to nursing school, which would not count towards his 
training time. He resigned and claimed constructive and unfair dismissal. This was 
upheld and compensation awarded.
Robinson v Crompton Ltd 1978 ICR 401:
The duty to support rules out the making of unjustified accusations against the 
employee.
C arter v Arnold & Golding COIT 1729/193:
The duty to support prevents thoughtless or indiscreet behaviour in relation to the
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employee.
Ferguson v Henry Wigfall & Son Ltd COIT 1550/141:
The duty to support dictates against undermining the authority of the employee, 
particularly if he/she is working in a supervisory capacity.
Duty to provide safe and healthy working conditions
British Aircraft Corporation v Austin 1978 IRLR 332 EAT:
The Employment Appeal Tribunal ruled that the employer's general duty to take 
reasonable care for the safety of employees prompted a specific obligation to investigate 
promptly complaints of lack of personal or public safety raised by employees. Austin 
resigned and was able to claim constructive and unfair dismissal because her complaint 
of failure to provide her with suitable safety goggles was not investigated or remedied 
during the passage of many months.
Unlawful acts
Morrish v Henly's (Folkestone) Ltd 1973 (ICR 482):
Thé National Industrial Relations Court (EAT's predecessor) found that dismissing an 
employee for refusal to connive in the falsification of company records over drawing 
petrol for a van was unfair.
Donnelly v Renilson & Co (colt 1414/143):
Donnelly resigned to avoid driving untaxed vehicles. An industrial tribunal held this 
was unfair dismissal.
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Craig V Engine Applications 1978 EAT:
Craig, an export clerk, made an untrue declaration to customs at his employer's behest. 
The next occasion, he reported his employers to Customs & Excise, but that application 
was never processed. He resigned over a third irregularity two months later, claiming 
constructive and unfair dismissal. The tribunal rejected his claims since he had been a 
willing participant in the first act, and then had not resigned immediately he had made 
the report on his employers.
Sybron Corporation v Rochem Ltd 1983, IRLR 253 and 2 All ER 707 
CA:
The Court ruled that the manager for European affairs of an American financial 
conglomerate had been under an implied contractual duty to report to his employers the 
complicity of some of his fellow employees in a massive commercial fraud upon his 
employers. Evidence showed he had been aware of it. The court held that, "He may be 
so placed in the hierarchy as to have a duty to report either the misconduct o f his 
superior.... or the misconduct of his inferiors'.
Cooper V Plessy Semi - conductors 1983 IT:
A foreman was fairly dismissed for failing to report to supervisors misconduct of 
employees who were sleeping on the night shifts. The chair of the tribunal stated: 
" ...These three men were in a position o f trust. They should have come to management 
at the earliest time to say this sort o f thing was going on and sought guidance how to 
deal with it'.
Canning v GLC 1980 IRLR 378 EAT:
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Canning, a housing officer, asked the Greater London Council to investigate an outside 
contractor who was submitting fraudulent paperwork. When no action was taken, he 
quit, claiming constructive and unfair dismissal. This was denied. The tribunal opined 
that whilst there is an implied term in the contract of employment that employers will 
behave honourably in business dealings, it is not broken in cases where employers 
'innocently' fail to investigate allegations of irregularities.
Duty of confidence
Disclosure of information in the public interest
Initial Services Ltd v Putterill 1968 1 QB 396:
Putterill resigned as sales manager just before handing documents to the DAILY MAIL 
concerning unlawful price fixing. His employers brought an action for breach of 
confidence. In ruling that prevention of disclosure would be contrary to the public 
interest. Lord Denning held that the public interest exception to the duty of confidence 
extends to "any misconduct o f such a nature that it ought to be disclosed to others.... 
The exception should extend to crimes, frauds and misdeeds, both those actually 
committed as well as those in contemplation'.
Hubbard v Vosper 1972 2 QB 84:
When an interlocutory injunction was sought to stop publication of a book about the 
Church of Scientology, Lord Denning added to the list of activities which may be in 
the public interest, the disclosure of activities that are "dangerous to members o f the 
public'.
Dunford and Elliott Ltd v Johnson and Firth Brown Ltd 1977 1 Lloyds
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Rep. 505: *
A report designated as confidential was passed to the defendants, who made use of the 
confidential information. Lord Denning considered that the courts will not enforce 
confidentiality in cases where the bounds of confidentiality are drawn wider than is 
reasonable, or if .keeping information confidential would be contrary to the public 
interest, or if there is just cause for its disclosure.
Limits on a public interest defence to actions for 
' breach of confidence
Beloff V Pressdam Ltd 1973 1 All ER 241:
Mr Justice Ungeod - Thomas asserted, '  public interest, as now recognised by
law, does not extend beyond misdeeds o f a serious nature and importance to the 
country and thus, in my view, clearly recognisable as such’. The court had rejected a 
public interest defence to breach of copyright over publication by the defendants of 
speculation about the identity of a possible successor to Prime Minister Edward Heath.
Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Times Newspapers Ltd 1975 1 QB 
613:
The Distillers Company applied for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the Times 
Newspapers Ltd from publishing confidential documents indicating possible negligence 
by the company over the drug thalidomide. In rejecting a public interest defence of 
disclosure, Mr Justice Talbot commented: "There is here no crime or fraud or misdeed 
on the part o f the plaintiffs, and in my view negligence, even if  it could be proved, 
could not be within the same class so as to constitute an exception to the need to protect 
confidentiality’.
180
Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans 1984 3 WLR 539:
The Court of Appeal held that the public interest defence was not limited to situations 
where there had been serious wrongdoing by the plaintiff, but would extend to 
situations where the public had a serious and legitimate interest in the revelation.
Restrictions on obtaining and receiving information
Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Times Newspapers Ltd:
Mr Justice Talbot permitted an injunction against publication of documents obtained 
during the discovery process for judicial proceedings. He ruled, "....the defendants 
have not persuaded me that such use .... is of greater advantage to the public than the 
public’s interest in the need for the proper administration o f justice, to protect the 
confidentiality of discovery of documents’. However, in Lion Laboratories Ltd v 
Evans below, the information disclosed was considered to be sufficiently important to 
justify the unlawful means obtained and the "flagrant breach o f confidence'.
Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner 1979 2 WLR 700:
The court admitted that there may be a defence of just cause where although 
information (here obtained through telephone tapping) in the event is entirely innocent, 
there had been reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.
Francome v M irror Group Newspapers Ltd 1984 WLR 892:
The court rejected a public interest defence to an injunction which prevented the DAILY 
MIRROR from publishing allegations that Francome had breached the rules of racing, 
a national newspaper not being an appropriate recipient of such information.
Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans 1984 3 WLR 539:
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Lord Justice Stephenson held "there is confidential information which the public may 
have a right to receive (in this case the potential inaccuracy of the Intoximeter 3000, a 
device being used as evidence in court) and which others, in particular the press (now 
extended to the media) may have a right and even a duty to publish, even if the 
information has been unlawfully obtained in flagrant breach o f confidence and 
irrespective of the motive of the informer'.
In a case heard in the High Court, Chancery Division, in which the plaintiff and the 
defendant were not allowed to be named, IRLR 447 1989, Mr Justice Scott dictated 
that the defendant's duty of confidence arising from his employment did not extend so 
as to rule out disclosure to the Financial Investment Management and Brokers' 
Regulatory Authority (FIMBRA) and the Inland Revenue, provided that the disclosures 
were within the prerogative of those authorities to investigate. The defendant, as a 
former employee and former compliance officer, had been prevented by an injunction 
from passing the confidential documents of the plaintiffs , who were investment 
advisers and managers, to these bodies.
Victim isation
Kirby v Manpower Services Commission 1980 1 WLR 725:
Kirby worked at a job centre. When he informed the local Council for Community 
Relations that potential employers registered with the job centre were discriminating 
against non-white applicants, he was demoted. He appealed to an industrial tribunal 
under the Race Relations Act, but the tribunal dismissed the appeal, holding that Kirby 
was not treated less favourably than any other employee would have been who 
disclosed information to an outside body. The Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld 
this decision.
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Wild and Joseph v Stephens and David Clulow Ltd 1980 COIT 1031/35:
Wild, personnel manager at Clulow Ltd, complained first to a supervisor and then the 
managing director, when Joseph was moved because it was thought undesirable to 
have a black receptionist. When nothing happened, she complained to the Commission 
for Racial Equality. She was then offered demotion or redundancy. An industrial 
tribunal ruled that she had been victimised and unfairly dismissed against the provisions 
of the Race Relations Act. Taking a different line than the tribunal in the Kirby case. 
Sir Jocelyn Bodilly commented, .... we think that grammatically the words in those 
circumstances .... mean no more than reference to persons in the "discriminator's' 
employment in a comparable field of employment'.
Aziz V Trinity Street Taxis Ltd 1988 CA:
Disciplinary action was taken against Aziz because he made secret tape recordings to 
show racial discrimination. Both the EAT and the Court of Appeal held that anyone in 
those circumstances, i.e. making such recordings, whatever the motive, would have 
been treated in the same way. Therefore the less favourable treatment comparison to 
prove racial discrimination was not satisfied.
Compensation
Lifeguard Assurance Co Ltd v Zadrozny 1977 EAT:
The tribunal stated that compensatory awards are intended to make up financial loss 
arising from unfair dismissal, not to penalise employers, or to comfort the sacked 
employee. More recent decisions have expanded the scope of compensation to cover 
consequences of the dismissal other than pure loss of wages. Thus we have:
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Norton Tool Co v Tewson 1972 ICR 501:
Sir John Donaldson ruled, ... we need only consider whether the manner and 
circumstances of his dismissal could give rise to any risk of financial loss at a later 
stage, for example making him less acceptable to potential employers or exceptionally 
liable to selection for dismissal. The tribunal also stated that employees should not be 
compensated for injured feelings.
Alexander v Home Office 1988 CA:
The court observed that whilst general damages should not be given on the same basis 
as damages for defamation of character, if the employee had been brought into 'hatred, 
ridicule or contempt', this should be a factor in assessing damages.
NW Thames Regional Health Authority v Noone 1988 CA:
The Court of Appeal upheld a decision of less favourable treatment on racial grounds 
and awarded £3,000 specifically for injury to feelings.
Lawton v BOC Transhield Ltd 1987:
Lawton lost an action for compensation of this type because the court ruled that his 
employers had not been in breach of a duty of care. However, the court did not rule 
that such a duty of care could not arise in other circumstances.
Re - employment
O'Laoire v Jackel International Ltd CA 1989:
The court ruled that an order to reinstate under the Employment Protection 
(Consolidation) Act 1978 is only an enforceable through that Act. This means that the 
ultimate sanction available is a modest amount
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of "additional compensation'{iht maximum is rarely if ever given).
Morgan Electrical Carbon Ltd v Donne 1987 EAT:
The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that in fixing compensation for failure to comply 
with re-employment, tribunals must address the employer's conduct in not re- 
employing.
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